Case Comments by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 4
Spring 3-1-1956
Case Comments
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
This Index is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Case Comments, 13 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 28 (1956), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/
vol13/iss1/4
28 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII
CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EFFECT OF GRANT OF DETERMINABLE FEE WITH
POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER AS MEANS OF IMPOSING RACIAL RESTRIC-
TIONS ON LAND. [North Carolina]
Since the turn of the century racial restrictive convenants in deeds
had been used widely without serious opposition from the courts, until
the United States Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer' held such
covenants unenforceable by court action. It has been estimated that
in 1948, when this ruling was handed down, there were more than 2oo
cases on the dockets of state appellate courts involving privately im-
posed racial restrictions on real estate,2 and the Supreme Court's de-
cision naturally produced intense speculation as to methods of avoid-
ing its effect. Generally, however, subsequent attempts to circumvent
the "judicial enforcement" doctrine laid down in the Shelley case
have met with indifferent success in the courts. It is therefore signif-
icant that one recent effort to impose racial restrictions in a deed to
real estate without invoking "state action" in enforcement has been
sustained by the North Carolina Supreme Court in the case of
Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer.3
Though the United States Supreme Court, in a series of cases be-
ginning in 1917, determined with finality that legislation imposing
racial restrictions on the sale and use of real estate is repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment,4 there were only a few decisions prior to
1948 in which the effectiveness of private restrictions of this nature
was denied.5 The ancient common law policy in favor of the free
alienability of land was invoked against the covenants only sparing-
1334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161 (1948).
'Heard, Race and Residence: The Current Status of Racial Restrictive Coven-
ants (1948) 1 Baylor L. Rev. 2o.
'242 N. C. 31, 88 S. E. (2d) 114 (1955).
'Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 6o, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. ed. 149 (1917) (city ordi-
nance making it unlawful for a Negro to occupy a house in a block where the
majority of residents were white held violation of due process); Richmond v.
Deans, 281 U. S. 704, 50 S. Ct. 407, 74 L. ed. 1128 (1930); Harman v. Tyler, 273
U. S. 668, 47 S. Ct. 471, 71 L. ed. 831 (1927) (memoranda decisions decided on
the authority of Buchanan v. Warley).
'For a digested coverage of state court decisions on racial restrictions on real
estate prior to Shelley v. Kraemer, see McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation
by State Court Enforcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions
in Deeds is Unconstitutional (1945) 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5.
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ly,6 and other objections to their validity rarely met with success. 7
Over half a century before Shelley v. Kraemer, at a time when very
few courts had been faced with questions of racial restrictions, a judge
of a federal district court in California, in holding void a privately
imposed covenant restricting real estate against occupancy by Chinese,
declared prophetically: "It would be a very narrow construction of the
[Fourteenth] constitutional amendment.., to hold that, while state
and municipal legislatures are forbidden to discriminate against the
Chinese in their legislation, a citizen of the state may lawfully do so
by contract which the courts may enforce.... Any result inhibited by
the constitution can no more be accomplished by contract of indi-
vidual citizens than by legislation, and the courts should no more en-
force the one than the other."8 However, this foreshadowing of the
Shelley case doctrine went unheeded; subsequent decisions in both
state and federal courts either ignored 9 or distinguished it.10 During
O1n a few states restrictions which directly forbade the sale or transfer
of the land were held invalid as unlawful restraints on alienation. Los Angeles Invest-
ment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596, 9 A. L. R. 115 (1919); Porter v. Bar-
rett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N. W. 532, 42 A. L. R. 1267 (1925); White v. White, io8
W. Va. 128, 150 S. E. 531, 66 A. L. R. 518 (1929). But courts in the same states,
when faced with covenants forbidding the use or occupancy of the land by certain
racial groups, held them to be valid, Burkhardt v. Lofton, 63 Cal. App. (2d) 23o,
146 P. (2d) 720 (1944); Schulte v. Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213 N. W. 102 (1927).
7Some courts recognized that changed social conditions and population changes
in the immediate neighborhood in which the restricted property was located might
provide sufficient reason for denying enforcement. Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F. (2d)
23 (C. A. D. C. 1942); Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P. (2d) 496 (1932) (held
a racial restriction in the form of a condition subsequent to be ineffective because of
changed conditions in the neighborhood); Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo. 166, 44
S. W. (2d) 857 (1931) (granted removal of a racial restrictive covenant for the
same reason). But more often courts, even those recognizing the existence of a
"changed conditions" doctrine, found it not applicable to the case being considered.
E.g., Grady v. Garland, 89 F. (2d) 817 (C. A. D. C. 1937); Stone v. Jones, 66 Cal.
App. (2d) 264, 152 P. (2d) 19 (1944); Dooley v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 199
Ga. 353, 34 S. E. (2d) 522 (1945); Porter v. Johnson, 232 Mo. App. 1i5o, 115 S. W.
(2d) 529 (1938); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217 (1918).
General "public policy" considerations were also rarely invoked against racial
restrictions on real estate. "The responsibility of striking down the validity of
racial restrictions with respect to the use and occupancy of real property is one
which no court or judge should assume on the strength of individual theories as to
what constitutes the 'present' public policy on the subject or of personal belief
that the consequences would be for the general good." Burkhardt v. Lofton, 63
Cal. App. (2d) 230, 146 P. (2d) 720, 725 (1944). Cf. concurring opinion in Fairchild
v. Raines, 24 Cal. (2d) 8i8, 151 P. (2d) 260, 267 (1944); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich.
625, 188 N. W. 330, 38 A. L. R. 118o (1922).
8Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181, 182 (S. D. Cal. 1892) [italics supplied].
"The case was rarely cited by the courts. In Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis. 389, 3
N. W. (2d) 734 (1942) the court assumed that it had been overruled by Corrigan v.
Buckley, 271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. ed. 969 (1926). Constitutional objections
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this era, the United States Supreme Court formally considered the
question of individual contractual restrictions only in the case of
Corrigan v. Buckley," and there it was actually decided only that the
covenants themselves, being the product of purely individual action,
could not be struck down as unconstitutional. The question of the
state action involved in judicial enforcement of such covenants was not
properly raised by the pleadings.
Inasmuch as the law on this subject was widely regarded as com-
pletely settled,' 2 the Shelley case seemed to introduce an abrupt de-
parture in holding that it is a denial of "equal protection" under the
Fourteenth Amendment for a state court to grant specific performance
or injunctive relief to enforce a restrictive covenant among property
owners designed to prevent the use or occupancy of the property by
members of certain racial groups.' 3 The decision did not overrule
Corrigan v. Buckley,' 4 but limited it to its narrowest interpretation-
i.e., that agreements between private individuals are not, per se, sub-
ject to attack under the Fourteenth Amendment.15 In determining
to racial restrictive covenants on grounds that state court enforcement constitutes
a denial of "equal protection" or "due process" were expressly ruled against in
Burkhardt v. Lofton, 63 Cal. App. (2d) 23o, 146 P. (2d) 720 (1944); Northwest Civic
Association v. Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27 N. V. (2d) 36 (1947); Ridgway v.
Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 296 N. Y. Supp. 936 (1937).
"°Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N. W. 3o at 331, 38 A. L. R. iS8o at
1182 (1922) where the Gandolfo case was distinguished on grounds that it in-
volved a treaty with China. For a discussion of the effect of the United Nations
Charter on racial restrictions on real estate, see Kemp v. Rubin, S88 Misc. 31o,
69 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 68o (1947), rev'd on other grounds 298 N. Y. 59
o , 81 N. E. (2d)
325 (1948).
271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. ed. 969 (1926).
"However, most commentators on the subject voiced their opposition. For a
collection of citations to such comment as of 1948, see Barnett, Race-Restrictive
Covenants Restricted (1948) 28 Ore. L. Rev. 1, n. i. For one of the rare comments
supporting the constitutional validity of such restrictions, see Note (1947) 45 Mich.
L. Rev. 733, 741: "State action cannot properly be conceived of as extending beyond
its conscious policy and the policy in these facts ends with the enforcement of
contractual undertakings .... "
lsShelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. ed. 1161 (1948). This de-
cision reversed the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo.
814 , 198 S. W. (2d) 679 (1946). The Shelley case is discussed in Barnett, Race-Re-
strictive Covenants Restricted (1948) 28 Ore. L. Rev. s; Heard, Race and Residence:
The Current Status of Racial Restrictive Convenants (1948) s Baylor L. Rev. 2o;
Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases, [1948] Wis. L. Rev. 5o8; Ming, Racial Restric-
tions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases (1949) 16 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 203; Note (1949) 9 La. L. Rev. 394.
"271 U. S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 70 L. ed. 969 (1926).
""We conclude, therefore, that the restrictive agreements standing alone
cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the
Fourteenth Amendment." 334 U. S. x, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 842, 92 L. ed. 1161, ss8o
(1948). Cf. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. ed. 835 (1883).
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that "judicial enforcement" of these covenants is "state action" and
therefore within the purview of the Amendment, Chief Justice Vin-
son, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared: "It is clear that but
for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full
panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy
the properties in question without restraint. These are not cases, as
has been suggested, in which the States have merely abstained from
action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discriminations
as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which the States have made
available to such individuals the full coercive power of government
to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment
of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and
financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell."'16
Subsequent to this holding, state courts have uniformly refused to
grant equitable relief to enforce racial restrictive covenants. 17 However,
continuing effort to find a way to avoid the force of the Shelley de-
cision and to effectuate the intent of the convenanting parties was
reflected in decisions soon handed down in two states. In 1949 the
Missouri court, interpreting the Shelley case as precluding only
equitable relief, held that a damages action for breach of a racial
restrictive covenant could be constitutionally maintained.'8 In 1951
the Oklahoma court arrived at the same result on the theory that
there could be no racial discrimination involved in a damages action
where both parties to the covenant are white.19
But the availability of the damages'remedy was short lived. In
1952 the California court, in an exhaustive opinion in Barrows v.
Jackson,20 decided that to grant damages on a restrictive covenant
was an indirect enforcement of the covenant itself and hence forbidden
under the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer. The United States Supreme
Court, with Chief Justice Vinson vigorously dissenting, affirmed the
California decision, reasoning that "This court will not permit or
16334 U. S. i, 19, 68 S. Ct. 836, 845, 92 L. ed. 1161, 1183 (1948) [italics supplied].
17Coleman v. Stewart, 33 Cal. (2d) 703, 204 P. (2d) 7 (1949); Clayton v. Wilkins,
32 Cal. (2d) 892, 197 P. (2d) 162 (1948); Malicke v. Milan, 320 Mich. 65, 32 N. W. (2d)
353 (1948); Woytus v. Winkler, 357 Mo. 1082, 212 S. W. (2d) 411 (1948); Rich v.
Jones, 142 N. J. Eq. 215, 59 A. (2d) 839 (1948); Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N. Y. 590, 81
N. E. (2d) 325 (1948); Earley v. Baughman, 200 Okla. 649, 199 P. (2d) 210 (1948).
T hWeiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W. (2d) 127 (1949).
1 Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P. (2d) 1017 (1951). In two other jurisdic-
tions it was meanwhile decided that a damages action could not be constitutionally
maintained. Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D. C. D. C. 195o); Phillips v. Naff,
332 Mich. 389, 52 N. W. (2d) 158 (1952).
'112 Cal. App. (2d) 534, 247 P. (2d) 99 (1952), noted (1953) 38 Corn. L. Q. 236;
(1953) io Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 207.
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require California to coerce respondent to respond in damages for
failure to observe a restrictive covenant that this court would deny
California the right to enforce in equity....-21
With both legal and equitable relief to enforce racial restrictive
covenants having been adjudged unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court, Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Bar-
ringer22 came before the North Carolina Supreme Court for review.
The case arose out of a transaction originating in 1929, when de-
fendant Barringer conveyed as a gift to plaintiff Park Commission, a
municipal corporation, a parcel of land to become part of a park area.
The deed provided that the property was to be "used and maintained
for park, playground and/or recreational purposes, for use by the white
race only," and further it was stated that if the property were not so
used, "the lands hereby conveyed shall revert in fee simple to the said
[grantor], his heirs or assigns....-23 A park was established and a golf
course constructed therein, which was open only to members of the
white race. In 1951 a group of Negroes, asserting that their constitu-
tional rights were being infringed by their being barred from the
public park, petitioned to be allowed to use the golf course. Plaintiff,
stating that it "does not desire to deprive any of its citizens of their
legal rights, nor.., to lose by reverter any of the properties entrusted
to it," initiated this action for a declaratory judgment "to obtain a
judicial determination of the effect of allowing Negroes to use the
golf course .... -24 The trial court held that "the admission of Negroes
to play golf will cause the reverter provisions in said deeds im-
mediately to become operative, and title to revert."
25
"Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 258, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 1036, 97 L. ed. 1586,
1596 (1953). Chief Justice Vinson in his dissent pointed out that no "non-Caucasian"
was before the court; that in fact the only non-Caucasians involved in any way
were already in undisputed, possession of the property. He concluded: "... .I cannot
see how respondent can avail herself of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of total
strangers ... " 346 U. S. 249, 269, 7.3 S. Ct. 1031, 1041, 97 L. ed. 1586, 16o2 (1953).
2242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. (2d) 114 (1955), noted (1955) 34 N. C. L. Rev. 113, cert.
den. Mar. 5, 1956, Leeper v. Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission, 24 U. S. L.
Wk. 3232.
2"... provided, however, that before said lands, in any such event, shall re-
vert ... and as a condition precedent to the reversion ... the said [grantor), his heirs
or assigns, shall pay unto the party of the second part or its successors the sum
of thirty-five hundred dollars ($3500)." 242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. (2d) 114, 117 (1955)
[italics supplied].
24242 N. C. 311, 88 S.E. (2d) 114, 118 (1955). The Park Commission joined as
defendants this grantor as well as the grantors in two other similar deeds, and
also the Negroes who had petitioned to be allowed to use the golf course located in
the park.
2242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. (2d) 114, 119 (1955).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently unanimously
affirmed the decision. After reviewing some of the cases and authorities
on the general subject of fees subject to forfeiture provisions, the court
decided that the Barringer deed, beyond doubt, had created in the
grantee Park Commission a "base"or "determinable" fee with a
possibility of reverter remaining in the grantor.2 6 Then, in a few lines,
the constitutional issue of the case was resolved: "It is a distinct
characteristic of a fee determinable upon limitation that the estate
automatically reverts at once on the occurrence of the event by which
it is limited, by virtue of the limitation in the written instrument
creating such fee, and the entire fee automatically ceases and de-
terminnes by its own limitations." The court pointed out that the
making of the conveyance with this provision could not of itself be
illegal, and concluded: "If Negroes use the... Golf Course, the de-
terminable fee conveyed to plaintiff by Barringer ... automatically
will cease and terminate by its own limitation expressed in the deed,
and the estate granted automatically will revert to Barringer.....,
27
Therefore, "The operation of this reversion provision is not by any
judicial enforcement of the State Courts of North Carolina, and
Shelley v. Kraemer has no application. We do not see how any rights
of appellants under the Fourteenth Amendment... are violated."
28
It would seem that one of the most immediate effects of this de-
cision is to place the Charlotte Park Commission in an untenable
position. In view of the rule of the recent United States Supreme Court
decision prohibiting the barring of Negroes from public parks in
Georgia and Maryland,29 the Park Commission, being a municipal
corporation, presumably cannot constitutionally continue to operate
the park on a segregated basis; but the principal decision will cause
-"In arriving at this conclusion the court cited some of the leading and recent
cases on the general subject of determinable fees: Connecticut Junior Republic
Association v. Litchfield, 119 Conn. io6, 174 At. 304, 95 A. L. R. 56 (1934); Brown
v. Independent Baptist Church of Wobrun, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N. E. (2d) 922 (1950);
First Universalist Society of North Adams v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N. E. 524.
15 L. R. A. 231 (1892); Smith v. School District No. 6 of Jefferson County, 250 S. W.
(2d) 795 (Mo. 1952); Hall v. Turner, no N. C. 292, 14 S. E. 791 (1892); Magness v.
Kerr, 121 Ore. 373, 254 Pac. 1012, 51 A. L. R. 1466 (1927).
"'The grantor must, of course, pay the sum stipulated in the deed. The court
did not consider the possibility that this proviso might be construed as nullifying
the reverter provision and creating merely an option to repurchase which might
be void under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Restatement, Property (1944) § 394,
comment c.
2242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. (2d) 114, 122 (1955) [italics supplied].
"nHolmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U. S. 878, 76 S. Ct. 141, 1oo L. ed. (advance p.
76) (1955); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U. S. 877, 76
S. Ct. 133, 1oo L. ed. (advance p. 75) (1955).
1956]
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the land to be lost to the Park Commission if it operates the park on
an integrated basis. And since the deed contained a provision for re-
verter if the land should cease to be used for "recreational purposes,"
apparently plaintiff cannot even close the park or put the land to
some other use without risking loss of the property. Thus, the re-
version of the property back to the grantor seems to be inevitable.3 0
However, the decision may have consequences much more far reach-
ing than the settling of the specific controversy before the court, for
it suggests a method by which private parties may readily circum-
vent the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer.31 It must be noted that this pro-
nouncement was made in the form of a declaratory judgment, which
has by its inherent nature no coercive effect on the parties. 2 There-
fore, it might be contended that the position taken by the North
Carolina court here does not constitute any state action to enforce
the discriminatory provision in the deed, particularly since it does not
necessarily indicate that the court would act on behalf of the grantor
if he were seeking court help in regaining possession of the land
after a breach of the condition by the grantee causing the fee to re-
vert. This limited interpretation of the decision finds some support
in the fact that nowhere in the opinion is there the least mention of
the obvious problem which would confront the grantor if the grantee
refused to surrender possession voluntarily after the violation of the
racial restriction. If, then, the North Carolina court intended to de-
cide only that such a reverter provision is effective insofar as the
parties to the deed willingly abide by it, there can probably be no
legitimate quarrel with the holding. The Shelley case recognized the
same effectiveness in racial restrictive covenants. As yet, the Fourteenth
Amendment has never been extended to include purely individual
conduct.38 However, such an interpretation would make the decision of
only slight legal significance, either to the parties actually now in-
3°"The defendant Barringer is ready, able and willing to pay the sum of
$3,500..." 242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. (2d) 114, 118 (1955).
"It was not entirely unforeseen that this method of circumvention might be uti-
lized. "Whether or not the courts could, under the constitutional principle an-
nounced in the Shelley Case, give effect to a limitation up~on the estate or title grant-
ed, if such limitation precluded transfer to persons of stated race or nationality, pre-
sents an interesting problem." Note (1949) 3 A. L. R. (2d) 466, 473 [italics original].
Other possible methods of avoiding the Shelley doctrine are pointed out in Note
(1953) 32 N. C. L. Rev. io6.
2... . it may be remarked that in form it [declaratory judgment] differs in
no essential respect from any other action; except that the prayer for relief does
not seek execution or performance from the defendant or opposing party." Bor-
chard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) 25. Declaratory judgments are author-
ized by statute in North Carolina. iA N. C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1953) § 1-253.
"Note 15, supra.
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volved or to parties subsequently becoming involved in similar contro-
versies.
34
It seems more likely that the North Carolina court intended to
hold that once the event on which a possibility of reverter depends
has occurred, the fee vests fully in the grantor, and, a fortiori, in any
subsequent action by or against the grantor, his standing will be the
same as that of any other legal owner of a fee. Thus, if he became the
plaintiff in an action of ejectment, his right to the possession of the
land would be based simply on his title to it, which title would have
vested in him prior to his bringing ejectment and purely as a result
of the deed itself, and not as a result of any court action. If this is
the meaning of the decision, and if it is allowed to stand, then the way
is open, by a simple exercise of draftsmanship, to give constitutional
validity to a racial restriction embodied in a deed to real estate and
thus completely to avoid the effect of the Shelley decision.
It cannot be denied that the analysis of the nature of a possibility
of reverter in the Barringer decision has a firm basis in property law. 5
It has long been settled in North Carolina and elsewhere that a
grantor of a fee simple may, by proper words in his deed, reserve to
himself a possibility of reverter, the possibility to materialize and the
reversion to vest automatically upon the happening of a stipulated
event, without any action either by the grantor or by a court.36 The
provision for reverter which is characteristic of a determinable fee
is a definite limitation upon the duration of the estate granted; it sets
a positive point beyond which that estate cannot endure; the grantor
has, in a sense, retained in himself a part of the totality of his original
ownership. As such, it differs from its near relative, the fee upon condi-
tion subsequent, which never determines until some affirmative action is
taken by the grantor, and thus may endure indefinitely even after breach
of the condition. If the grantee of a fee upon condition subsequent
breaches the condition, there arises in the grantor a "right of re-
entry" or "power of termination" which normally he must exercise
in a court action if the estate is to be terminated.37 Thus the "ju-
3SEven so interpreted, the decision might present a constitutional issue. Since
presumably a municipal corporation can no longer constitutionally operate a segre-
gated park (note 29, supra.), is it unconstitutional for a municipal corporation even
to become a party to a deed embodying a racial restriction? In other words, is the
North Carolina court justified in regarding the Park Commission as an "individual"?
mBut see note 27, supra.
"Hall v. Turner, sio N. C. 292, 14 S. E. 79, (1892); and authorities cited in
note 26, supra.
1On determinable fees and fees upon condition subsequent: i American Law
of Property (1952) §§4.6-4.15; 1 Simes, Future Interests (1951) § 12-13; 2 Tiffany,
Real Property (3rd ed. 1939) § 314.
While it is true that there is general agreement that a limitation in the form of
1956]
36 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII
dicial enforcement" doctrine of the Shelley case more clearly applies
to a racial restriction in the form of a condition subsequent than a
similar restriction in the form of a reverter provision. The concept
of a reverter provision is different also from that of a covenant such
as that involved in the Shelley case. A covenant of that sort is a servi-
tude imposed on the estate; if it is breached, the covenantee may
seek legal or equitable relief, but the estate of the covenantor does not
terminate by reason of the breach alone. The servitude imposed by
a covenant may be regarded as becoming a part of the land, but it
cannot accurately be regarded as limiting or defining the estate itself. A
covenantee-grantor of a fee simple does not retain in himself any part
of his original ownership; he grants all that he has.3 8
That it was the technical nature of a reverter provision which un-
derlay the conclusion reached by the North Carolina court in the
Barringer case is indicated by the language and authority included
in the opinion. In describing the Barringer deed and the estate thereby
granted, the court constantly and, it seems, pointedly emphasized that
the provisions in the deed were limitations, not merely conditions or
covenants.39 And later in the opinion the estate-like nature of the
grantor's possibility of reverter was stressed.40 The court obviously
a reverter provision may validly be imposed on a fee simple in favor of the grantor,
it cannot be said that all of the case law relating to the subject is crystal clear.
Courts often confuse reverter provisions and conditions subsequent. 19 Am. Jur.
58o. Language construed in one case to be a reverter provision may in another be
construed as a condition subsequent, a covenant, or merely an expression of de-
sire. Note (1951) 15 A. L. R. (2d) 976, 981 (dealing particularly with property con-
veyed to be used as a park.)
Several eminent authorities have argued that since the statute Quia Emptores,
determinable fees have become absolute fees. This argument is set forth and sup-
ported in Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) §§ 31 et seq., where,
however, it is pointed out that the possibility of reverter is widely recognized
and is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Gray's view is criticized in
Powell, Determinable Fees (1928) 23 Col. L. Rev. 207. It has been suggested that
both conditions subsequent and possibilities of reverter be abolished: Goldstein,
Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use
of Land (1940) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 248.
3On covenants as servitudes: 2 American Law of Property (1952) § 9.24; 14 Am.
Jur., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions §§ 192 et seq.
3"Barringer by clear and express words in his deed limited ... the estate
granted.... It seems plain that his intention, as expressed in his deed, was that
plaintiff should have the land as long as it was not used in breach of the limita-
tions of the grant, and, if such limitations, or any of them, were broken, the estate
should automatically revert to the grantor by virtue of the limitations of the deed.
In our opinion, Barringer conveyed to plaintiff a fee determinable upon special
limitations." 242 N. C. 811, 88 S. E. (2d) 114, 122 (1955).
..011.. to hold that the fee does not revert back to Barringer by virtue of the
limitation in the deed would be to deprive him of his property without adequate
compensation and due process .. " 114 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. (2d) 114, 123 (1955).
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regarded the limitations placed on the estate by Barringer as a legiti-
mate part of the "right to alienate" which is an "inherent element of
ownership,"'1 and not as mere contractual restrictions.
Thus the North Carolina decision does gain some support from tra-
ditional common law property concepts. However, the conclusion can
just as well be reached that the "limitation" on the estate is, in reality,
nothing more nor less than the old familiar racial restriction, differing
from the proscribed racial covenant only in that it is accompanied by
a stringent forfeiture provision imposed to encourage compliance.
42
Should the restriction be violated and the grantee refuse to surrender
possession voluntarily, it would of course be necessary for the grantor
to obtain court help to regain possession, and it seems likely that the
United States Supreme Court would classify that court help as "state
action" to enforce a racial restriction.4 3 In view of the policy behind
the Shelley case, the subsequent extension of the rule of that decision
in Barrows v. Jackson,44 and the present judicial attitude towards civil
rights in general and racial discrimination in particular, it is difficult to
believe that a rule such as that announced in the Barringer case will
long be permitted to stand.
ROBERT R. HUNTLEY
'1242 N. C. 311, 88 S. E. (2d) 114, 123 (1955).
'2To a court wishing, for any reason, to invalidate a possibility of reverter,
certain logical difficulties may arise. Note 40, supra. "What happens to the estate
of the grantee? ... In the case of the grant with a condition subsequent, once the
divesting contingency has been removed, the estate of the grantee has become inde-
feasible. It has not been enlarged, because he had originally received the entire in-
terest, subject, however, to the risk of losing it.... But to invalidate the possibility of
reverter implies the enlargement of the grantee's estate. At the time of the convey-
ance, he received something less that what the grantor had. Judicial fiat gives him
the rest." But the author concluded as to such reasoning: "Its principal ingredient,
however, is a heavy dose of nonesense." Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities
of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land (1940) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 248,
274 [italics supplied]. A condition subsequent thus seems easier to invalidate than
a possibility of reverter. Cf. Letteau v. Ellis, 122 Cal. App. 584, 1o P. (2d) 496 (1932).
In Clifton v. Puente, 218 S. W. (2d) 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) the court, when
faced with a provision similar to that in the Barringer case, followed Shelley v.
Kraemer and made no attempt to distinguish between reverter provisions and other
types of racial restrictions. The case is criticized in Note (1949) 28 Tex. L. Rev. iio
and analyzed in Groves, Judicial Interpretation of the Holdings of the United
States Supreme Court in the Restrictive Covenant Cases (195o) 45 Il1. L. Rev. 614,
621.
'3"State action" under the Fourteenth Amendment is discussed and defined
in Dorsey c. Styvesant Town Corporation, 299 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. (2d) 541 (1949),
cert. den. 339 U. S. 981, 70 S. Ct. 1019, 94 L. ed. 1385 (1950), noted (1948) 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 344, 349.
"346 U. S. 249, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. ed. 1586 (1953)-
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF FLUORIDATION OF PUBLIC WATER
SUPPLY AS EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH.
[Ohio]
Fluoridation of public water supplies for the prevention of dental
caries has caused bitter controversies in the field of public health dur-
ing the present decade.' The constitutional validity of municipal ordi-
nances providing for fluoridation has been litigated in the courts with
the same vehemence as has been displayed in arguing the safety and effi-
cacy of the measures before legislative bodies and in scientific journals.2
Though a number of different constitutional issues have been raised,
3
perhaps the most serious objection is that the treatment of the public
water supply interferes with freedom of religion as advocated by cer-
tain religious groups who oppose "medication."
In Kraus v. Cleveland,4 one of the latest of the water fluoridation
cases, the Ohio Supreme Court was called upon to strike a balance be-
tween the religious freedom of individuals and the authority of the
city to promote the public health. After holding the required public
hearings, the city of Cleveland adopted resolutions and ordinances pro-
viding for the fluoridation of the public water supply for the purpose of
preventing dental caries. Plaintiff brought a taxpayer's action to enjoin
expenditures of money by defendant city for such a purpose. The con-
tention was made that the ordinances were unconstitutional because
"Dental caries is, perhaps, the most widespread disease in existence, yet it has
commonly been accepted by the public as one of the incidents of life. Rhyne & Mul-
lin, Fluoridation of Municipal Water Supply-A Review of the Scientific and Legal
Aspects (1952) 38. This may be due, in part, to its common incidence in every
walk of life for countless generations. The remains of extremely early cliff-dwelling
Indians on display at Mesa Verde National Park show very definite evidence of many
severe cases.
2De Aryan v. Butler, i19 Cal. App. (2d) 674, 260 P. (2d) 98 (1953); Chapman v.
Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 S. (2d) 142 (1954); Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P. (2d) 859
(Okla. 1954); Kaul v. Chehalis, 45 Wash. (2d) 616, 277 P. (2d) 352 (1954); Dietz,
Flouridation and Domestic Water Supplies in California (1952) 4 Hastings L. J. 1;
Notes (1954) 7 Ala. L. Rev. 145; (1955) 5 Cath. U. L. Rev. iso. Regardless of this
raging conflict, artificial fluoridation of public water supplies has occurred in a
great number of communities throughout the nation. Rhyne & Mullin, Flouridation
of Municipal Water Supply-A Review of the Scientific and Legal Aspects (1952) 15.
3This comment does not include discussion of the objection that the measure
is "class legislation," raised and met in Kraus v. Cleveland, 16 N. E. (2d) 779 (Ohio
Cir. Ct. 1953), aff'd 121 N. E. (2d) 311 (Ohio App. 1954), noted (1954) 7 Ala. L. Rev.
145; (1955) 5 Cath. U. L. Rev. iio, and in Chapman v. Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 S.
(2d) 142 (1954). The Ontario Court of Appeals invalidated a municipal bylaw pro-
viding for fluoridation, on the ground that legislation delegating powers to munici-
palities did not include "the power to prescribe medicinally for the health of its
inhabitants," that function being lodged in other governmental agencies. See Toronto
Globe and Mail, Mar. 20, 1956, p. 1.
l163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N. E. (2d) 609 (1955).
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his personal liberties were violated in that he was being subjected to
compulsory medical experimentation which, in turn, violated his re-
ligious freedom. It was also urged that dental caries is a matter for
private, not public, treatment and prevention. The trial court, after
discussing the importance of healthy children to the entire commun-
ity,5 held that the ordinance does not infringe upon freedom of re-
ligion, and that fluoridation is a question for the legislature, whose de-
cision would not be overturned in the absence of a palpable abuse of
discretion. After an affirmance in the intermediate court,6 plaintiff
brought his case to the Supreme Court of Ohio which also affirmed the
judgment below.7 This court rejected the contention that, to be
valid under the police power, the subject matter of the health ordi-
nance had to relate to a contagious or infectious disease creating an
imminent and overriding necessity. In its view, the regulation need
only be shown to bear a reasonable relationship to the general health
of the community. It was also held that, while theoretically the same
protection against dental caries can be obtained by private dental
treatment, this possibility does not create an alternative which pre-
cludes the exercise of the police power because, in fact, there are in-
sufficient private health facilities to provide this safeguard for the
children of the community. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with
the lower courts' conclusions that the question is essentially one for the
legislature, and that the existence of differences of opinion as to the
safety and efficacy of fluoridation s does not create a justicable question,
absent a palpable abuse of discretion.
The limits of police power when it encroaches upon areas of per-
sonal freedom are not clearly defined. The courts, however, recognize
that "the health of the people is the first law," 9 and that "the welfare
of the many is superior to that of the few... ." Indeed, in Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court of the United States declared:
"We are not prepared to hold it to be an element in the liberty secured
'The opinion of the trial court discussed the various views on the safety and
efficacy of these methods in reaching the ends sought to be attained. Kraus v. Cleve-
land, si6 N. E. (2d) 779 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1953). City of Cleveland ordinances pro.
vided for one part of fluoride per million parts of water. This is a safe degree of
concentration. Rhyne & Mullin, Fluoridation of Municipal Water Supply-A Re-
view of the Scientific and Legal Aspects (1952) 9.
GKraus v. Cleveland, 12 1 N. E. (2d) 311 (Ohio App. 1954).
7Kraus v. Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N. E. (2d) 6o9 (1955).
"It is significant that at the time of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25
S. Ct. 358, 49 L. ed. 643 (o5), the acceptance of vaccination as a safe and effective
preventive of smallpox was far from being universal in the medical profession.
037 Am. Jur. 926.
"1State ex rel Milhoof v. Board of Education 76 Ohio St. 297, 81 N. E. 568,
570 (1907).
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by the Constitution of the United States that one person, or a minority
of persons, residing in any community and enjoying the benefits of
its local government, should have the power thus to dominate the
majority when supported by the authority of the State.""
In determining whether public health measures violate religious
freedom, the courts take into consideration two concepts inherent in
the doctrine of religious freedom.12 The first is an absolute freedom to
believe as one wishes; this cannot be abridged. State control of the
mind being especially repugnant to a democratic society, the right to
entertain religious beliefs must be beyond the reach of police power.13
The second of the concepts included in the doctrine of religious free-
dom is the right to act pursuant to that belief, which right is subject
to some control by the state. Though the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Board of Education v. Barnette,14 ruled that the
individual's religious freedom was infringed by a school board require-
ment that all students in the public schools should give an oral salute
to the flag of the United States daily as a condition of attendance,';
Justices Black and Douglas, in their joint concurring opinion, ob-
served: "No well ordered society can leave to the individuals an
absolute right to make final decisions, unassailable by the State, as to
everything they will or will not do. The First Amendment does not go
so far. Religious faiths, honestly held, do not free individuals from
responsibility to conduct themselves obediently to laws which are either
imperatively necessary to protect society as a whole from grave and
pressingly imminent dangers or which, without any general prohibition,
merely regulate time, place or manner of religious activity."'1
11197 U. S. 11, 38, 25 S. Ct. 358, 366, 49 L. ed. 643, 654 (905). Justice Cardozo
once observed: "One who is a martyr to a principle-which may turn out in the end
to be a delusion or error-does not prove, by his martyrdom that he has kept within
the law." Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 268, 55 S. Ct. 197, 206, 79 L. ed. 343,
355 (1934)-
'-Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245, 55 S. Ct. 197, 79 L. ed. 343 (1934); Rey-
nolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244 (1878); New Braunfels v. Wald-
schmidt, io9 Tex. 302, 207 S. W. 303 (1918); State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39
Wash. (2d) 86o, 239 P. (2d) 545 (1952).
a "Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought
essential as to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as
by evil men .... As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those
bent on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity.... Compul-
sory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 64o, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1186, 87 L. ed. 1628, 1639
(1942).
1 3 19 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. ed. 1628 (1942).
I-Eailure of the student to comply resulted in his being "unlawfully absent"
and subjected his parents to criminal proceedings.
"6Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 643, 63 S. Ct. 1178, n88, 87 L. ed.
1628, 1640 (1942).
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In the field of public health, courts first stated that in order for
the health measure to prevail, the evil against which protection is
sought for the public must be imminently dangerous, creating an
overriding necessity.' 7 Plaintiff in the principal case seized upon this
as the proper test of the validity of the regulation, but the Ohio court
properly refused to apply such a stringent standard. Rather, it has been
more accurately observed that the police power "includes anything
which is reasonable and necessary to secure the peace, safety, health,
morals, and the best interests of the public." "[I]t can only be
when that which the Legislature has done comes within the rule that
if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health.., has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is,
beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by
the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and
thereby give effect to the Constitution."' 8 The Ohio court, in apply-
ing substantially this rule in the principal case, has adopted the
proper approach despite early language that there must be an over-
riding necessity. This requirement was satisfied in the earlier cases
when the public health services were chiefly concerned with combat-
ing diseases that actually were infectious, contagious, and dread.
As medical science has progressed to make protection feasible
against less severe afflictions, the stricter test of overriding necessity
fell into disuse. Moreover, the courts appear to be especially reluctant
to strike down state action designed to protect the welfare of children,
even though the objection urged is interference with religious free-
dom.19 Thus, in numerous decisions, courts have applied the more
flexible "rational basis" test for determining the validity of "police"
regulation in overriding religious objections to such measures as com-
'TFor typical language to this effect see, Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89
at 91 (igoo).
2 State Board of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N. E. l19, 1021 (1912).
The police power of a state may be said to embrace, "at least, such reasonable regu-
lations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect public health
and public safety." Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. i1, 25, 25 S. Ct. 358, 361, 49
L. ed. 643, 649 (igo5), citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U. S.) 1, 6 L. ed. 23
(1824) and other early cases.
"Prince v. Commonwealth, 321 U. S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. ed. 645 (1944);
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. ed. 1628 (1942);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 51o, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. ed. 1o7o (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. ed. 1042 (1923); Sturges & Bum Mfg.
Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U. S. 320, 34 S. Ct. 6o, 58 L. ed. 245 (1913); People ex rel.
Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N. E. (2d) 769 (1952); State v. Bailey, 158 Ind.
324, 61 N. E. 730 (19o); People v. Pierson, 176 N. Y. 201, 68 N. E. 243 (1903).
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pulsory vaccination against smallpox, 20 and compulsory chest X-rays
as a condition to entering a state university.2 1 Similar public health
measures have been sustained on the same test, where no religious
freedom question was raised, in cases involving the taking of land for a
sanitary land fill,22 the prohibition of the sale of oleomargarine, 23 muni-
cipal burial restrictions, 2
4 and compulsory sewage purification.
25
Surprisingly enough, chlorination of water to prevent typhoid has only
once been called into question, in which case the constitutionality of
chlorination was sustained.
2 6
Rejecting assertions to the contrary, the courts have held that a city
is under no duty to supply water free from fluoride.2 7 This is readily
apparent from the fact that if fluoride exists naturally in the water
supply, the city is under no duty to remove it.28 Indeed, the city is
under no constitutional compulsion to provide water at all but may
do so if empowered by its citizens.2 9 Having voted to have water
supplied by the city, the citizens may vote to have it supplied on
condition that it contain fluoride, so long as the city is not thereby
caused to breach its duty3 0 that the supplied water be potable, palat-
able, and not injurious.3 1 No instance has been disclosed in which
harmful effects have resulted to anyone so long as the proper amount
of fluoride is contained in the water; rather, the overwhelming weight
2'Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 43 S. Ct. 24, 67 L. ed. 194 (1922); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. ed. 643 (19o5); Blue v. Beach, 155
Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89 (19oo); State ex rel. Milhoof v. Board of Education, 76 Ohio
St. 297, 81 N. E. 568 (19o7); New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 1o9 Tex. 302, 207 S. W.
303 (1918).
"State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. (2d) 860, 239 P. (2d) 545 (1952).
-Bowes v. Aberdeen, 58 Wash. 535, 1o9 Pac. 369 (igio).
'Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 S. Ct. 992, 32 L. ed. 253 (1888).
1 Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 3o S. Ct. 301, 54 L. ed.
515 (1910).
2State Board of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 98 N. E. 1oi9 (19i2).
^0In Commonwealth v. Town of Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 52 N. E. (2d) 566 (1943),
the court held that the State could constitutionally require the city to chlorinate its
water, thus assuming, without deciding, that chlorination itself is constitutional.
-De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. (2d) 674, 260 P. (2d) 98 (1953); Chapman
v. Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 S. (2d) 142 (1954); Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P. (2d) 859
(Okla. 1954); Dietz, Fluoridation and Domestic Water Supplies in California (1952)
4 Hastings L. J. i, See dissent, Kaul v. Chehalis, 45 Wash. (2d) 616, 277 P. (2d) 352,
358 (1954).
2Chapman v. Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 S. (3d) 142 (1954); Dietz, Fluoridation
and Domestic Water Supplies in California (1952) 4 Hastings L. J. i.
"Dietz, Fluoridation and Domestic Water Supplies in California (1952) 4
Hastings L. J. i.
3°Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P. (2d) 859 (Okla. 1954).
3See cases cited in note 27, supra. Also see 56 Am. Jur., Waterworks §§ 56,
74-76-
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of medical opinion is that there would be highly beneficial results to
an important and substantial portion of the community.32 Thus, de-
spite any popular differences of opinion, scientific evidence strongly
supports the conclusion that fluoridation does bear a reasonable re-
lationship to the general health of the public.
The courts should not be deterred by the fact that dental caries has
never before been a subject of regulation. Current recognition of the
right to regulate for this purpose does not mean that there has been an
extension of the police power, but rather that, though the subject has
always been appropriate for protection, new scientific discoveries have
but recently provided the methods to exercise that protection. What
once was endured can now be prevented; and as science grows and
provides the methods, defenses can be thrown up against even more
diseases that plague mankind.
33
The Ohio decision seems sound also in rejecting plaintiff's con-
tention that the availability of private dental treatment to provide
the desired fluoridation makes action by public authority in the field
improper. In point on this question is Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 34 an
action to enjoin an official of Pennsylvania from enforcing against a
manufacturer of bedding a state law prohibiting the use of "shoddy"3 5
in making of bedding. The legislation was defended on the ground that
it was designed to protect public health by preventing materials
harboring disease germs from being placed in the hands of persons
who might become diseased through contact with quilts containing
shoddy. However, the fact was undisputed that this danger to health
could be eliminated by appropriate sterilization techniques at low
cost. Because there was some public interest in having these articles
manufactured, and because the same health protection intended by the
statute could be accomplished privately by the manufacturer through
sterilization, the Supreme Court of the United States found that the
legislature had acted arbitrarily in prohibiting all use of shoddy, and
had thereby transgressed the limits of the police power. Plaintiff in
2See De Aryan v. Butler, ii9 Cal. App. (2d) 674, 260 P. (2d) 98, 99 (1953);
Chapman v. Shreveport, 225 La. 859, 74 S. (2d) 142, 144 (1954); Kraus v. Cleveland,
116 N. E. (2d) 779, 790 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1953); Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P. (2d) 859, 862
(Okla. 1954); Thompson Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies (i95i) 3 Hastings
L. J. 123; Dietz, Fluoridation and Domestic Water Supplies in California (1952)
4 Hastings L. J. i at 1-6; Rhyne & Mullins, Fluoridation of Municipal Water Sup-
ply-A Review of the Scientific and Legal Aspects (1952) 5-15.
3See Dowell v. Tulsa, 273 P. (2d) 859, 863 (Okla. 1954).
3'27o U. S. 402, 46 S. Ct. 320, 70 L. ed. 645 (1926).
="Shoddy" was defined by the Court as any material which has been spun
into yarn, knit or woven into fabric, and subsequently been cut up, torn up, broken
up, or ground up.
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the Kraus case 36 attempted to relate this limitation on the police
power to the public fluoridation measure by arguing that several alter-
nate means were available. These possibilities include having a dentist
apply fluoride externally to the teeth, purchasing bottled water to
which fluoride has been added, and supplying treated water only in
school drinking fountains. However, it is probable that none of these
courses of action is actually feasible because of the practical diffi-
culties and the excessive cost of these methods. By fluoridation of
the entire public water supply by governmental action, the desired
benefits can be obtained at a cost of only 5 to 14 cents per person per
year,37 but the expense to private individuals of furnishing their own
treatment would be so great as to be beyond the means of most people.
There being no feasible substitute for carrying on the health improve-
ment program by private action, the principle of the Weaver case
does not apply to prohibit public action. At this point, the matter
becomes one of legislative discretion as to whether the benefits to be
derived are of sufficient importance to justify governmental action.
Whatever course the legislature chooses to follow, its action is not sub-
ject to disallowance by the courts unless there has been a palpable
abuse of discretion.
The various objections raised against the constitutionality of fluor-
idation ordinances have been successfully met. The result will doubt-
less be a benefit to society in that the children of today, the leaders of
tomorrow, will be less troubled by dental caries than their ancestors.
This step forward has been accomplished without expansion of the
police power to an extent that unduly infringes upon personal free-
dom. Yet those who still object are not without recourse; but their
"appeal must be made to the legislature or the ballot-box, not to the
judiciary." 3 8  GEORGE S. WILSON. III
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-RIGHT OF WIFE TO ALIMONY AFTER Ex PARTE
DIVORCE BY HUSBAND. [Federal]
The stamp of approval placed on the migratory ex parte divorce1
in 1942 by the United States Supreme Court gave vitality to a prob-
lem which had been, for the most part, dormant until that date. In
nKraus v. Cleveland, 63 Ohio St. 559, 127 N. E. (2d) 609 (955).
8TRhyne & Mullin, Fluoridation of Municipal Water Supplies-A Review of
the Scientific and Legal Aspects (1952) 27, 47.
8Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 686, 8 S. Ct. 992, 996, 32 L. ed. 253,
257 (1887).
"Ex parte divorce is one obtained by one spouse in proceedings in which the
court does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant spouse.
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the famous first Williams case2 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution
requires that a divorce granted by a state in which one of the parties
has a bona fide domicile must be recognized in every other state. The
due process of law requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment is satis-
fied by giving the absent spouce notice of the divorce proceedings
by publication in a newspaper.3 Thus, a married person may be di-
vorced without ever having received actual notice of the proceedings,
and a woman may find herself no longer a "wife" without ever having
had an opportunity to present a claim for alimony to any court.
Even when a wife does have actual notice of the husband's foreign
divorce proceedings, she is faced with the problem of deciding whether
or not to defend the action. Although she may seek to defend and
contest the bona fides of her husband's domicile in the state where he
brings the action, if she loses she is barred from raising the question
again by the doctrine that res judicata applies to jurisdictional ques-
tions.4 If she defends, presents a claim for alimony, and loses on the
claim, res judicata will similarly bar her from again raising that issue
in any court.5 Still, if she fails to contest the divorce during the pro-
ceedings, she may never have another opportunity to present her
alimony claim. On the other hand, by not participating in the foreign
proceedings, she may at a later date and in a more favorable forum,
question the validity of the husband's divorce decree on the ground
of his lack of domiciliary status within the jurisdiction granting the
decree.6 If she can establish that her husband was not a bona fide
domiciliary of the divorcing state, then the decree is not entitled to
extra-territorial recognition.7 The result is that, at least outside the
'Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 279 (1942).
3Estin v. Estin, g44 U. S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. ed. 1561 (1948); Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 279 (1942).
'Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 92 L. ed. 1429 (1948). Also, Coe
V. Coe, 334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094, 92 L. ed. 1451 (1948) (party in whose favor
a divorce was rendered is also barred from later raising the jurisdictional question,
since he had appeared in the divorce proceedings).
'Lynn v. Lynn, 302 N. Y. 193, g7 N. E. (2d) 748 (1951); 17"Am. Jur. 58o. In Coe
v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094, 92 L. ed, 1451 (1948) it was held that the wife's
appearance gave the Nevada court jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of alimony
even though the claim was not asserted. The Court said that the absence of an ali-
mony claim during divorce proceedings is equal to denial of the same and such
claim cannot be raised later in any court.
ORice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674, 69 S. Ct. 751, 93 L. ed. 957 (1949) (after death of
husband his ex parte Nevada divorce was attacked and found invalid for want of
valid domicile by the Massachusetts court); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S.
226, 65 S. Ct. 1o92, 89 L. ed. 1577 (1945) (commonly called the second Williams
case.)
7See note 6, supra.
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decreeing state, she remains a "wife," and whatever right to alimony
she may have had prior to the ex parte divorce is unimpaired.
The problem of a "wife's" right to alimony after an ex parte
divorce was again raised in the recent case of Hopson v. Hopson.s Here
Tasanilla Hopson, the husband, deserted his wife, Delores, shortly
after their marriage. Upon her refusal to divorce him, he instituted
divorce proceedings in Florida while she was living in a Maryland
suburb of Washington, D. C. She neither appeared nor otherwise
participated in the Florida proceedings in which her husband ob-
tained a final ex parte divorce decree based on constructive service.
The decree provided for support of their child but made no pro-
vision for alimony for the wife. Twelve days after the decree became
final, Tasanilla remarried in Kentucky, from which marriage a child
has been born. A month after the Florida decree was entered he re-
turned to the District of Columbia, and there Delores brought suit
for maintenance for herself and support for her child.9 Upon trial,
the court found that Tasanilla did not have a bona fide intent to es-
tablish a domicile in Florida. For this reason the Florida court was
without jurisdiction to render the decree, which was therefore not en-
titled to full faith and credit in the District of Columbia. From this
ruling Tasanilla appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia on the primary ground that the lower court erred in re-
fusing to accord full faith and credit to his Florida decree. The Court
of Appeals, presented with this question, re-examined the entire re-
lationship of alimony to ex parte divorce.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Estin v. Estin'° decided
in 1948, held that where the wife had obtained a court support order
before the husband obtained an ex parte divorce, the question of
survival of an alimony claim is a matter to be answered by each indi-
vidual forum according to its own local rules of public policy. In
affirming the decision of the New York Court of Appeals that the
husband must provide financial support even after divorce, the Su-
preme Court actually gave the stamp of constitutional approval to
the doctrine of "divisible divorce""I-that is, under the Full Faith
8221 F. (2d) 839 (C. A. D. C., 1955).
OThe terms "maintenance" and "alimony" will be used interchangeably in this
comment to mean any form of financial support as an incident of an existing or dis-
solved marital relationship.
.334 U. S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. ed. 1561 (1948).
n"Divisible divorce" means that under the U. S. Const. Art. IV, § i (the Full
Faith and Credit Clause) a divorce may be recognized to dissolve the marital
status yet ineffective to terminate certain personal rights such as the wife's and
child's right to support. Although the language is relatively new, identical results
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and Credit Clause of the Constitution, a divorce may be effective to
dissolve the marriage relationship yet "ineffective on the issue of
alimony."' 2 The Court reasoned that Mr. Estin's ex parte Nevada
divorce decree, though valid to terminate the marital status, could
not destroy the "property right" which Mrs. Estin had obtained by
virtue of her prior maintenance judgment.
The question of whether or not a wife's unadjudicated alimony
claim will survive an ex parte divorce decree was left open by the
United States Supreme Court, because in the Estin case the claim had
been reduced to judgment before the ex parte Nevada divorce decree
was rendered. The question was first presented in the District of
Columbia in the case of Meredith v. Meredith13 in 1953. Here Mr.
Meredith obtained an ex parte divorce in Texas while his wife's
maintenance counter-claim to his earlier divorce action in the District
of Columbia was still pending. In denying Mrs. Meredith's alimony
claim, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, relying on
the Estin decision, held that the local law of the District of Columbia
was governed by its alimony statute' 4 calling for the existence of
"husband" and "wife" status at the time of decreeing alimony. This
status had been destroyed by Mr. Meredith's Texas decree. Refer-
ring to these requirements, the court declared that "no interpreta-
tion, however liberal, can eliminate those essential prerequisites."'1
Although the decision was that Mrs. Meredith's claim did not survive
the divorce, still the court fully recognized that it was constitutionally
possible under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that such a claim
could survive. In support of this contention of the Meredith case, the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in the Estin case was
extended, the Court of Appeals observing in a footnote that such
reasoning would seem to be equally applicable to an original grant
were reached by the United States Supreme Court in Barber v. Barber, 21 How.
582, 6 L. ed. 226 (1859). For an excellent discussion of "divisible divorce" see
Morris, Divisible Divorce (1951) 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287.
-334 U. S. 541, 549, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 1218, 92 L. ed. 1561, 1569 (1948).
132o4 F. (2d) 64 (C. A. D. C., 1953).
'D. C. Code (1951) § 16-415: "Whenever any husband shall fail or refuse to
maintain his wife and minor children, if any, although able so to do, the court, on
application of the wife, pendente lite and permanently, may decree that he shall
pay her, periodically, such sums as would be allowed to her as pendente lite or
permanent alimony in case of divorce for the maintenance of herself and the minor
children, if any, committed to her care by the court, and the payment thereof
may be enforced in the same manner as directed in regard to the payment of
permanent alimony." Quoted in Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F. (2d) 839, 842, n. 3 (C. A.
D. C., 1955).
1 -0o4 F. (2d) 64, 67 (C. A. D. C., 1953).
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of maintenance after divorce.' 6 With that remark, the court actually
laid the foundation upon which it later built the Hopson decision.
This was the state of the law in the District of Columbia when
Mrs. Hopson brought her action after her husband had obtained his
ex parte Florida decree. Because of the deference owed to "the pro-
ceedings of a sister state. . .", the Court of Appeals declined to at-
tack the Florida decree, saying: ".... the result of the attack might well
be to stigmatize unnecessarily a subsequent marriage and the children
born thereof."' 7 Instead, the court completely redeclared local law in
the District of Columbia on the matter of alimony after divorce and
held that Mrs. Hopson's claim had survived the divorce.'8 The earlier
decision in Meredith v. Meredith, was disposed of with the observa-
tion that, "On reconsideration we now conclude that we went too far
in fixing this blanket rule, since circumstances may exist in a particu-
lar case... where allowance of maintenance after such divorce would
serve, rather than contravene public policy."'19 New meaning was given
to the alimony statute by the holding that the statute was merely a
specific authorization to enter an alimony decree rather than an ex-
press limitation on a court's general equitable powers to do so. As its
only authority for holding that Mrs. Hopson's unadjudicated alimony
claim survived the ex parte Florida divorce, the court invoked and
relied upon the statement which it had appended in a footnote to the
Meredith case. There it had been indicated that the reasoning on the
"divisible divorce" concept by the United States Supreme Court in the
Estin case would seem to be equally applicable to the Hopson situa-
tion-that is, where the wife's claim has not been adjudicated in her
favor prior to husband's divorce.20 The majority took the view that
Mrs. Hopson's right to alimony was a personal right which, under
the "divisibility" doctrine, is not terminated with the dissolution of
the marital status.
16204 F. (2d) 64, 66, n. 3 (C. A. D. C., 1953): "While the Estin decision in-
volved merely the enforcement of a maintenance order entered prior to the
foreign divorce, its reasoning would seem to be equally applicable to an original
grant of maintenance after the divorce. Either may be done consistently with the
full faith and credit clause."
'Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F. (2d) 839, 847 (C. A. D. C., 1955).
'sThe trial court, after finding Mr. Hopson's Florida divorce invalid, entered
judgment in favor of Mrs. Hopson for maintenance for herself and support of the
child. The Court of Appeals also decided in Mrs. Hopson's favor, but on the
ground that her alimony claim survived divorce, whether valid or not. The appel-
late court therefore reversed and remanded, assigning as error the trial court's un-
necessary examination of the validity of the Florida decree.
10221 F. (2d) 839, 845 (C. A. D. C., 1955).
10See note 16, supra.
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The Hopson dissent argued that the finding of the lower court not
only could but should have been affirmed in the light of the then
existing local policy within the District of Columbia, contending that
the principles of law, settled by precedent cases, should have been fol-
lowed. Speaking through Chief Judge Stephens, the minority argued
that "It is elementary that if in the jurisdiction of a given court the
principles of law appropriate for the decision of a case before the
court are already known, whether through statutes or reported cases, it
is the duty of the court to decide the case by the application of those
principles." 21 It should be pointed out that the Hopson dissent also
relied on the Estin case, but in the restrictive sense of attacking the
authorities cited by the majority, on the ground that in that case
the United States Supreme Court had said absolutely nothing about
the wife's alimony claim which "had not ripened into adjudication
in her favor prior to the entry of the foreign decree of divorce in
favor of the husband."22 This view that the rule of the Estin decision
should not be extended beyond its exact fact situation finds sup-
port in several jurisdictions. 23
The question of a wife's claim for alimony surviving an ex parte
divorce has received conflicting treatment throughout the states, the
result turning on local rules of policy, statutes, and statutory interpre-
tation.2 4 Certainly no better picture of this conflict can be found than
in studying the Hopson decision on the one extreme and the Vermont
21
See 221 F. (2d) 839, 856 (C. A. D. C., 1955).
2See 221 F. (2d) 839, 852 (C. A. D. C., 1955).
=3In New York, where the Estin decision was rendered, the courts have re-
fused to go beyond that rule to allow alimony in the absence of a maintenance de-
cree rendered prior to the ex parte divorce. Harris v. Harris, 279 App. Div. 542,
11o N. Y. S. (2d) 824 (1952): Adler v. Adler, 192 Misc. 953, 81 N. Y. S. (2d) 797
(1948). Unadjudicated alimony claims were denied in: Calhoun v. Calhoun, 70 Cal.
App. (ad) 233, 16o P. (2d) 923 (1945); Commonwealth v. Petrosky, 168 Pa. Super.
232, 77 A. (2d) 647 (1951); Atkins v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54 N. E. (2d) 488 (1944),
principally on the ground that full faith and credit requires the termination of a
wife's right to further maintenance along with the termination of the marital
status.
-Alimony based on unadjudicated claim was allowed after ex parte divorce
in Davis v. Davis, 70 Colo. 37, 197 Pac. 241 (1921) and Searles v. Searles, 140 Minn.
385, 168 N. W. 133 (1918), on the ground that an ex parte divorce is "in rem"
rather than "in personam" therefore the decree only operates to destroy the res,
the marital status, and not the personal right to alimony. Alimony was considered
a "property" right which is not destroyed by ex parte divorce in Gray v. Gray,
61 F. Supp. 367 (E. D. Mich. 1945). The Ohio court construed the term "wife" in
its alimony statute to designate the person rather than the actual existing marital
relation. Thus, the husband's ex parte divorce did not deprive the former wife
of alimony in Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502 (1869). For cases in which alimony, based
on an unadjudicated claim, was denied, see note 23, supra.
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rule on the other. In Loeb v. Loeb,25 under facts almost identical with
the Hopson case, the Vermont Supreme Court very recently denied
the wife's claim on the gound that alimony is but an incident of the
marriage relationship, the dissolution of which not only terminates
the right of the wife to receive, but also the duty of the husband to
provide, further financial support. The view was taken that since the
marital status constitutes the very basis of an action for alimony or
separate maintenance, the wife must assert her claim for alimony be-
fore the husband's divorce proceedings are concluded or forever be
barred from raising the question.26 This decision follows the classical
idea that marriage is an indivisible entity rather than a bundle of rights
and duties, part of which may be terminated by divorce while the
others survive. In view of this conflict on the matter of alimony after
divorce, and the lingering reluctance of the courts to effect the neces-
sary changes in local policy to provide the helpless wife with the re-
lief to which she is justly entitled, it is submitted that the more de-
sirable solution is to be found in legislation allowing alimony after
divorce.
Statutory solution of this problem has followed several patterns.
27
The most desirable pattern seems to be that adopted by New York
in its recently enacted statute, recommended and drafted by the Law
Revision Commission of that State.28 This statute has been tested and
_ 1 1 4 A. (2d) 518 (Vt. 1955) For cases in accord with Loeb v. Loeb, see note
23, supra.
mCalhoun v. Calhoun, 70 Cal. App. (2d) 233, i6o P. (2d) 923 (1945); 42 C. J. S.
207.
-Statutes on this subject have followed three general patterns. The first merely
permits alimony to be granted to a "wife," which provision may be construed to
deny alimony, as in the Meredith case, 204 F. (2d) 64 (C. A. D. C., 1953), and also
to allow alimony as in the Hopson case. The second type of statute authorizes
a spouse to bring a divorce action on the ground that the other spouse has obtained
a divorce in another state. This type exists only in Michigan, 3 Mich. Comp. Laws
(1948) § 552.6 (6) and in Florida, 5 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1954) § 65.04 (8). The Michigan
statute has held not to violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Albaugh v.
Albaugh, 320 Mich. 16, 30 N. W. (2d) 415 (1948). In Keener v. Keener, 152 Fla. 13,
ii S. (2d) 18o (1942) it was held that the Florida statute did not violate Full Faith
and Credit Clause. The third and most satisfactory type of statute covering this
problem has been adopted in New Jersey and New York, whereby alimony after
divorce is authorized. The New Jersey statute, 2 N. J. Rev. Stat. (ig5o) c. 50 § 37, was
held to entitle a former wife to alimony in Staedler v. Staedler, 6 N. J. 380, 78 A.
(2d) 896 (1951); Payne v. Payne, 2 N. J. Super. 270, 63 A. (2d) 549 (1948). The New
York statute, N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1954) § 117o-b, has also been relied on for
granting alimony after ex parte divorce. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 207 Misc. 291,
138 N. Y. S. (2d) 222 (1955).
2sSee N. Y. Law Revision Commission Report (1943) Recommendation and
Studies, 463, 468, 471, for a complete study of this subject and also the recom-
mended legislation which has now been enacted by. the New York Legislature:
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found to solve the problem which had troubled the New York courts
ever since the Estin case was decided.
29
Although legislative treatment of the problem seems desirable, it
is perhaps not necessary. After the Hopson decision, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered a rehearing in the
Meredith case, and reversed its earlier decision.30 In the rehearing
opinion, the majority of the court declared: "In Hopson v. Hopson
we merely applied the principles of the Supreme Court cases above
referred to. We must do the same here. It follows that the Texas
decree, even though valid as to the marital status of the Merediths
and the consortium rights of both spouses, could not destroy Mrs.
Meredith's right to claim maintenance, a financial right. Her claim to
maintenance was filed in the District of Columbia in an action in
which the court here had jurisdiction over the husband because he
had brought the action. The Texas court had no jurisdiction over the
wife and so could not deprive her of this financial right. It was
therefore error for the District Court to dismiss the claim to main-
tenance as moot because of the Texas decree." 31 This language seems
to indicate that an ex parte divorce decree is invalid to the extent
that it purports to cut off a wife's right to alimony in a proceeding
in which the court does not have personal jurisdiction over her. If
this be so, another jurisdiction giving recognition to such an invalid
decree as valid would also violate the Fourteenth Amendment, since
the Supreme Court has ruled that due process requires that no other
jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment
elsewhere acquired without due process.32 Under this view, the first
Meredith decision violated the Due Process Clause, and the result in
the Hopson case is the only one that can be reached consistent with
due process of law. LAcY E. PuTNEY
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1954) § 117o(b). The commission determined that such legis-
lation was necessary to protect a wife whose right to support would be cut off,
in the absence of a maintenance decree, by a husband's ex parte divorce obtained in
another state. In order to avoid discrimination against foreign divorces, as warned
against by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the Estin case, the statute is made
applicable whether the ex parte divorce is obtained in a foreign court or in a New
York court.
• The New York Statute, tested in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 207 Misc. 291, 138
N. Y. S. (2d) 222 (1955), changed the New York law by permitting an unadjuciated
alimony claim to survive an ex parte divorce. For New York cases prior to this
statute, see Note (1953) 28 A. L. R. (2d) 1410.
Meredith v. Meredith, 226 F. (2d) 257 (C. A. D. C., 1955), reversing on re-
hearing 204 F. (2d) 64 (C. A. D. C., 1953).
'226 F. (2d) 257, 259 (C. A. D. C., 1955).
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U. S. 22o at 229, 66 S. Ct. 556 at 56o, 90 L. ed. 635 at
640 (1946).
1956]
52 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII
EQUITY-RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE DECREE To ENFORCE CON-
TRACT To MANUFACTURE CHATTEL. [Virginia]
The trend toward fusion of legal and equitable procedure, though
not equivalent to a complete merger of the two branches of juris-
prudence, has had the effect of removing the historic conflict between
law and equity courts, thus allowing the latter to expand their juris-
diction to controversies in which equitable remedies were not pre-
viously available. The expansion of the scope of specific performance is
an excellent example. Although it cannot be said that the availability of
this form of relief has been extended to the point of being an alterna-
tive remedy for breach of contract to be invoked purely at the election of
the injured party, yet the recent Virginia case of Thompson v. Common-
wealth,' indicates that that ideal, recognized by Story over one hun-
dred years ago,2 is coming appreciably nearer.
The suit was brought for specific performance of a contract be-
tween the plaintiff Commonwealth and the defendants, International
Roll Call Corp. and Thompson, which provided that the defendants
"prepare, build, construct, and deliver" to the Commonwealth "two
complete spare recorder units without cases, and two complete spare
high speed vote counters; it being understood that both the recorder
units and counter units are to be of the same model and type now
in use in the voting systems in the Senate and House of Delegates."
3
The defendants answered that specific performance should not be de-
creed because the remedy at law was adequate, inasmuch as the con-
tract was for the sale of chattels which were not unique in nature, for,
while the Commonwealth "'cannot go into the market and purchase'
the equipment,... 'any first class machine shop, of which there are
several around Richmond can build the counters and recorders, as
well as the defendants can'. ' ' 4 In defense it was also contended that
should specific performance be granted, "the personal attention and
labor of two of your defendants" would be required for many months,
thereby placing them in a position "tantamount to involutary servi-
tude." 5
In view of traditional equity rules, the contentions of the defen-
dants seemed sound. It is often stated as a general rule that equity will
1197 Va. 208, 89 S. E. (2d) 64 (1955).
22 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (1st ed. 1836) 25; 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence
(12th ed. 1877) 705.
2rhompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 2o8, 21o, 89 S. E. (2d) 64, 66 (1955).
4
Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 2o8, 213, 89 S. E. (2d) 64, 68 (1955).
5Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 214, 89 S. E. (2d) 64, 68 (1955).
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not give specific performance of contracts for the sale of chattels.6 In
reality, the rule is not based on the distinction between real and
personal property,7 but on the ground that damages at law will
usually afford a complete remedy because plaintiff can purchase the
chattel from another source and, by obtaining damages from defen-
dant, can recompense himself for any loss suffered by the failure of
defendant to furnish the chattel under the contract.8 The buyer's
right to obtain specific enforcement of such a contract thus depends
on his ability to show that the chattel is of a unique nature which
makes it unobtainable elsewhere. 9 By this means he can meet the
requirement that "a clear case of the inadequacy of damages is neces-
sary in order to obtain equitable relief" where a chattel is involved.' 0
Therefore, it would appear that the Virginia court departed from the
historic requirement of uniqueness, for it granted specific performance
OGriscom v. Childress, 183 Va. 42, 31 S. E. (2d) 309 (1944). See: Glascock v.
Sukumlyn, 281 P. (2d) 90, 93 (Cal. 1955); Reid v. McRea, 19o Ga. 323, 9 S. E. (2d)
176, 18o (1940); Richardson v. Lamb, 253 Mich. 659, 235 N. W. 817, 818 (1931);
Cochrane v. Szpakowski, 355 Pa. 357, 49 A. (2d) 692, 694 (1946); Shepherd v. Groff, 34
W. Va. 123, 11 S. E. 997 (1890); 17 Michie, Jurisprudence (1951) Specific Perform-
ance § 63; McClintock, Equity (2nd ed. 1940) 153; Walsh, Equity (1930) 305; 4
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1941) § 1402.
7,,... the fundamental principles which govern a court of equity in decreeing
the specific performance of contracts are in essence the same whether the contract
concerns realty or personalty." Martindelk v. Fiduciary Counsel, 133 N. J. Eq. 4o8,
3o A. (2d) 281, 285 (1943); Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491 (1888);
Krause v. Hoffman, 239 Mich. 348, -214 N. W. 146 (1927); Virginia Trust Co. v.
Webb, 2o6 N. C. 247, 173 S. E. 598 (1934). See: Wehen v. Lundgaard, 41 Cal.
App. (2d) 6io, 107 P. (2d) 491, 493 (1940); Edelen v. W. B. Samuels & Co., 126 Ky.
295, 103 S. W. 36o, 362 (1907).
'The remedy at law was found to be adequate in the following cases: Southern
Iron & Equipment Co. v. Vaughn, 201 Ala. 356, 78 So. 212 (1918); Dunner v.Hoover,
43 Cal. App. (2d) 753, i1 P. (2d) 737 (1941); Wehen v. Lundgaard, 41 Cal. App.
(2d) 61o, 107 P. (2d) 491 (1940); Bowman v. Adams, 45 Idaho 217, 261 Pac. 679
(1927); Spoor-Thompson Mach. Co. v. Bennett Film Laboratories, 1O5 N. J. Eq. io8,
147 At. 202 (1929) (machine of special design).
'Where the chattel has some peculiar, unique, or sentimental value to the buyer,
not measurable in damages, specific performance will be granted. Downing v. WVil-
liams, 238 Ala. 551, 191 So. 221 (1939); Cole v. Cole Realty Co., 169 Mich. 347, 135
N. W. 329 (1912); Kann v. Wausau Abrasives Co., 81 N. H. 535, 129 Atl. 374 (1925);
Summers v. Bean, 13 Grat. 404 (Va. 1856); Hubbard v. George, 81 W. Va. 538, 94
S. E. 974 (1918). But specific performance has been denied for want of uniqueness
where a pecuniary value could be placed on the article. Kane v. Tuckman, 131
Fed. 6o9 (C. C. N. D. Iowa, 19o4); Southern Iron & Equipment Co. v. Vaughn, 20oi
Ala. 356, 78 So. 212 (1918); Bowman v. Adams, 45 Idaho 217, 261 Pac. 699 (1927)
(denying specific performance where unique but having ascertainable pecuniary
value).
lo5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) 3954-
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while conceding that the equipment which the defendants had con-
tracted to supply could be produced by other craftsmen in the vicinity,
even though it could not be immediately purchased in the market.
In considering the defendants' objection to specific perform-
ance as involving enforced personal service, the court recognized
the general rule that "courts of equity will not entertain suits to en-
force specifically contracts... involving skill, labor and judgment.""
Several reasons have been given for the refusal to enforce such con-
tracts. Specific enforcement of close personal service contracts has
been held to contemplate involuntary servitude amounting to an
infringment of personal liberty in violation of the Federal Consti-
tution.12 Aside from the constitutional objection, there appears to
be a general public policy against such enforcement.' 3 Other objec-
tions to specific enforcement of personal service contracts are based
on the long and minute supervision which might burden the court
issuing such a decree, 14 and the difficulty of compelling performance
of the services to the best of the defendant's ability.15 These problems
are especially applicable where the work requires special skill or
experience, since the courts do not have a standard for measuring
skill or experience. In many jurisdictions these objections would ap-
pear to be sufficiently persuasive to have prompted a refusal to en-
nThompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 214, 89 S. E. (2d) 64, 68 (1955);
McClintock, Equity (2nd ed. 1948) 164; Walsh, Equity (1930) 335; Pound, The Pro-
gress of the Law: Equity (1910) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420.
'Birmingham Trust & Say. Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry. Co., 271 Fed. 743 (N. D.
Ga. 921); Poultry Producers v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 208 Pac. 93 (1922); Walsh,
Equity (193o) 335; Stevens, Involuntary Servitude by Injunction (1921) 6 Corn. L.
Q. 235.
UChadwick v. Chadwick, 21 Ala. 580, 25 So. 631 (1898); H. W. Gossard Co. v.
Crosby, 132 Iowa 155, 1o9 N. W. 483 (19o6); Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248,
9 A. (2d) 639 (1939). It is well established that if a contract is found to involve
a continuous personal relationship it will not be enforced. Coykendall v. Jackson,
17 Cal. App. (2d) 729, 62 P. (2d) 746 (1936); Win. Rogers Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58
Conn. 356, 20o Atl. 467 (1890); Edelen v. W. B. Samuels & Co., 126 Ky. 295, 103 S. W.
36o (1907); Asberry v. Mitchell, 121 Va. 276, 93 S. E. 638 (1917); Campbell v. Rust,
85 Va. 653, 8 S. E. 664 (1889).
"Calumet Co. v. Oil City Corp., 114 Fla. 531, 154 So. 141 (1934); Greer v. Pope,
14o Ga. 743, 79 S. E. 846 ('913); George E. Warren Co. v. A. L. Black Coal Co.,
85 W. Va. 684, 102 S. E. 672 (1920).
""The jurisdiction of equity will not be exercised to decree a specific per-
formance, however inadequate may be the remedy for damages, where the con-
tract is of such a nature that obedience of the decree cannot be compelled by the
ordinary processes of the court." Leonard v. Plum Bayou Levee Dist., 79 Ark. 42, 94
S. W. 922 (19o6); Win. Roger.s Mfg. Co. v. Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 20 Atl. 467 (1890);
Sword v. Aird, 306 Mich. 14, 9 N. V. (2d) 907 (1943); Connell v. Yost, 62 W. Va.
66, 57 S. E. 299 (1907).
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force the contract involved in the Thompson case,16 since specific per-
formance cannot be demanded as a matter of absolute right.
17
In spite of this strongly entrenched authority supporting the de-
fendants' two contentions, the Virginia court granted specific per-
formance. As a rebuttal to the defendants' contention that the plain-
tiff's remedy at law was adequate, the court accepted the approach
of Williston that the modern trend of equity should "be less technical
in the application of this principle, and where a special need on the
part of the plaintiff, and at least a temporary monopoly on the part
of the defendant, justify its application, the remedy is allowed for
breach of contracts for the sale of personal property for which dam-
ages might otherwise be adequate."' 8 But the court in the instant
case may be extending even the Williston view, by finding the chattel
to be unique because it is not readily available on the open market.
The remedy at law was held inadequate because "there are no other
experienced manufacturers of such equipment...." from which the
Commonwealth could in the ordinary course of business order the
equipment.' 9 The defendants' contention that there were several other
machine shops in the vicinity capable of producing the device, though
not contested, was declared not to make plaintiff's remedy at law
adequate,20 because plaintiff, even after receiving a damages judgment,
would have to assume the burden of finding a manufacturer who
could produce the device without plans or previous experience. This
"responsibility and risk" should properly fall on the defendants.2 '
"Iron Age Pub. Co. v. Western Union Teleg. Co., 83 Ala. 498, 3 So. 449 (1888);
Leonard v. Plum Bayou Levee Dist., 79 Ark. 42, 94 S. W. 922 (19o6); Calumet Co. v.
Oil City Corp., 114 Fla. 531, 154 So. 141 (1934); Geo. E. Warren Co. v. A. L. Black
Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 684, 102 S. E. 672 (1920).
17Brogdon v. Hogan, 18! Ga. 244, 5 S. E. (2d) 657 (1939); Mitchum v. Mitchum,
183 S. C. 75, 19o S. E. 104 (1937); Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S. E. (2d) 875
(1948).
",Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 213, 89 S. E. (2d) 64, 67 (1955).
"Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 214, 89 S. E. (2d) 64, 68 (1955).
"'This broad approach to the determination of equity jurisdiction would ap-
parently be approved by several other courts. "In order to deny one the relief
which a court of equity can give, it is not in all cases sufficient that there be a
remedy at law. The remedy must be plain and adequate, and as certain, prompt,
complete, and efficient to attain the ends of justice and its prompt administra-
tion as the remedy in equity." Dailey v. City of New York, 17o App. Div. 267, 156
N. Y. Stipp. 124, 129 (1915), quoted as above with approval in Brummel v. Clifton
Realty Co., 146 Md. 56, 125 Atl. 905, 907 (1924). The Illinois court set down a
liberal view when it granted specific performance because the remedy at law
might not be adequate. McMullen v. Vanzant, 73 Ill. 190 (1874). "It is worth
noting that on the Continent of Europe and in Scotland specific performance is
allowed without any other limitations than those which the circumstances of the
case necessarily impose." 3 Williston, Sales (Rev. ed. 1948) 328.
-"Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 214, 89 S. E. (2d) 64, 68 (1955).
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Having thus established, in refuting the defendants' first conten-
tion, that the production of the equipment contracted for required
a substantial degree of unique skill and experience, the court tended
to undermine this course of reasoning in answering the defendants'
second objection to the granting of specific performance. Here, it was
reasoned that the defendants would not be compelled by the decree to
render such personal services in producing the equipment as would
place them in involuntary servitude to the plaintiff, because the defen-
dants may contract with some other manufacturer to build the device
for them.2 2 However, if the job is of a nature that a substitute builder
can handle it satisfactorily, it would appear that the defendants' quali-
fications are not special or unique;23 and if this is true, it would appear
that the plaintiff could obtain another manufacturer to do the job
and then would have an adequate remedy at law against the defen-
dants in a damages action for any extra expenses incurred in procur-
ing the desired equipment.2 4 The defendants' assertion that other
shops in the area could do the work was accepted by the court when
that fact could be used against the defendants' personal-service ob-
jection but was ignored by the court when that fact supported the
defendants' lack-of-uniqueness objection.
This is not to say, however, that the result reached in the principal
decision is not commendable. The defendants' personal service ob-
jection appears ill-conceived in both its aspects in the present situation.
First, enforced personal service appears to be objectionable as involun-
tary servitude in the constitutional sense only when of a confining
nature and under the direction of an employer as to details.235 Hence,
2Specific performance has been denied where a substitute for the chattel was
available. Le Moyne Ranch v. Agajanian, 121 Cal. App. 423, 8 P. (2d) 1055 (1932);
Spoor-Thompson Mach. Co. v. Bennett Film Laboratories, 1o5 N. J. Eq. lo8, 147
At. 202 (1929).
'4"In order to find the remedy at law adequate, it is not necessary that plain-
tiff be put in exactly the same position as he would have been by the performance
of the contract; it is sufficient if he can be put in substantially the same condition."
McClintock, Equity (2nd ed. 1948) 152. If plaintiff can obtain like goods with the
damages received, the remedy at law is usually adequate. Francis v. Medill, 16
Del. Ch. 129, 141 Atl. 697 (1928); American Snuff Co. v. Walker, 175 Ky. 149,
193 S. W. 1021 (1917); Hearn v. Ruark, 148 Md. 354, 129 Atl. 366 (1925); Fox v.
Fitzpatrick, 19o N. Y. 259, 82 N. E. 11o3 (19o7).
2
AIt has been held that the adequacy of the remedy at law, to preclude specific
performance, must be as certain, complete, and efficient as specific performance. Griffin
v. Oklahoma Nat. Gas Corp., 37 F. (2d) 545 (C. C. A. loth, 1930); Brummel v. Clifton
Realty Co., 146 Md. 56, 125 At. 9o5 (1924).
2zThe objection appears most frequently in contracts for close personal service.
E.g., Miller v. City of Phoenix, 51 Ariz. 254, 75 P. (2d) 1033 (1938); Ledford v.
Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R. Co., 298 Ill. App. 298, 18 N. E. (2d) 568 (1939); Fitzpatrick
v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 9 A. (2d) 639 (1939); Safro v. Lakofsky, 184 Minn. 336,
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this objection was not appropriate in the principal case because the
defendants would not be required to do their work under the continu-
ous and personal direction of the plaintiff, but would work in their
own shop, using their own means, at times of their own choosing,
the plaintiff having no right to interfere or supervise, but only the
right to demand that the finished product be delivered within reason-
able time in proper form and condition. In effect, the defendants
argue that a court should never specifically enforce a contract for the
manufacture and delivery of chattels. Secondly, in regard to contracts
involving individual taste, skill or judgment, but no close personal
relationship, the difficulty of enforcement, rather than a general policy
of law against such enforcement, appears to be the main considera-
tion,26 specific performance being granted if damages would be diffi-
cult to estimate.2 7
The idea of the law allowing a contract-breaching party to refuse to
perform because the non-breaching party can obtain someone else to
provide for him the benefit the breaching party contracted to con-
fer is not pleasing to the sense of justice. It would appear more sen-
sible to permit the plaintiff to determine which remedy, damages or
specific performance, would most benefit him, 28 rather than to give the
wrongdoer the choice of performing the contract or paying damages.
While such an unsatisfactory procedure may once have been necessary
in order that equity jurisdiction might develop alongside traditional
common law concepts, 20 it seems no longer necessary in a jurisprudence
238 N. W. 641 (1931). These contracts are enforced, by injunction against per-
formance of these services for others, if there is an express covenant not to so
perform, but not in cases involving no peculiar talent. Win. Rogers Mfg. Co. v.
Rogers, 58 Conn. 356, 2o Ati. 467 (189o); Safro v. Lakofsky, 184 Minn. 336, 238 N.
W. 641 (1931). Such enforcement is criticized by Stevens, Involuntary Servitude
by Injunction (1920) 6 Corn. L. Q. 235.
"The courts do not appear to limit their jurisdiction in cases of this type
but exercise their discretion to refuse the remedy. Tucker v. Warfield, 73 App. D. C.
278, isg F. (2d) 12 (1941); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Swiss Oil Corp., 41 F. (2d) 4 (C.
C. A. 6th, ig3o); Calumet Co. v. Oil City Corp., 114 Fla. 531, 154 So. 141 (1934);
Stem v. Freeport Acres Inc., 107 N. Y. S. (2d) 81o (1951). The modern approach is
well stated by Walsh: "The courts now realize that superintendence by the court
or its representative is unnecessary, that the court is called on merely to construe
the contract and to make a decree ordering its performance accordingly, leaving
to the plaintiff the privilege of raising the question thereafter as to whether or
not the decree has been compiled with, with undoubted power in the court to
compel full performance." Walsh, Equity (193o) 328.
M'Adams v. Messenger, 147 Mass. 185, 17 N. E. 491 (1888); Svenburg v. Fosseen,
75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4 (1899); Adams v. Snodgrass, 175 Va. 1, 7 S. E. (2d) 146
(1940).
s Story, Equity Jurisprudence (12th ed. 1877) 705; Walsh, Equity (193o) 3o6;
Note (195o) 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 409.
-'The historic conflict between law and equity appears to have caused many
1956]
58 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII
in which the presence of both law and equity has been so thoroughly
reconciled.3 0 The West Virginia Supreme Court appears to have ac-
cepted this fact in declaring that "the court is controlled by that
sound and reasonable discretion, which governs itself as far as may
be, by general rules and principles, but which at the same time with-
holds or grants relief according to the circumstances of each particular
case, when these rules and principles will not furnish any exact measure
of justice between the parties."3 1
Unfortunately, the Virginia court in the Thompson case did not set
down that broad a principle in reaching its reasonable and progressive
result regarding the availability of the specific performance remedy. It
appeared to find itself so bound by the traditional rules restricting
equity's power to grant such relief that the desired result could be
reached only by a strained application of those rules. Unfortunately
also, the action of the Virginia court in giving recognition to tradi-
tional rules while applying them with an unusual effect in order to
reach a desired result leaves to conjecture how the Virginia court will
react to future requests for specific performance of contracts for the
purchase or manufacture of chattels. However, the decision in the
Thompson case stimulates the hope that the general trend toward
enforcement of contracts for the sale of chattels will be supported in
Virginia.32  IV. BERNARD SMITH
of the restrictions upon equity's powers, since equity "did not establish itself with-
out great jealousy on the part of the common law courts." Fry, Specific Performance
of Contracts (2nd ed. 1884) 8. For further discussion of this point see Note (195o)
17 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 409.
3This appears to be recognized by the ever increasing willingness of the courts
to enforce contracts not relating to land. General Securities Corp. v. Welton, 223
Ala. 299, 135 So. 329 (1931); Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 316 Mass. 631, 56 N. E.
(2d) 1 (1944) (compiling in footnote i the Massachusetts cases broadening specific
performances); Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Evatt Const. Co., 256 Mass. 404,
152 N. E. 715 (1926); Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 Atl.
378 (1929); Titus v. Empire Mink Corp., 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 909 (1939). For a discus-
sion of additional developments in equity see Simpson, Fifty Years of American
Equity (1936) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 171.
-"Johnson v. Ohio River R. Co., 61 W. Va. 141, 56 S. E. 200, 204 (1906).
32No definite trend can be found in previous Virginia decisions on points in-
volved in the principal case. The court has granted specific performance where the
public interest is evidently involved. Southern Ry. Co. v. Franklin & P. R. Co., 96 Va.
693, 32 S. E. 485 (1899). The court has dismissed the problem of judicial supervision,
upon the assumption that its decrees will be obeyed. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Williams Slate Co., 143 Va. 722, 129 S. E. 499 (1925). But it has found the remedy
at law adequate in many cases. Griscom v. Childress, 183 Va. 42, 31 S. E. (2d) B09
(1944); Walker v. Henderson, 151 Va. 913, 145 S. E. 311 (1928); Wright v. Pucket, 22
Grat. 370 (Va. 1872). It has also, on occasion, been quick to deny enforcement on
the ground that a contract involved personal service, Campbell v. Rust, 85 Va. 653,
8 S. E. 664 (1889), but has shown a more liberal vein in a similar case, Grubb v.
Sharkey, 90 Va. 831, 20 S. E. 784 (1894).
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LABOR LAW-APPLICATION OF RIGHT-To-WORK LAWS TO ATTEMPTS OF
UNIONS To EFFECTUATE UNION SECURITY MEASURES. [Nevada]
In a number of states legislation has been enacted' in recent years
to restrict or prohibit the use of a union or closed shop agreement 2 or
similar union security devices, with the stated purpose of protecting
the workingman's right to a free and unhampered decision on the
question of whether or not he will join a union. The need for these
so called "right-to-work" statutes was explained by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in the case of State v. Whitaker in 1947: "Until
the beginning of the war only a relatively small minority of employees
(less than 20 per cent) were affected by contracts containing any com-
pulsory features. According to the Secretary of Labor, however, within
the last 5 years over 75 per cent now contain some form of compulsion.
... [W]ith this trend, abuses of compulsory membership have be-
come ... too serious and too numerous to justify permitting pres-
ent law to remain unchanged."3 The legislative remedy for this prob-
lem took the form of statutes and constitutional amendments provid-
ing that no one shall be denied an opportunity to obtain or retain em-
ployment solely because of his membership or non-membership in a
labor organization.4 Most of these enactments also contained a pro-
'Eighteen states now have right-to-work laws. Ala. Code (Supp. 1953) tit. 26,
§ 375; Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1952) § 56.1302; Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) § 81-20ol et
seq.; Fla. Const. (944) Declaration of Rights § 12; Ga. Code Ann. (Supp. 1951)
§§ 54-902 et seq., 54-9922; 2 Iowa Code (1954) c. 7 36A.2; La. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954)
tit. 23 §§ 881 et seq.; 5a Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1954) tit. 25, § 6984.5; Neb. Rev.
Stat. (1952) § 48-217; Nev. Stat. (1953) c. 1; 2c N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 195o)
§§ 95-78 et seq.; N. D. Rev. Code (Supp. 1953) §34-0114; S. C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1954)
§40-46; S. D. Code (Supp. 1952) § 17.11o1; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, Supp.
1952) §§11412.8 et seq.; i Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1949) arts. 5154c, 5207a; Utah Sess. Laws
(1955) c. 54; 6 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §§4o-68 et seq.
:A closed shop agreement is one which requires membership in a union as a
condition of employment. East Co. v. United Oysterman's Union, 13o N. J. Eq. 292,
21 A. (2d) 799 (1941). A union shop contract is one under which the employees
of the company would be required to become members of the union as a condition
of retaining employment. Wallace Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 141 F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 4th,
1944).
3228 N. C. 352, 45 S. E. (2d) 860, 870, 871 (1947).
"'No person shall be denied employment because of membership in, or affili-
ation with, or resignation or expulsion from a labor organization, or because
of refusal to join or affiliate with a labor organization; nor shall any individual
or corporation or association of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral,
to exclude persons from employment because of membership in or non-membership
in a labor organization." Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) §48-217. This provision is com-
prehensively typical of provisions contained within the right-to-work legislation.
However, in some states, such as Arizona, where the legislature had already
adopted measures to prevent coercion of employees not to join a labor organization,
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vision prohibiting employers from entering into contracts or agree-
ments obligating themselves to exclude persons from employment be-
cause they are or are not labor union members. 5 Although union
security was seriously limited by the passage of these statutes, unions
have been unsuccessful in their repeated attempts to have them de-
clared unconstitutional.6 The Supreme Court of the United States has
rejected arguments that the legislation violates the right of freedom of
speech,7 denies equal protection of the laws,8 impairs the obligation of
the right-to-work laws have been phrased as follows: "No person shall be denied
the opportunity to obtain or retain employment because of non-membership in
a labor organization...." Ariz. Code Ann. (Supp. 1952) § 56-1302.
'The Supreme Court of the United States, upholding the validity of the Ne-
braska right to work statute, has defined the effect of this legislation to be to com-
mand employers to employ workers without regard to union or non-union affilia-
tion. See Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 355 U. S.
525, 69 S. Ct. 251, 252, 93 L. ed. 212, 216 (1949).
OLincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525,
69 S. Ct. 251, 93 L. ed. 212 (1949); Whitaker v. State, 335 U. S. 525, 69 S. Ct. 251,
93 L. ed. 212 (1949); American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.,
335 U. S. 538, 69 S. Ct. 258, 93 L. ed. 222 (1949); Walter v. State, 34 Ala. 268, 38 S.
(2d) 6o9 (1949); Local 688 v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S. W. (2d) 958 (1950);
Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S. E. (2d) 872 (1949).
Perhaps the basic attitude of the Court in this controversy was summed up
by Justice Frankfurter when he observed in a concurring opinion: "Obviously
the proper forum for mediating a clash of feeling and rendering a prophetic judg-
ment is the body chosen for those purposes by the people. Its functions can be
assumed by this court only in disregard of the historic limits of the Constitution."
American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U. S. 538, 557, 69
S. Ct. 26o, 267, 93 L. ed. 222, 233 (1949). Compare Hanson v. Union Pac. R. R., s6o
Neb. 669, 71 N. W. (2d) 526 (1955), in which the Nebraska court said the right
to work was a fundamental human right which is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment from infringement by the federal government,
such infringement being found in the Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), 45
U. S. C. A. §§151 et seq. (1954)-
7"Nothing in the language of the laws indicates a purpose to prohibit speech,
assembly, or petition. Precisely what these state laws do is to forbid employers
acting alone or in concert with labor organizations deliberately to restrict em-
ployment to none but union members .... There cannot be wrung from a con-
stitutional right of workers to assemble to discuss improvements of their own
working standards, a further constitutional right to drive from remunerative
employment all other persons who will not or can not participate in union as-
semblies." Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 355
U. S. 525, 53o, 69 S. Ct. 251, 254, 93 L. ed. 219, 217 (1949).
"'In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3o U. S.
1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893, io8 A. L. R. 1352, this Court considered a challenge
to the National Labor Relations Act on the ground that it applied restraints against
employers but, did not apply similar restraints against wrongful conduct by em-
ployees. We there pointed out ... the general rule that 'legislative authority ex-
erted within its proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach.' . . . We
cannot say that the Arizona amendment has denied appellants equal protection of
the laws."
"We are satisfied that Arizona has attempted both in the anti-yellow dog con-
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contracts made prior to the enactment of the statutes,9 and deprives
employees of liberty without due process of law.10
Having been unsuccessful in their attacks on the constitutionality
of the right-to-work laws, unions have used various approaches in at-
tempts to circumvent the prohibitions of the acts and neutralize their
effects. One of these was demonstrated by the recent case of Building
Trades Council of Reno v. Bonito." When plaintiff was constructing
several new units as additions to his motel, a business agent of the
defendant labor organization attempted to persuade him to sign a con-
tract which read as follows: "The employer agrees that when crafts-
men covered by this agreement are required, the employer shall first
apply to the union to supply such craftsmen. If the union shall be
unable, within 48 hours, to supply such craftsmen, the employer may
employ craftsmen from such other source as he may choose."'12 Plain-
tiff was put on the "We Do Not Patronize List" because he refused
to sign the agreement, and as a consequence when he subsequently
attempted to have a sign constructed and installed at his motel, he was
unable to obtain any service from local businesses. He then engaged a
California firm to provide the desired sign. Upon delivery of the sign
to Plaintiff's premises, the employees of the California firm contacted
defendants and were informed of the presence of the name of plaintiff's
tract law and in the anti-discrimination constitutional amendment to strike at what
were considered evils, to strike where those evils were most felt, and to strike in a
manner that would most effectively suppress the evils." American Federation of
Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U. S. 538, 541, 542, 69 S. Ct. 258, 259,
93 L. ed. 222, 225 (1949).
""There is a suggestion though not elaborated in briefs that these state laws
conflict with Art. I, § io of the United States Constitution, insofar as they impair
the obligation of contracts made prior to their enactment. That this contention
is without merit is now too clearly established to require discussion. See Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 436-439, 78 L. ed. 413, 427-430, 54
S. Ct. 231, 88 A. L. R. 1481, and cases there cited." Lincoln Federal Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 35 U. S. 525, 531, 69 S. Ct. 251, 254, 93 L. ed.
212, 218 (1949).
'0"This court beginning at least as early as 1934, when the Nebbia case was
decided, has steadily rejected the due process philosophy ennunciated in the Adair-
Coppage line of cases. In doing so it has consciously returned closer and closer to
the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against what
are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs,
so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional pro-
hibition, or of some valid law .... Just as we have held that the due process clause
erects no obstacle to block legislative protection of union members, we now hold
that legislative protection can be afforded non-union workers." Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525, 536, 537, 69 S. Ct.
251, 257, 93 L. ed. 212, 221 (1949)-
1-a.8o P. (2d) 295 (Nev. 1955).
F280 P. (2d) 295, 297 (Nev. 1955).
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business on a "We Do Not Patronize List." The employees of the Cali-
fornia firm therefore refused to make the installations and returned
the sign to their place of business in California. The motel owner sued
to enjoin the union from continuing to include his name on its black-
list, claiming that the Nevada right-to-work statute13 made the ob-
jective sought by the union illegal. The union argued that the statute
in question did not apply because the agreement sought was not to
exclude non-union labor from employment, but rather was to make
the union the employment agency of the motel owner. The trial court
granted an injunction which was sustained by the Supreme Court of
Nevada on the reasoning that the union's interpretation of the agree-
ment as an agency arrangement was unrealistic and unreasonable, that
the 48-hour limitation was actually a period of time during which
non-union men would be prevented from obtaining employment,
and that such discrimination against non-union workers would ren-
der the agreement sought a violation of the statute.
The courts have experienced considerable difficulty in ascertaining
what factors should receive consideration in determining whether the
specific course of conduct brought into question is in violation of a
right-to-work law. Earlier cases, which were brought primarily to test
the constitutionality of the statutes, typically involved contracts under
which unions had expressly sought to obtain closed or union shops,
and there was no need to look beyond the face of the agreement to
find that it was within the prohibition imposed by the legislation.'
4
However, controversies soon began to arise in which the union action
complained against did not so obviously contravene the statute, and
the courts were required to examine the elusive factors of motive,
intent, and consequence. In Local Union No. zo v. Graham,15 a gen-
eral contractor had obtained subcontractors to work on a construction
job, some of whom hired non-union labor. After some negotiations be-
tween union representatives and the general contractor, the union
began to picket the premises with signs which simply stated, "This Is
13 "Sec. 2 ... No person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain
employment because of nonmembership in a labor organization, nor shall ... any
corporation, individual or association of any kind enter into any agreement.
written or oral, which excludes any person from employment or continuaton
of employment because of nonmembership in a labor organization.
"Sec. 7 ... Any person injured or threatened with injury by an act declared
illegal by this Act shall, notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary,
be entitled to injunctive relief therefrom." Nev. Stat. (1953) c. 1.
"4Local No. 234 v. Henley & Beckwith, Inc., 66 S. (2d) 8M8 (Fla. 1953); N. L. R. B.
v. Auchter, 102 N. L. P. B. 88x (1953), 2o9 F. (2d) 273 (C. A. 5th, 1954); Walter v.
State, 34 Ala. 268, 38 S. (2d) 6o9 (1949); Local 688 v. Stephenson, 148 Tex. 434, 225
S. W. (2d) 958 (1950); Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S. E. (2d) 872 (1949).
"345 U. S. 192, 73 S. Ct. 585, 97 L. ed. 946 (1953)-
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Not a Union Job," and as a result the union laborers refused to work
further. The contractor sought to enjoin the picketing as unlawful,
alleging that it was for the purpose of inducing him to prevent non-
union laborers from working on the job. The trial court granted the in-
junction on the finding that the picketing was "carried on... for aims,
purposes and objectives in conflict with provisions of the Right to
Work laws of the State of Virginia and, therefore, [was] illegal....-16
The injunction was sustained by the United States Supreme Court. In
dissent, Justice Douglas emphasized the delicacy of the issue presented:
"The line between permissible and unlawful picketing will ... often
be narrow or even tenuous. A purpose to deprive nonunion men of
employment would make the picketing unlawful; a purpose to keep
union men away from the job would give the picketing constitutional
protection."' 7 He concluded that the record before the Court showed
no more than that the picketing was an attempt to advertise to union
men and sympathizers that non-union men were working on the job.
However, the majority of the Court was willing to accept the finding of
the Virginia courts that the picketing, though appearing innocent
while in progress, "was combined with conduct and circumstances
occurring before and during the picketing that demonstrated a pur-
pose on the part of [the union] that was in conflict with the Right
to Xork Statute."'$ Furthermore, it was pointed out that "The imme-
diate results of the picketing demonstrated its potential effectiveness ...
as a practical means of putting pressure on the general contractor to
eliminate from further participation all nonunion men on the proj-
ect."' 9
The Graham decision having opened the door to the examination
of objectives and ultimate results, the state courts have demonstrated
a wide diversity of opinion as to how far they may properly go in
projecting the circumstances into the future to determine whether
illegal consequences will arise from the course of conduct under ques-
tion. Even before the Graham case went to the Supreme Court, the
Virginia court, in upholding the validity of picketing in a very similar
situation, declared: "If the peaceful publication of the facts in an ef-
fort to unionize the painters resulted in economic pressure on the
[employers] ... that result did not make the purpose unlawful or
the picketing illegal. It cannot be said that picketing otherwise legal
becomes illegal because of the possibility that as a result of it a per-
'0545 U. S. 192, 195, 73 S. Ct. 585, 587, 97 L. ed. 946, 950 (1953) [italics supplied
by Supreme Court].
17345 U. S. 192, 202, 73 S. Ct. 585, 590, 97 L. ed. 946, 953 (1953).
S345 U. S 192, 197, 73 S- CL 585, 588, 97 L ed. 946, 951 (953).D345 U. S. 192, 21, 73 S. Ct. 585, 589, 97 L. ed. 946, 952 (1953).
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son affected by it may do an unlawful act, unless the purpose of the
picketing is to compel the doing of such an act." 20 A federal district
court, in applying the Arkansas right-to-work law, adopted an even
more restrictive approach in Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers.21 The
employer apparently argued that under the contract in question it was
intended by both himself and the union that the labor employed
should be restricted to union members. However, the court noted that
the contract made no provision for a closed or union shop or other
practice prohibited by the statute, and then asserted: "In passing
upon these motions we cannot go beyond the complaint and the con-
tract, and we can see nothing in them from which any illegality can
be inferred.. .. "22
By coincidence, the same statute was involved in a decision in
which the Arkansas Supreme Court took a very broad view of its
power to consider possibilities of future consequences in passing on
the validity of union action. In Self v. Taylor23 an employer sought an
injunction against picketing which followed his refusal to enter into
a collective bargaining contract with the union. The proposed con-
tract contained no provisions for a union or closed shop nor any other
term referring to practices outlawed by the right-to-work act. Though
the union argued that it had no motive in negotiating the contract ex-
cept to protect its members against having to work with non-union
labor, the employer alleged that the union was insisting on a 6o-day
cancellation provision with the intention of using it to harass him with
repeated contract negotiations unless he would consent to discharge two
non-union employees. The court ruled that the union did not have
a right to picket to obtain a contract which, though legal on its face,
in the circumstances of this case was obviously designed to achieve
indirectly a result which the law makes illegal.24 Indicating the sharp
2"Painters & Paperhangers Local Union v. Rountree Corp., 194 Va. 148, 154,
72 S. E. (2d) 402, 405 (1952).
n1 15 F. Supp. 802 (E. D. Ark. 1953).
2115 F. Supp. 802, 817 (E. D. Ark. 1953). The complaint charged that defendants,
an international labor union and certain government contractors, disrupted em-
ployment relationships between plaintiff and his individual employees under a
collective bargaining agreement and caused a breach of such agreement. It further
alleged that this was done pursuant to a preconceived plan, a conspirarcy, the
object of which was to force the plaintiffs to abandon their rights under the
contract. The contract contained a provision whereby the union would furnish at
the request of the-employer duly qualified workers in sufficient numbers as may
be necessary properly to execute work contracted for by the employer.
2'217 Ark. 953, 235 S. W. (2d) 45 (195o).
21217 Ark. 953, 235 S. W. (2d) 45 at 49 (195o). The testimony included a state-
ment by a union official to the effect that the union would not exercise its termina-
tion power if it found the employer to be on good behavior. The court interpreted
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conflict which exists on this question is the vigorous and persuasive dis-
sent. It pointed out that all the union was actually asking for was a
normal collective bargaining contract with a perfectly legal 6o-day
cancellation clause, and argued that the possibility or even the proba-
bility of this legal contract being used at some later time in an effort
to secure an illegal closed shop contract does not justify its being in-
validated. "The action now being taken by the majority of this court
appears to me to be a serious and dangerous one.... It may apply in
any case where any group, or any individual, seeks to engage in law-
ful conduct which, in the minds of some or all, may create a later
opportunity for unlawful conduct. It is the motive, the hope, the un-
certain expectation that is feared, and because of the fear a lawful
act is enjoined. This is too tenuous."
25
Perhaps even more tenuous was the action of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in Piegts v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters20 enjoining
picketing of an employer who refused to negotiate a contract in which
he would recognize the union as the sole bargaining agent for all of
his employees, union and non-union, in regard to wages, hours, and
working conditions. The contract made no reference whatever to re-
strictions against non-union employees, and there was no contention
that the union was attempting to use the contract to influence em-
ployment practices of the employer. Yet the court upheld the employer's
argument that the contract would be in conflict with the state right-
to-work law because a non-union worker's rights would be "abridged"
if the union acted as his agent. No explanation for this conclusion
was offered, except that "liberty of contract is a non-union man's pre-
rogative," and that the union might demand higher wages or shorter
hours for the employees when the non-union man would prefer
not to make such demands. 27 In dissent, it was pointed out that the
union was not attempting, through the contract or otherwise, to pro-
vide that workers be required to join a union as a condition of em-
ployment, which is the evil prohibited by the statute, and that the ma-
jority's decision was dearly in violation of the positive provision of the
statute that the statute should not be applied to deny the right of
"good behavior" to include the firing of his two non-union employees. Never be-
fore during the 9 years of dealings between employer and union had the union
insisted on a 6o-day termination clause, but during those previous negotiations the
employer did not have non-union help.
5,See 217 Ark. 953, 235 S. W. (2d) 45, 52 (1950).
181 S. (2d) 835 (La. 1955).
278k S. (2d) 835 at 838 (La. 1955).
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employees through a union to bargain collectively with their em-
ployer.
28
While right-to-work laws are productive of some beneficial results,
such broad interpretations as were made in the Self and Piegts cases
may cause severe injury to labor-management relations. These interpre-
tations naturally lead to charges by the union that the statutes can be
used by hostile courts to prohibit almost any union security measure.
Already, it is said that in the field of state labor legislation the most
bitter controversy centers about the right-to-work laws; 29 and at the
last two annual meetings of the Secretary of Labor's conference on
state laws, resolutions have been adopted condemmng such legislation. 30
In the Bonito case the Nevada court made a reasonable compro-
mise between the extreme views as to the scope of application of the
statutes. Though the agreement sought by the union did not express-
ly provide that the employer should discriminate against non-union
labor, the court felt that inquiry can properly be made as to whether
the operation of the plan proposed is intended to result ultimately
in such discrimination. If so, the fact that its illegality did not appear
on the face of the proposed agreement should not save it. However,
it seems inevitable that undue prejudice to union rights will result
if a court has power to hold a presently valid agreement illegal simply
because the court believes, as in the Self case, that the union may use
it in the future to work discrimination. Although the United States
'See 81 S. (2d) 835, 839, 840 (La. 1955), referring to La. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1954)
tit. 23 §§881 et seq. The disregard of other sections of the same Act indicates
that the court felt that the discrimination section was supreme over all existing law,
or certainly supreme over other sections of this Act. Construction of the statute
in this manner may lead to a constitutional issue of decided importance. If one as-
sumes that the right to bargain collectively is a constitutionally protected right,
then it would seem that a decision such as this would run afoul of the doctrine
of Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. ed. 1213 (1940). This
doctrine incorporates the idea that a general statute may not be construed in such a
way that a constitutional right is held to be in violation of the statute. The statute
has to be so narrowly drawn as to define specific conduct as constituting an im-
mediate danger to a substantial interest of the state.
On the other hand, if one assumes that the right to bargain collectively is
merely a constitutional issue having not yet been presented to the courts, it would
seem that the Louisiana court should construe this statute so as not to raise that
question. The Supreme Court of the United States will not pass upon a consti-
tutional question, although properly presented by the record, if there is also present
some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. Thus, if a case can be
decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other
a question of statutory construction or general law, the court will decide only the
latter. Light v. United States, 220 U. S. 523 at 538, 31 S. Ct. 485 at 488, 55 L. ed. 570
at 575 (1911)-
2Note (1955) 36 L. R. R. (Analysis) 89, 9i .
30Note (1955) 36 L. R. R. iog, 127.
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Supreme Court in the Graham case struck down a union demand which
appeared innocent but was presently being used to obtain an illegal
objective, that case does not seem to justify the courts in pro-
jecting developments into the future to find prospective illegal activity.
Nor does it seem that the application of the provisions prohibiting
discrimination against non-union labor should be made without due
regard to other existent state or federal law protecting the right of
unions. Foremost among these are labor's right of freedom of speech
through picketing for a lawful purpose and its rights to bargain col-
lectively with an employer through a union agent. The failure to rec-
ognize the latter right, expressly granted by state statute, led the
Louisiana court into a highly vulnerable position in deciding the
Piegts case.
Thus, a three-step inquiry would enable the courts to reach more
sound results in these controversies over the application of the right-
to-work laws to specific union demands: (I) Is the demand being made
one which on its face contravenes the statute? (2) If not, is the end
which the union is presently attempting to attain through its de-
mands one which results in discrimination against non-union labor?
(3) Even if so, is the union activity of a kind which is protected by other
state or by federal law? By following this procedure, courts would be
more likely to avoid reaching the extreme decisions which unduly
prejudice the interests of either union labor or management.
SAMUEL L. DAVIDSON
LABOR LAW-SCOPE OF PROHIBITION AGAINST SECONDARY BoYcoTr UNDER
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT. [Federal]
Though at least one prominent legal authority has refused to de-
fine the term "secondary boycott' because of its uncertainty and vague-
ness,1 it is generally defined by the National Labor Relations Board and
the courts as a "union tactic whereby a dispute with Employer A is used
as a justification for putting economic pressure on Employer B.' 2 Prob-
ably because of this vagueness and because of the significance the boy-
'In reference to the term "secondary boycott," the Restatement of Torts states:
"That phrase has such an uncertain meaning and is so frequently applied to such
diverse situations that it is not used in the Restatement of this Subject." Restatement,
Torts (1939) § 8o1(4). See also, Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction
(193o) 42, quoting Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111, 118 (S. D. N. Y.
1914).
i'ower, Secondary Boycotts: An Outline (1954) 5 Lab. L. J. 183, 185.
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cott has received as a union tactic, legislators and judges alike have re-
peatedly modified the law concerning secondary boycotts. 3 The latest
legislative change on the federal level came about in 1947 with the pas-
sage of Section 8(b)(4 )(A) of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
which provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organ-
ization.., to engage in, or to induce or encourage... a strike or con-
certed refusal in the course of their employment to use... or other-
wise handle or work on any goods.., where an object thereof is...
forcing.., any employer.., to cease using... or otherwise dealing in
the products of any.., manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person .... ,,4
In light of the sweeping language of Section 8(b)(4)(A), it could
readily be argued that even primary action would be outlawed; 5 but
with an eye to legislative intent, the N. L. R. B. quickly eliminated this
'The secondary boycott was extensively used as a successful labor union tactic
in the i88o's at which time the Knights of Labor boycotted consumers who had
accepted products from manufacturers deemed by the union to be unfair. This
practice prevailed until the famous Danbury Hatters decision, Loewe v. Lawlor, 2o8
U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301, 52 L. ed. 488 (i9o8), which held that the Sherman Act, 26
Stat. 2o9 (189o), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7 (1951), could be applied to curtail certain
labor union activities, when these activities were in restraint of trade. In 1914,
due in part to union resentment toward the Danbury Hatters decision, Congress
passed the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 12-17 (1951), which
was intended to limit the application of the Sherman Act in regard to labor unions.
However, the intended effect of the Clayton Act was restricted in Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 245 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. ed. 349, 16 A. L. R. 196
(1921), the Court construing Section 2o of the Clayton Act to be but a restatement
of the law as it existed under the Sherman Act. Thus, members of machinists
unions throughout the nation who were not employed by Duplex, but who were
in sympathy with its employees, could not lawfully strike against customers of
Duplex, since only workers directly employed by Duplex were to be protected. With
the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§ o1-
105 (1947), the power to issue injunctions in most labor disputes was withdrawn
from the federal courts. This had the practical effect of permitting most secondary
boycotts which previously would have been prohibited under the regulations of
the Sherman Act. When the Eightieth Congress in 1947 passed Section 8(b) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (1947), the
secondary boyocott was proscribed as an unfair labor practice. Though this section
of the statute does not prohibit the secondary boycott by name, it was definitely
designed for this purpose. As Senator Taft said: "The only strikes which are de-
dared to be illegal are secondary boycotts and jurisdictional strikes." 93 Cong. Rec.
6446, June 5, 1947.
'61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. § 15 8(b)(4 )(A) (Supp. 1954).
'If the union activity occurs on the premises of the employer with whom the
dispute exists it is usually held to be primary action, while if the action occurs
at a place of business where strikers have no labor dispute it is held to be secondary.
Newman, The Law of Labor Relations (1953) 115. The N. L. R. E. has adopted what
is usually referred to as the situs doctrine in the determination of this question. For
discussion on this subject, see Note (1955) 50 N. W. L. Rev. 247 at 252.
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possibility in the Pure Oil Co. case, 6 holding that only secondary
action was intended to be prohibited. Thus, if a dispute between em-
ployees and employer results in a strike by the employees, the strike
is not forbidden by this Section though it naturally terminates
business between employer and his customers.
The kind of action typically covered by the statute was found
in the Howland Dry Goods Co. case, 7 where the N. L. R. B. held it
to be an unfair practice for Local 145, desiring recognition as the
bargaining representative of the employees of the Delivery Co., to
picket the entrance of the Read Co., a customer of the Delivery Co.,
to induce the employees of the Read Co. to stop working, for the pur-
pose of causing a cessation of business between the two firms. Similarly,
it would not be lawful for a union engaged in a dispute with employer A
to boycott employer B because employer B does business with employer
A.8 However, employees of A, in dispute with their employer, are not
prohibited from approaching manufacturer B with whom A does
business, requesting that in furtherance of their dispute with A, B
stop dealing with A. This is so since there is no attempt either to
boycott B, or to influence B's employees to take part in the dispute
by bringing pressure on B if B fails to cease dealing with A.P
In 395 1, The United States Supreme Court extended the effect
of Section 8(b)( 4)(A) beyond its obvious application in three Building
Trade decisions.' 0 In each case general contractors had contracted
with several subcontractors, one of whom employed non-union help,
to work on certain building projects. Union workers in the employ-
ment of other subcontractors, upon realizing non-union workers were
on the job, struck and picketed the premises of the respective pro-
jects, refusing to work with the non-union help.
Since undoubtedly a dispute which was in one sense primary existed
between the non-union subcontractors and the picketing union, the
Pure Oil Co., 84 NLRB 315 (1949). Accord: Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 NLRB 547
(195o); Interborough News Co., 90 NLRB 2135 (1950); Shultz Refrigerated Service,
Inc., 87 NLRB 5o2 (1949); Ryan Construction Corp., 85 NLRB 417 (1949).
7Howland Dry Goods Co., 85 NLRB io37 (1949).
8H. R. Rep. No. 51o, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. 43.
"United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 81 NLRB 8o2 (1949), where
it was held the union action was not in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A) even though
the union employees threatened to picket the company if it did not comply with
their request to stop dealing with the primary employer.
"IN. L. R. B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675,
71 S. Ct. 943, 95 L. ed. 1284 (1951); International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 5oi v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 694, 71 S. Ct. 954, 95 L. ed. 1299 (1951);
Local 74, Brotherhood of Carpenters 8= Joiners v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 707, 71
S. Ct. 966, 95 L. ed. 1309 (195).
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Court apparently concluded that the general contractors were neutrals
in reference to this dispute and therefore were being subjected to the
pressure of secondary action."I Because normally in secondary boycotts
the picketing ensues at the plant of the neutral or secondary employer, a
question was raised as to whether the elements of secondary action
existed in the building trade situation where picketing took place
at the premises of the primary disputant, which by coincidence were
also the premises of the neutral employer.
12
Moreover, the petitioning unions took further issue with the N. L.
R. B.'s finding that the object of the strike was to cause a cessation
of business between the general contractor and the non-union subcon-
tractor. In the first place, the contention was advanced that the con-
tractor and subcontractor were not "doing business" with each other
because the contractor had such control over the subcontractor's work
on the project as to make the latter a virtual employee of the former.
Therefore, any interference which the union's activities might create
in regard to the dealings between the two would not have the effect
of forcing one party to cease "doing business" with the other. However,-
the Court ruled that the relationship between contractor and sub-
contractor is that of independent contractors, and that therefore they
were "doing business" within the terms of Section 8 (b)(4 )(A). Secondly,
the unions contended that their object in striking was not to cause
a business cessation but that they merely wished to unionize the job. The
Supreme Court recogonized the merit in the union argument but re-
jected it on the reasoning that in order to accomplish the ultimate
objective to make the job all union, the union must necessarily force
the non-union subcontractors off the job. This end could only be
accomplished by a termination of the contract between the general
contractor and the non-union subcontractor; and so, one of the ob-
""The secondary employer is the neutral employer with whom the union has
no basic dispute." Tower, Secondary Boycotts: An Outline (1954) 5 Lab. L. J. 183,
185.
12Though this point was extensively argued in two of the Courts of Appeals,
Denver Building & Construction Trades Council v. N. L. R. B., 186 F. (2d) 326 (C. A.
D. C. 195o), rev'd 341 U. S. 675, 71 S. Ct. 943, 95 L. ed. 1284 (1951); International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 5oi v. N. L. R. B., 181 F. (2d) 34 (C. A.
2nd, 195o) aff'd 341 U. S. 694, 71 S. Ct. 954, 95 L. ed. 1299 (1951), the Supreme Court
evidently regarded it as insignificant. In the Denver case Justice Burton did rec-
ognize this problem, conceding that if there had been no contract between the
general contractor and the non-union subcontractor the dispute might have been
primary. Apart from this comment the Court remained silent on this point; however,
in view of legislative intent that primary action was to be excluded from Section
8(b)(4)(A), it is obvious that the Court decided that the action in the Building
Trade cases was secondary in nature.
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jectives of the union employees in picketing was the termination of
business between the contractors. Thus, the Court has decided that
if an objective-not necessarily the sole objective-of the secondary
action is to bring about a cessation of business between any employer
and another person, the action is prohibited.13
This problem of objectives was raised again in the recent case
of Douds v. International Longshoremen's Association, Independent,14
under conditions removed from the typical secondary boycott situation.
Two longshoremen unions, the petitioning "Independent" union
and the AFL-ILA, were competing for the position of bargaining rep-
resentative in the Port of New York.15 Members of a local union of the
Independent had gone on strike to force their employer to discharge
an employee who had recently resigned from the Independent union
and joined AFL-ILA. Consequently, this employee was discharged,
but when the Independent local returned to work, the discharged em-
ployee set up a picket on the pier. Protesting the dismissal from em-
ployment, a truck driver's union, Local 807, affiliated with the AFL,
refused to break the picket. In retaliation, Independent unions
throughout the Port of New York refused to service any of the trucks
operated by members of Local 807, thereby causing almost a complete
tie-up of the Port.
Though the basic dispute existed between the unions, it brought
about secondary repercussions, inasmuch as business ceased between
the employers of the Independent longshoremen and the trucking
concerns who employed members of Local 807 as drivers. The exis-
tence of this secondary effect gave rise to the contention that this type
of union action, retaliatory against a rival union, fell within the un-
fair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(b)(4 )(A). Upon this con-
1aN. L. R. B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S.
675, 689, 71 S. Ct. 943, 952, 95 L. ed. 1284, 1295 (1951): "It is not necessary to
find that the sole object of the strike was that of forcing the contractor to terminate
the subcontractor's contract.
"'224 F. (2d) 455 (C. A. 2nd, 1955) cert. denied Oct 24, 1955, Doc. No. 335-
"The happenings which antedate the actual labor dispute are of interest. The
International Longshoremen's Association, Independent, had been preceded by
a union of the same name which had been affiliated with the American Federation
of Labor but was expelled in the fall of 1953, whereupon the AFL chartered the
AFL-ILA in its place. In its effort to obtain certification as representative of the
longshoremen in the Port, the AFL attempted to recruit members from the ranks
of the Independent. On December 23 and 24 an election was held upon the pe-
tition of the AFL-ILA that it represented a majority. The Independent union won
this election, but certification was witheld because of its alleged methods during
the voting. During the hearing on this matter the ex parte injunction was granted.
Douds v. International Longshoremen's Association, Independent, 224 F. (2d) 455
(C. A. 2nd, 1955).
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tention the petitioner obtained an ex parte injunction temporarily
enjoining the Independent union from further work refusals or strikes
in this respect. However, the union disobeyed the court order by con-
ducting a general strike throughout the Port of New York, and the
District Court for the Southern District of New York imposed fines
and sentences on the basis of a jury finding that the object of the strike
was to cause the employers of the Independent union to stop dealing
with the trucking concerns. 16 Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit where the order was reversed, on the holding
that the object of the refusal of the Independent longshoremen to
service trucks was to promote the cause of the Independent union
in its struggle for certification as representative of the longshoremen
in the Port. The termination of business between the employers in-
volved was held to be but a consequence of the contest for represen-
tation.
The question thus arises as to whether the facts in the Building
Trade cases and the Longshoremen's case are sufficiently different to
warrant the finding of an unfair labor practice in the former but not
in the latter. In order to find an unfair labor practice under Section
8(b)( 4)(A) it seems necessary to establish: (1) a secondary action, and
(2) a strike, boycott, or refusal to work where an object thereof is to
cause a cessation of work between any employer and any person with
whom he is doing business.
17
"-The instructions to the trial court were "that the refusal to serve the trucks,
taken independently of the strike, was unlawful, if its 'object was to force the em-
ployer of the men working on the piers to cease doing business with trucking con-
cerns employing 8o7 drivers'; or if it had the 'object' of forcing 'customers of the
trucking concerns employing 807 drivers to cease doing business' with them. In that
case they should convict; but if on the other hand they found that the strike was
not a subterfuge to cover the refusal, they should acquit." 224 F. (2d) 455, 458 (C. A.
2nd, 1955).
Judge Hand, delivering the opinion for the Court of Appeals, objected to these
instructions on the ground that when Judge Burke left no question to the jury
except whether the strike was a scheme to cover the refusal to service the trucks
regardless of whether the refusal was a step in the contest for representation, the
jury had to find that the union action fell within Section 8(b)(4)(A). 224 F. (2d)
455 at 459 (C. A. 2nd, 1955).
17Rabouin v. N. L. R. B., 195 F. (2d) go6 (C. A. 2nd, 1952); Di Giorgio Fruit
Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 191 F. (2d) 642 (C. A. D. C. 1951) cert. denied 342 U. S. 869
72 S. Ct. 11o, 96 L. ed. 653 (1951); Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 NLRB 547 (1950); Inter-
borough News Co., go NLRB 2135 (195o); Shultz Refrigerated Service, Inc., 87 NLRB
502 (1949); Ryan Construction Corp., 85 NLRB 417 (1949); Pure Oil Co., 84 NLRB
35 (1949) holding only secondary action is to be proscribed. Contra: International
Rice Milling Co. v. N. L. R. B., 183 F. (2d) 21, 26 (C. A. 5 th, i95o) rev'd on other
grounds 341 U. S. 665, 71 S. Ct. 961, 95 L. ed. 1277 (1951), in which it was said: "The
statute clearly provides a remedy for the type of conduct engaged in by the union,
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In neither of the Building Trade cases nor the Longshoremen's
case was there a secondary boycott in the usual sense of the term, be-
cause no labor dispute over wages, hours, or working conditions ex-
isted between the primary employer and his employees, followed by
the employees' union placing economic pressure on either a customer
or any other person with whom the primary employer carried on
business transactions.' 8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in the
Building Trade cases decided that the type of conduct proscribed by
Section 8(b)(4 )(A) was involved.'
9 Consequently, though the courts de-
clare that secondary action is necessary to bring the action under
Section 8 (b)(4 )(A), there appears to be a marked willingness on their
part to find secondary action in order to comply with this requisite.2 0
In view of this tendency, the Court of Appeals in the Longshoremen's
case would certainly have been justified in such finding.
Moreover, in N. L. R. B. v. Washington-Oregon District Council
the Board found a union refusal to process shingles produced by non-
union help to be secondary in nature, in spite of the fact that no
prior dispute existed between the union and the producer of the non-
union made shingles.21 This decision eliminates a distinction which
might have been drawn between the Building Trades cases and the
Longshoreman's case to the effect that the secondary action is not pres-
ent unless a prior dispute exists either between the primary employer
and the union or between the neutral and the union.22
without resort to any distinction between primary and secondary activities. If the
union's activities come within the language of the statute, they constitute an unfair
labor practice ..."
"Douds v. International Longshoremen's Association, Independent, 224 F.
(2d) 455 at 458, 459 (C. A. 2nd, 1955).
"IN. L. R. B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675,
71 S. Ct. 943, 95 L. ed. 1284 (1951); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 5ol v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 694, 71 S. Ct. 954, 95 L. ed. 1299 (1951); Local
74, Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 707, 71 S. Ct.
966, 95 L. ed. 1309 (195).
-This can be seen by comparing Tower's definition of secondary boycott,
quoted in the first paragraph of this comment, with the situation in the Building
Trade cases. On the surface it would appear the Building Trade situation com-
plies with the definition since the union in dispute with A, the non-union subcon-
tractor, brought economic pressure on employer B through picketing; however,
if the question were asked how might the union resort to primary action against
the non-union subcontractor on the construction site, the fallacy in this view of the
situation becomes evident. It would have been impossible for the union to con-
duct primary action without bringing economic pressure on the general con-
tractor.
2N. L. R. B. v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' District Council, 211 F.
(2d) 149 (C. A. 9 th, 1954).
"Judge Hand recognized this distinction but the judgment of the district court
was reversed, since the Court of Appeals felt that the decision was in error because
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On the question of whether the secondary action of the union
was for a prohibited objective, it has already been noted that the
Building Trade decisions held that the cessation of business between
the primary employer and the person with whom he is doing business
need not be the sole objective of refusal to work by the union; rather,
if an object of the strike or refusal to work is to cause a termination of
business, it is proscribed by Section 8(b)(4 )(A).
23 Thus, it is not neces-
sary for the courts to determine whether the underlying object of the
union activity comes under that Section, because if an intermediate
objective necessary to the attainment of the ultimate objective is to cause
a cessation of business, the action becomes an unfair labor practice.
In the Longshoremen's case it is clear that one objective of the Inde-
pendent's refusal to service the trucks was to effect a discontinuance of
business between employers of the Independent union workers and
the trucking concerns employing drivers from Local 807. This result
was desired for the obvious purpose of inducing the trucking con-
cerns to bring pressure on their Local 807 drivers to break the picket
of the discharged employee. Assuming this to be true, the union action
would fall within the purview of Section 8(b)(4 )(A), and the fact that
the union's ultimate objective was to promote its cause in the struggle
for representation among the longshoremen does not alter the situa-
tion.
Furthermore, in at least one case, New York Shipping Association,
the Board has inferred that the problem of union objectives is prac-
tically irrelevant, stating: ".... though it is plain that primary action
is to be excepted from the scope of Section 8(b)(4 )(A), there is nothing
in the legislative history to warrant a conclusion that where secondary
action is involved, Congress intended to draw a distinction between
different kinds, so as to include some but not others. There is evidence,
on the other hand, that Congress ... intended Section 8(b)( 4)(A) to
condemn all action directed against or which has the effect of injur-
ing the business of third persons not involved in the basic disagree-
ment giving rise to the conflict."
24
the object of the union action was permissible. See Douds v. International Long-
shoremen's Association, Independent, 224 F. (2d) 455 at 458, 459, 46o (C. A. 2nd, 1955).
2N. L. R. B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S.
675, 71 S. Ct. 943, 95 L. ed. 1284 (1951); International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 5o v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 694, 71 S. Ct. 954, 95 L. ed. 1299 (1951);
Local 74, Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 707, 71
S. Ct. 966, 95 L. ed. 13o9 (igs5); N. L. R. B. v. Wine, Liquor 8- Distillers Workers'
Union, 178 F. (2d) 584, 16 A. L. R. (2d) 762 (C. A. 2nd, 1949); Sperry v. Building &
Construction Trades Council, IPi F. Supp. 36 (W. D. Mo. 1955).
24New York Shipping Association, 107 NLRB 686, 711 (1954).
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Consequently, there appears no sound reason to warrant the con-
flicting results obtained in the Building Trade case and the Longshore-
men's case, for in the latter sufficient evidence existed to find both
secondary action and an unlawful objective as defined by the statute.
On this view of the situation, the Court of Appeals has failed in the
principal case to apply the secondary action prohibition to the lengths
which the Supreme Court has indicated it might operate. However,
it may well be that the Court of Appeals' more limited interpretation
should be adopted, for otherwise the scope of Section 8(b)(4 )(A) could be
extended to far-reaching extremes whereby the union's basic right to
strike would be greatly curtailed.2 5 This view is particularly realistic
in light of the Fifth Circuit's pronouncement that even primary ac-
tivities can be proscribed, and this factor seems to indicate the em-
phatic need for revision of Section 8(b)( 4 )(A).
2 6 To remove the am-
biguities now creating the problem of the cases under discussion,
Congress should enact concise definitions of primary and secondary
action, whereby the former is permitted and the latter held unlawful.
2 7
Likewise any revision should specify that the object referred to in re-
lation to the union's action means the sole or underlying purpose of
the practice alleged to be unfair.
28
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2'This possibility was expressed by Judge Faye in the Court of Appeals' opinion
in the Denver Building Trade case: "To hold otherwise might well outlaw virtually
every effective strike, for a consequence of all strikes is some interference with busi-
ness relationships between the struck employer and others." Denver Building &
Construction Trades Council v. N. L. R. B., 186 F. (2d) 326, 334 (C. A. D. C. 1950)
rev'd 341 U. S. 675, 71 S. Ct. 943, 95 L. ed. 1284 (1951). The same opinion was
voiced by Justice Douglas, dissenting, with whom Justices Jackson and Reed con-
curred, when this case reached the Supreme Court: "If that is forbidden, the Taft-
Hartley Act makes the right to strike, guaranteed by § 13, dependent on fortuitous
business arrangements that have no significance so far as the evils of the secondary
boycott are concerned." N. L. R. B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades
Council, 341 U. S. 675, 693, 71 S. Ct. 943, 953, 95 L. ed. 1284, 1297 (1951). Accord:
Douds v. International Longshoremen's Association, Independent, 224 F. (2d) 455 at
459 (C. A. 2nd, 1955). Cf., N. L. R. B. v. Business Machine Board, 24 L. Wk. 2287
(1955), where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that a union may
picket the customers of a firm under certain circumstances.
"See quotation in note 17, supra, from International Rice Milling Co. v. N. L.
R. B., 183 F. (2d) 21, 26 (C. A. 5 th, 195o), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U. S. 665, 71
S. Ct. 961, 95 L. ed.1277 (1951). Accord: Joliet Contractors Association v. N. L. R. B.,
20o2 F. (2d) 606 (C. A. 2nd, 1953).
21See Cohen, Labor, Taft-Hartley, and the Proposed Amendments (1954) 5 Lab.
L. J. 391 at 4o9 where this revision is discussed.
-As originally drafted, Section 8 (b)(4)(A) made it an unfair labor practice to
engage in a concerted refusal to perform any services when "the purpose" was to
force an employer to cease doing business with any other person. S. 1126, 8oth
Cong., 1st Sess. After Congressional conference reports on Section 8 (b)(4)(A), the
term "the purpose" was found to be too restrictive and might be interpreted to
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PROPERTY-RIGHT OF SURFACE OWNER To PREVENT MINERALS OWNER
FROM STRIP MINING To REMOVE COAL DEPOSITS. [Federal]
A frequent source of litigation in the leading coal producing states
in recent years has been the controversy between the owner of the
surface estate and the owner of the mineral estate as to whether oper-
ations known as "strip mining" may be used to remove the coal de-
posits. Because the alternatives in the balance are either that the value
of the surface estate will be destroyed or that the coal deposits cannot
be exploited, the problem is one which affects not only the rights of
the property owners who are parties to the dispute but also the in-
terest of the public generally.
There seems to be complete agreement that when the right to
strip mine has been expressly granted to or reserved for the owner
of the mineral estate, the surface owner cannot prevent strip mining
operations, even though the public interest may seem to be adversely
affected.1 Several states have recognized the need for legislative con-
trol to ameliorate the destruction wrought by strip mining,2 yet in
mean the "sole" objective and thus nullify the entire provision. 93 Cong. Rec.
6859, June 12, 1947. Thus, though the legislative intent was to exempt primary
action from the Section, Senator Taft's amendment had the effect of cancelling this
exemption. Sherman, Primary Strikes and Secondary Boycotts (1954) 5 Lab. L. J.
241. President Eisenhower, in his labor message January 11, 1954, recognized the
economic alliance between employers at construction sites and suggested that a
labor union in dispute with one employer be permitted to picket the construction
site. Cohen, Labor, Taft-Hartley and the Proposed Amendments (1954) 5 Lab. L.
J. 391 at 431. It is sumbitted that instead of specifying certain situations which
should be exempted, it would be more realistic to reinsert Section 8(b)(4)(A) as
originally drafted, thereby permitting the courts to determine the underlying
union objective.
'Sherrill v. Erwin, 31 Tenn. App. 663, 220 S. W. (2d) 878 (1949); Tokas v. J.
J. Arnold Co., 122 W. Va. 613, 11 S. E. (2d) 759 (1940); Donley, The Law of Coal, Oil
and Gas in West Virginia and Virginia (1951) § 144; Donley, Coal Mining Rights
and Privileges in West Virginia (1949) 52 W. Va. L. Rev. 32, 54; 58 C. J. S., Mines
and Minerals §159. Where the mineral rights included the right to remove the
coal in any manner or by any method: Mt. Carmel R. Co. v. M. A. Hanna Co.,
371 Pa. 232, 89 A. (2d) 508 (1952).
20f the six states (Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West
Virginia) producing approximately 85% of the bituminous coal mined in the
United States by underground and strip mine operation, four have statutes regulat-
ing strip mining: 8 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1952) §§ 46-1501-1515; 2 Ohio Re-
vised Code (Baldwin, 1954) c. 1513; 52 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) §§ 1396.1-
1396.20; 1 W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1955) c. 22, art. 2A. These statutes have
similar provisions which require the payment of a nominal fee, the securing of a
permit, and the posting of a performance bond, the amount of which is based upon
the number of acres to be mined, before commencing to strip mine. The statutes
also set forth the operator's duties which are secured by the performance bond and
which generally consist of filling, draining, and regrading the mined area, and
of replanting vegetation upon the land affected. Note (1948) 23 Ind. L. J. 168.
CASE COMMENTS
the face of such regulation the reservation of stripping rights is not
against public policy.3
In the instances in which the grant or the exception of mining
rights was made without an express provision for the right to strip
mine, the courts have not been consistent either in their approach
to or in their solution of the problem. Illustrating the action of a
court in a case in which the deed was ambiguous as to mining rights
is the recent decision in United States v. Polino.4 In a proceeding
brought by the United States, as owner of surface rights, the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia was asked
for an interpretation of a clause in the deed excepting and re-
serving the right to mine and remove minerals from land conveyed
to the government and subsequently set apart by the government as
part of a national forest. Under the terms of the deed, the right to mine
and remove was subject to rules and regulations prescribed by the
Secretary of Agriculture,5 and defendant coal company, lessee of the
successor in interest of the original grantor, and other individual de-
fendants were charged with strip mining in disregard of the surface
owner's rights and in violation of the provisions in the deed.
Following West Virginia law, the court held that under a proper
construction of the severance deed the coal company, under its lease
to mine and remove coal, did not acquire the right to do so by strip
mining methods. The principal rule of construction utilized in ar-
riving at this conclusion was that the manifest intent of the parties to
the severance deed, as gathered from the surrounding circumstances
and the purpose of the conveyance, governs. 6 In applying this rule,
the court proceeded to ascertain the intent of the parties by reasoning,
first, that the right which was intended to be withheld was the right
to mine coal by the usual methods known and accepted as common
3West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d) 46
(1947).
'United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772 (N. D. W. Va. 1955).
rThe regulations provided that: (i) those claiming the right to mine under the
deed of severance were required to exhibit upon demand of the "Forest Officer"
in charge satisfactory written evidence of their right to do so; (2) only so much
of the surface as was reasonably necessary for mining purposes could be occupied
or disturbed; and (3) all reasonable and usual provisions should be made for
surface support. 131 F. Supp. 772, 773 (N. D. W. Va. 1955).
OLong v. Madison Coal Corp., 125 F. Supp. 937 (IV. D. Ky. 1954); Peerson
Drilling Co. v. Scoggins, 261 Ala. 284, 74 S. (2d) 450 (1954); Kinder v. La Salle
County Carbon Coal Co., 31o Ill. 126, 141 N. E. 537 (1923); Hudson & Collins v.
McGuire, 188 Ky. 712, 223 S. W. 1101, 17 A. L. R. 148 (1920); Psencik v. Wessels, 205
S. W. (2d) 658 (rex. Civ. App. 1947); Roadcap v. County School Bd., 194 Va. 2o,
72 S. E. (2d) 250 (1952); White v. Bailey, 65 XV. Va. 573, 64 S. E. 1019, 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 232 (1909).
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practice at the time the lease was executed and in the place where the
lands in question were located. Thus construed, the mining rights
included deep or shaft mining only, since strip mining was not known
in the area where the lands were situated at the time the severance
deed was executed.7 Second, substantial emphasis was placed upon the
knowledge of the parties as to the purpose for which government in-
tended to use the land, which the court felt was evidenced by the
language of the deed referring to forest officers and reserving to the
owner of the mineral rights only that surface which was reasonably
necessary to its operation.8 Such knowledge that the land was to be
set aside for forestry purposes was thought to indicate that the parties
had not contemplated that the surface would be destroyed, but rather
that it should be kept intact. Under such circumstances they would
not have intended to reserve the right to engage in strip mining,
which by its very nature results in the complete removal and destruc-
tion of the surface.
While on its facts the Polino case differs in many respects from the
cases which it cites as authority,9 the decision and reasoning behind
it are representative of the policy of strict construction which the
West Virginia court has adopted when dealing with instruments upon
which claims of right to strip mine are based.' 0 Proposing to give effect
UIt was shown by the evidence that in 1917, at the time the deed of severance
was executed, there were no coal strip mining operations in Randolph County, West
Virginia where the land was located. And while the defendant attempted to show
that stone was being mined in that vicinity by the quarrying method, which is some-
what similar to stripping, the court pointed out that defendant acquired
through its lease only the right to mine and remove coal, and no other minerals.
131 F. Supp. 772, 775 (N. D. W. Va. 1955).
"See note 5, supra.
"Action of trespass for damages to realty caused by alleged negligence in al-
lowing debris from adjoining strip mine activities to deposit on plaintiff's land,
where defendant contended that by reason of its ownership of the coal underlying
plaintiff's land it had the right to strip mine without liability for damages: Oresta
v. Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S. E. (2d) 622 (1952). Declaratory judgment
proceeding, which arose over the denial of plaintiff's alleged right to strip mine
or to acquire that right by purchase, to adjudicate his rights under the deed of
severance: West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d)
46 (1947). Suit for injunction on behalf of plaintiff, grantee of "all the coal and
other minerals of every kind and description" to restrain the defendant, successor
in interest of the grantor, from extracting valuable brick clay from beneath the
surface on the ground that the seam of clay passed to him by the grant: Rock
House Fork Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S. E. 684 (1918).
"OIn West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong the court noted that strip min-
ing had received legislative sanction [1 W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1955) c. 22, art.
2A], but stated that this legislation demands a strict construction of all instruments
upon which the practice of strip mining is based although it precludes the invalida-
tion of such stripping provisions as against public policy. 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2 d)
46 at 53 (1947).
CASE COMMENTS
to the intention of the parties as determined by the language of the
instrument and the purpose of the conveyance, in the light of sur-
rounding circumstances, the state Supreme Court in West Virginia-
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong" and in Oresta v. Romano Bros.'2 had
held that under a grant of the right "to mine, dig, excavate and remove"
and under a reservation of the right of "mining, excavating, shipping
and removing," respectively, the parties intended that the coal should
be mined and removed by the usual method then known and accepted
as common practice where the lands in question were located. In
neither of these cases did the facts show that strip mining was prac-
ticed at the time and in the place where the severance deed was exe-
cuted.
This position is strengthened by the fact that a reservation of the
right to mine, with nothing more, does not imply a right to injure or
destroy the surface; such a right must have been expressed in terms that
leave no doubt as to its existence. 13 Neither does the express right to
use, or to use and occupy, so much of the surface as may be reason-
ably necessary for mining purposes give the mineral owner the right
to destroy the surface, for neither the word "use" nor the word "oc-
cupy" contemplates destruction.14 And even where the mineral owner
has been given the right to conduct his mining operations in whatever
"i29 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d) 46 (1947).
"137 W. Va. 633, 73 S. E. (2d) 622 (1952).
"Catron v. South Butte Mining Co., 181 Fed. 941 (C. C. A. 9 th, 191o); Carson
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 212 Ark. 953, 209 S. W. (2d) 97 (1948); Evans Fuel Co. v.
Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 236 Pac. 1023 (1925); Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534
(1923); Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 14o Iowa 114, 115 N. W. 497, 18 L. R. A. (N. s.)
736 (1908); Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 63, 61 At. 559 (1905);
Williams v. Hay, 12o Pa. 485, 14 At. 379, 6 Am. St. Rep. 719 (1888); Coleman v.
Chadwick, 8o Pa. 81, 21 Am. Rep. 93 (1875); West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d) 46 (1947).
24Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534 (1923); West Virginia-Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d) 46 (1947). The West Virginia court
in Oresta v. Romano Bros. summarized this point when, construing a reservation of
coal and other minerals with the right of "mining, excavating, shipping, and re-
moving," it observed that: "... the mining rights contained in such reservation
do not mean or include the right to destroy or remove the surface overlying
the coal or to transport and relocate such surface from its original location above
the coal, each of which situations necessarily results in substantial measure from
the mining of coal by the strip mining method.... [T]here is a pronounced practi-
cal distinction between an injury to, or the imposition of a necessary or convenient
burden upon, the surface of land containing coal in or underneath the surface,
each of which may be caused by the mining and the removal of such coal through
and by means of excavations, tunnels, and passageways beneath the surface ... and
the destruction, the removal, or the relocation in the mining and the removal
of coal, of the overlying surface which necessarily results in substantial measure
from the use of the presently recognized strip mining method." 137 W. Va. 633, 73
S. E. (ad) 622, 629 (1952).
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manner he may decide "most convenient or economical," this right
has been held not to justify arbitrary infringement upon the surface
rights of the owner of the surface estate.' 5
The approach of the Whrest Virginia court has been that those
provision which are intended to limit, regulate or govern operations
and methods which are carried out chiefly in subterranean mining do
not permit the removal or relocation of the surface to allow removal
of the coal as is required in strip mining.16 This view in effect is that
the mining rights expressly set forth in the severance deed, by grant
or reservation, are in derogation of the mining rights incident to the
ownership of the minerals, rather than by way of enlargement of those
rights.
17
In Pennsylvania and Ohio, which are apparently the only other
jurisdictions in which the issue of the principal case has reached
the courts of record, the law has taken quite a different course.' 8
There, the solution is -wrought from a combination of a liberal con-
struction of the rights incident to the ownership of the minerals,
granted or reserved by the severance deed, and a rather unusual ap-
plication of the doctrine of subjacent support. The result is perhaps
"General Refractories Co. v. Swetman, 303 Ky. 427, 197 S. W. (2d) 908 (1946).
"In the opinion of the Strong case, the court stated that the mining rights
involved were expressly granted and did not rest upon necessary implication as is
the case where the coal is granted without an express grant of mining rights, and
therefore the express terms of the granted rights served to restrict the rights con-
ferred. 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d) 46 at 49 (1947). The plaintiff's argument in
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Duricka, 374 Pa. 262, 97 A. (2d) 825, 827 (1953) that had the
grantor intended to restrict the grantee to subterranean mining methods it would
have been simple for him to have done so in so many words, was rejected with the
statement that: "Carried to its ultimate development such an argument would
mean that every contract would have to enumerate not only what is granted but
also what it did not grant"
"7Donley, The Law of Coal, Oil and Gas in West Virginia and Virginia (1951)
§ 144; Donley, Coal Mining Rights and Privileges in West Virginia (1949) 52 W. Va.
L. Rev. 32, 39.
IsFranklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119 N. E. (2d) 688 (Com. Pleas 1954) is
the only Ohio decision found pertaining to this issue. The court summarily dis-
posed of the question of the rights incident to the mineral grant by reference to
a distinguishable case to the effect that merely because strip mining was unknown
at the time the severance deed was executed, it does not follow that the mineral
owner has no right to use that process or any other improved method of mining that
has come into use. There is nothing further in the report which sheds light upon
the position taken by this Ohio inferior court as to the right to strip mine absent
express provisions. It rested its decision solely upon the issue of waiver of subjacent
support, and found that from the language of the deed the surface owner did
not intended to part with his right of subjacent support of the soil. Thus, this de-
cision bears mainly upon the second phase of the Pennsylvania approach, see this
comment, infra.
CASE COMMENTS
best exemplified by Commonwealth v. Fisher,9 in which it was estab-
lished, upon facts nearly identical with those of the principal case, that
the defendant had the right to mine his coal by contemporary strip
mining methods, even though such mining was not anticipated by the
parties at the time the deed was executed. This position adopts the
liberal view that the mineral owner does not intend to waive any rights
that are not enumerated in the deed of severance, but to which he is
entitled as an incident of ownership of the mineral estate.20
These incidental rights, appurtenant to the grant or reservation,
have been said to be gauged by the necessities of the particular case
and may therefore vary with changed conditions and circumstances.21
Thus, the mineral owner is allowed to keep pace with the progress of
modern invention rather than being limited to appliances and pro-
cesses existing at the time the grant or reservation was made.22 This
view of the Pennsylvania court takes cognizance of the fact that min-
ing today includes more than digging, excavating, or removing min-
erals from subterranean workings by the utilization of shafts, slopes,
drifts or tunnels.23 Also recognized is the fact that, unless strip min-
ing is permitted, the reservation of the right to mine, and the words
used in reference to it, in many instances would be meaningless be-
cause the coal cannot be mined in any other manner.
24
"364 Pa. 422, 72 A. (2d) 568 (1950), noted (ig5o) 12 Pittsb. L. Rev. 142, (1949)
54 Dick. L. Rev. 92 (trial court decision). Cf. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Duricka, 374 Pa.
262, 97 A. (2d) 825 (953).
-"It has been contended that this view represents the common understanding of
the profession in West Virginia under the doctrine of Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va.
307, 121 S. E. 90 (1924) which stated that the ownership of coal carries with it
certain privileges, as an incident of that ownership, without the necessity of an
express grant or exception of that privilege. Donley, The Law of Coal, Oil and
Gas in West Virginia and Virginia (1951) § 144; Donley, Coal Mining Rights and
Privileges in West Virginia (1949) 52 W. Va. L. Rev. 32, 39.
-"Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464, 34 Am. Rep. 242 (880); Marvin v. Brewster Iron
Mining Co., 55 N. Y. 538, 14 Am. Rep. 322 (1874); Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp.
v. Meadows, 184 Va. 168, 34 S. E. (2d) 392 (1945).
=Williams v. Gibson, 85 Ala. 596, 4 So. 350, 5 Am. St. Rep. 368 (1888); Com-
monwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 3go, 102 A. (2d) 893 (1954); Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A. (2d) 568 (1950); Oberly v. Frick Coke Co., 262 Pa. 83,
104 AtI. 864 (1918); Richardson v. Clements, 89 Pa. 503, 33 Am. Rep. 784 (1879);
Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 175 Va. 366, 8 S. E. (2d) 303 (1940), modified
in 181 Va. 195, 24 S. E. (2d) 559 (1943).
-Even Mark Twain would readily admit that his definition of a mine as "a
hole in the ground owned by a liar" would be totally inadequate to describe
present day strip mine operations which number 1,643 and produce 1o8,909,756
net tons or 23.3% of the total bituminous coal production in the United States. 2
Minerals Yearbook (U. S. Bureau of Mines, 1952) 16, 72.
- Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390, 102 A. (2d) 893 (1954). This fact
did not go unnoticed in the Oresta case by Judge Fox, who, criticizing his col-
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However, the Pennsylvania court concedes that if the mineral
owner has a legal duty to support the surface of the land, he cannot
remove and destroy the surface down to the underlying vein of coal.
25
Therefore, although it may be decided that the owner of the mineral
estate has reserved the right to strip mine, it still must be determined
whether he will be permitted to exercise the right, since the reserva-
tion of the right to mine and remove coal does not confer the right
to mine so as to damage the surface owner's right to subjacent support.20
Absent explicit language in the deed confirming the right to surface
support, this decision is said to rest solely upon the facts of the par-
ticular case, which determined whether the right to support has been
waived, expressly or by implication, by the surface owner.
27
In West Virginia, a grant or reservation of "all" the coal and the
leagues' position, said in the dissent: "... for if the coal can be removed only as
alleged in the bill, by the single method, strip mining, now sought to be em-
ployed, and this Court says that that particular method may not be employed,
the right of plaintiff to remove its coal is absolutely destroyed. I can see neither
moral nor legal justification for that inescapable result, but that aspect of the case
does not appear to have been considered by those who concur in the majority
opinion, or, if considered, was not deemed of sufficient importance to merit dis-
cussion." 137 W. Va. 633, 42 S. E. (2d) 46, 56.
'Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A. (2d) 568, 571 (195o).
"Russell Coal Co. v. Bd. of County Com'rs, 129 Colo. 330, 270 P. (2d) 772
(1954); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Salardino, 125 Colo. 516, 245 P. (2d) 461, 32
A. L. R. (2d) 1302 (1952); Piedmont & George's Creek Coal Co. v. Kearney, 114
Md. 496, 79 AtI. 1o13 (1911); English v. Harris Clay Co., 225 N. C. 467, 35 S. E. (2d)
329 (1945); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, i9 N. E. (2d) 688 (1954); Com-
monwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A. (2d) 568 (1950); Commonwealth v. Fitz-
martin, 376 Pa. 39 o , 102 A. (2d) 893 (1954); Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 347 Pa.
29o, 32 A. (2d) 227 (1943); Charnetski v. Miners Mills Coal Mining Co., 270 Pa.
459, 113 Atl. 683 (1921); Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 134 W. Va. 387, 59 S. E.
(2d) 655 (195o); Godfrey v. Veyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va. 665, 97 S. E.
186 (1918). Where the court held that the right to "use" did not give the mineral
owner the right to strip mine and he was still under a duty to support the sur-
face, it nevertheless refused to grant an injunstion against him, because stripping
was the only method available to mine the coal, and to destroy his right to the
coal would be inequitable: Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534 (19-2) •
Accord: Trkja v. Keys, 49 Cal. App. (2d) 211, 121 P. (2d) 54 (1942) (placer mining
of gold).
OMason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 111. App. 350, 51 N. E. (2d) 285 (1943); Eng-
lish v. Harris Clay Co., 225 N. C. 467, 35 S. E. (2d) 329 (1945); Rush v. Sines Bros.
& Co., 34 Ohio App. 38, 17o N. E. 379 (1929); Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa.
39o , 1o2 A. (2d) 893 (1954); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A. (2d) 568
(195o); Pennsylvania Coal & Coke Corp. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co., 132 Pa. Super.
533, 1 A. (2d) 511 (1938), affirmed 333 Pa. 272, 3 A. (2d) 356 (1939); Campbell v.
Campbell, 29 Tenn. App. 651, 199 S. W. (2d) 931 (1946); Winnings v. Wilpen Coal
Co., 134 W. Va. 387, 59 S. E. (2d) 655 (1950), noted (195o) 3 Ala. L. Rev. 242; God-
frey v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 82 W. Va. 665, 97 S. E. 186 (1918); Donley, The
Law of Coal, Oil and Gas In West Virginia and Virginia (ig5i) §i5o; Donley, Coal
Mining Rights and Privileges in West Virginia (1949) 52 W. Va. L. Rev. 32, 50.
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right to remove "all" the coal, as a rule of property is per se a waiver
of the right to surface support.28 And there is some authority, outside
the field of coal mining, to the effect that the surface support right is
limited to subterranean mining and so does not extend to open or pit
mining, of which strip mining is a form.29 Although the Pennsylvania
court has not adopted any such rules as to waiver, it has consistently
found in cases concerning strip mining that the right to surface support
was waived either by an absolute release of the mineral owner from
liability for damage to the surface or by the cumulative effect of
the provisions of the severance deed.3 0 Even with the Pennsylavnia
court's faculty for finding a waiver, it probably could have found no
language in the reservation in the Polino case that would sustain a
a waiver of the surface owner's right to support, and so the application
of the Pennsylvania approach in this instance would not have resulted
in a different conclusion.31
Though both might well have reached the same decision in the
principal case, it is apparent that the courts of the two states have,
under the guise of rules of construction of deeds, exerted control over
a matter of economic policy. Under the circumstances of the Polino
case, when presented with the choice of stimulating the conservation
"'In a reservation: Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 113 W. Va. 309, 167 S. E.
737 (933), noted (1933) 39 W. Va. L. Q. 358. In a grant: Griffin v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 59 NV. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24 (19o5), noted (1921) 28 XV. Va. L. Q. 149; Donley,
The Law of Coal, Oil and Gas in West Virginia and Virginia (1951) § 15o; Donley,
Coal Mining Rights and Privileges in West Virginia (1949) 52 W. Va. L. Rev. 32,
5o. Must modify "coal": Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke Co., 89 IV. Va. 55, 1o8 S. E.
491 (1921).
The West Virginia decisions do not represent the majority view. Schloss-
Sheffield Steel 8: Iron Co. v. Sampson, 158 Ala. 59o, 48 So. 493 (1909); Paull v.
Island Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 218, 88 N. E. 959 (1909); Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co.,
91 Kan. 31o, 137 Pac. 941, 50 L. R. A. (N. s.) 686 ('914); Berkey v. Berwind-XWhite
Coal Mining Co., 220 Pa. 65, 69 At. 329, 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 851 (19o8); Stonegap Col-
liery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S. E. 305 (1916); 36 Am. Jur., Mines and Min-
erals § 187.
'Kaolin mining: English v. Harris Clay Co., 225 N. C. 467, 35 S. E. (2d) 329
(1945). Feldspar mining: Banks v. Tennessee Mineral Products Corp., 2o02 N. C.
408, 163 S. E. 1o8 (1932). 58 C. J. S., Mines and Minerals §278.
RIOelease from liability: Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 39o , 102 A.
(2d) 893 (1954); Mt. Carmel R. Co. v. M. A. Hanna Co., 371 Pa. 232, 89 A. (2d) 508
(1952). Cumulative effect of provisions: Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.
(2d) 568 (195o).
"On the contrary, the language used in regulation number three inserted in the
deed of severance (see note 5, supra) indicated that the owner expressly retained
his right of support; but there is nothing in the report of the case to indicate that
this issue was considered, though it was mentioned in the government's trial brief
and by the decisions cited as authority. Government's Trial Brief, U. S. v. Polino,
p. io; Oresta v. Romano Bros., 137 WV. Va. 633, 73 S. E. (2d) 622, 623 (1952); West
Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d) 46, 50 (1947).
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of forest lands and wildlife or of encouraging industrial development,
each to the detriment of the other, the West Virginia court has chosen
to serve the interest of conservation and the Pennsylvania court the
interests of the mining industry. While the West Virginia court has
precluded itself from restricting the use of strip mining as a matter of
public policy by its decision in the Strong case,3 2 it is clearly accom-
plishing the same result through the application of the rule of thumb
adopted in the principal case-that the parties intended that the coal
should be mined and removed by the usual method then known and
and accepted as common practice where the land in question was
located.3 3
NOEL P. COPEN
TORTS-CLASsIFICATION or RIDER AS "GUEST" OR "PASSENGER" UNDER
GUEST STATUTES. [Virginia]
The increasing frequency of accidents in vehicular traffic during
the last three decades has given rise to the contention that a gratuitous
guest should not be allowed to recover damages from his accommo-
dating host for injuries arising out of the ordinary adversities of
modern traffic. This point, supplemented by a public interest in
avoiding increases in liability insurance rates caused by the payment of
numerous judgments (many of which may have been the result of
collusion between guest and host),1 has led about half of the states to
enact automobile guest statutes.2 The statutes generally provide that
an injured guest who has given no consideration for his ride will not
be allowed to recover damages from his host unless the latter's im-
'129 W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d) 46 (1947).
'Whatever may be the merits of this policy, its obvious danger was pointed
out by Judge Fox, dissenting in West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129
W. Va. 832, 42 S. E. (2d) 46, 55 (1947): "Whatever may have been in the minds of
the parties to the 19o4 deed, in respect to strip mining, it is not, in my opinion,
a safe rule to place obstructions in the way of the business and mechanical de-
velopments of the present age. Progress and development, along any line of en-
deavor, are necessary to the future of our productive and commercial life. An en-
terprise which stands still, is, sooner or later, due for liquidation."
"A discussion of the reasons underlying the passage of guest statutes is given
in Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N. W. 581 i(931); Allen, Why do Courts
Coddle Insurance Companies (1927) 61 Am. L. Rev. 77; Prosser, Torts (2nd ed.
1955) 451.
2For a collection of guest statutes, see: Notes (1936) 5 Fordham L. Rev. 183;
(1932) 18 Iowa L. Rev. 78.
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proper operation of the vehicle was intentional, 3 reckless, 4 or grossly
negligent.5
Though the general intent of this legislation is recognized, the
scope of its application continues to be a point of controversy in the
courts. In the recent Viirginia case of Dickerson v. Miller, a driver
was sued on behalf of a decedent who had been a waitress in a restau-
rant managed by defendant. On the night of the accident in which
decedent was killed, defendant requested that she work past the normal
working hours, telling her that if she would do so, he would take her
home in his automobile. Decedent, who normally did not remain
past closing time and who ordinarily secured her own transportation
home, acceded to defendant's request and worked late. As she was
being transported home pursuant to this arrangement, the car driven
by defendant struck an electric light pole, and decedent was killed.
The applicable guest statute of Virginia reads as follows: "No person
transported by the owner or operator of any motor vehicle as a guest
without payment for such transportation... shall be entitled to re-
cover damages against such owner or operator for death or injuries...
unless such death or injury was caused or resulted from the gross
negligence.., of such owner or operator." 7
The trial court held as a matter of law that gross negligence was
not shown and that decedent was not a paying passenger, and as a
consequence she came within the guest statute barring recovery. The
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for de-
fendant and remanded the case for a new trial, on the ground that a
jury could reasonably have found decedent a paying passenger at the
time of the accident, in which case the guest statute would not apply.
When confronted with cases of this nature in jurisdictions having
a guest statute, the courts are commonly required to deal with two
problems of interpretation: first, whether plaintiff was a guest or a
paying passenger; and if plaintiff is found to be a guest, second,
whether defendant has been guilty of that lack of care which makes
him liable for injuries sustained by a guest.
In determining what factors are necessary to establish the status
of the occupant of an automobile as that of a paying "passenger"
rather than "guest," the courts are in accord as to some general prin-
ciples to be applied. There is general agreement that to make the
3Ore. Code Ann. (193o) § 55-1209. See Note (1936) 5 Fordham L. Rev. 183.
4lowa Code (1954) § 321-494.
Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 39-740.
0196 Va. 659, 85 S. E. (2d) 275 (1955).
72 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) § 8-646.1 [italics supplied].
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rider a paying passenger, the benefit conferred on the driver must be
more than an incidental one such as companionship s or part of a
mere exchange of social courtesies.9 At the other extreme, it is clearly
agreed that a cash payment furnished in consideration for transpor-
tation constitutes the occupant a passenger rather than a guest.10 Also,
a person may generally be a paying passenger without actual monetary
payment for the ride, it being sufficient that the rider's occupancy of
the car is for the definite benefit of the owner or operator, or for the
mutual benefit of the owner or operator and the occupant.1 Nor is it es-
sential that the consideration pass directly from the passenger to the
driver. If the latter received a direct benefit from another, the serv-
ice to the rider has been held not to be gratuitous. 12 The decisions
reflect less agreement, however, in applying these principles to fact
'Bree v. Lamb, 120 Conn. 1, 178 At. 99 (1935); Miller v. Miller, 395 Ill.
273, 69 N. E. (2d) 878 (1946); Boyd v. Mueller, 320 Ill. App. 3o3, 5o N. E. (2d)
847 (1943); Connett v. Winget, 374 Ill. 531, 3o N. E. (2d) 1 (940); Hasbrook v.
Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N. E. (2d) 87 (1949).
Also Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 4 th, 194o), applying Virginia
statute, where wife of naval officer undertook trip by automobile to join her
husband, and a friend of the wife accompanied her in order to meet fiance, under
an arrangement requiring friend to pay for her own food and lodging but not re-
quiring friend to drive or pay operational expenses. Friend was held not a
"passenger" but a "guest" within the Virginia guest statute, notwithstanding that
wife derived benefit from companionship and assistance in driving, and that friend
was driving at time of accident. Speaking of the sufficiency of companionship as a
consideration, the court said: "No case has been brought to our attention, however,
though we have scanned the authorities carefully, which holds that the mere benefit
resulting from companionship, or the advantage resulting from a promise to assist
in driving, was of legal value sufficient in itself to transfer a gratuitous under-
taking into an undertaking for payment." 115 F. (2d) 675, 68o.
'Christ v. O'Neil, 28 Cal. App. (2d) 651, 83 P. (2d) 96 (1938); Master v. Horowitz,
237 App. Div. 237, 261 N. Y. Supp. 722 (1932), aff'd 262 N. Y. 609, 188 N. E. 86 (1933);
Miller v. Ellis, 188 Va. 207, 49 S. E. (2d) 273 (1948); Brown v. Branch, 175 Va. 382,
9 S. E. (2d) 285 (1940). Also, Ackerman v. Steiner, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 600, 59 N. E. (2d)
950 (1944), in which parties who had been on a social trip together, and who
were involved in an accident while plaintiff, on defendant's departure, was ac-
companying defendant in order to point out the correct route, were held to occupy
a host-guest relationship under the Ohio guest statute. Accord, the principal case,
Dickerson v. Miller, 196 Va. 659, 85 S. E. (2d) 275, 277 (1955): "The benefits, in
short, must be more than gratuitous gestures of reciprocal hospitality, or social
amenities, extended without thought of bargaining for transportation."
11Ward v. George, 195 Ark. 216, 112 S. W. (2d) 30 (1937); Bond v. Sharp, 325
Mich. 460, 39 N. W. (2d) 37 (1949); Parrish v. Ash, 32 Wash. (2d) 637, 203 P. (2d) 330
(1949).
nPayment need not be in money, and is sufficient if passenger's presence di-
rectly compensates owner in a substantial and material or business sense, as dis-
tinguished from mere social benefit or nominal or incidental contribution to ex-
penses. Wilcox v. Keeley, 336 Mich. 237, 57 N. W. (2d) 514 (1943); Scholz v. Lever, 7
Wash. (2d) 76, 109 P. (2d) 294 ('941).
'-McGuire v. Armstrong, 268 Mich. 152, 255 N. W. 745 (1934).
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situations where the rider has furnished compensation of some sort, but
the intention of the parties in regard to the compensation was not
clear. This is especially true of cases in which the occupant contributes
all or part of the expenses of a trip. The courts appear to consider the
following factors pertinent in determining whether the compensa-
tion given constitutes consideration in such cases: the time at which
the compensation was agreed upon;13 the nature of the trip being
undertaken;'14 and the relationship of the parties. 15
Except in its earlier decisions, the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has applied a liberal test in allowing plaintiffs to qualify as
paying passengers. In Gale v. Wilber,'6 decided in 1934, the court,
"It seems essential, to constitute the compensation "payment," that the
agreement of the parties that compensation would be made must have been entered
into before the trip was undertaken. Thus, in Morse v. Walker, 229 N. C. 778,
51 S. E. (2d) 496 (1949) the court held that if the jury found that a contract for the
payment of gas and oil was made before the trip, this would constitute payment
for transportation within the purview of the Virginia guest statute. Accord, Mc-
Mahon v. DeKraay, 70 S. D. i8o, 16 N. W. (2d) 3o8 (1944).
14 In cases turning on the nature of the trip undertaken, the courts seem agreed
that the trip must have been of a business nature, or one growing out of a business
relationship, as opposed to one of a purely social nature. Whitechat v. Guyette, 19
Cal. (2d) 428, 122 P. (2d) 47 (1942); McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. (2d) 279, 70 P.
(2d) 909 (1937); Miller v. Ellis, 188 Va. 207, 49 S. E. (2d) 273 (1948).
'Courts appear disinclined to deem compensation to be payment in cases where
the relationship of the parties is such that the undertaking of the trip could not
reasonably be expected to be founded on a business relationship. Thus, in Hale
v. Hale, 219 N. C. 191, 13 S. E. (2d) 221 (1941) (applying Virginia statute), a
father who contributed to the cost of gasoline used on a trip he was taking with
his son was held to be a guest, the court saying the facts indicated at most a situa-
tion of reciprocal hospitality between members of the same family, and adding that
doubtless the suggestion that there was a formal contract would have met the
displeasure of both parties until such time as the self-interest of the plaintiff inter-
vened. Accord, Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N. E. (2d) 87 (1949).
1N163 Va. 211, 175 S. E. 739 (1934). In this case the Virginia court for the first time
expressly ruled on the question of consideration required to qualify plaintiff as
a passenger, holding that there must be a contractual relation between the parties.
Here, at the time of accident plaintiff was riding with defendant, her neighbor, at
defendant's invitation to go with her to meet defendant's husband. The court held
that this arrangement did not constitute a contractual relation between the parties.
In determining the proper meaning of the term "passenger" (as opposed to "guest")
the court relied on the Massachusetts cases of Jacobson v. Stone, 277 Mass. 323,
178 N. E. 636 (1931) and Flynn v. Lewis, 231 Mass. 55o, 121 N. E. 493 (1919). At
163 Va. 211, 217, 175 S. E. 739, 741 (1934) the court declared: "The Massachusetts
court, in our opinion, has evolved the soundest interpretation of its meaning.... In
the case of Flynn v. Lewis... the defendant asked a friend to accompany his
daughter to a city to help the latter purchase a coat. The friend was killed on the
way. The court held that there was an absence of any contractual relation be-
tween the parties which would take the case out of the guest rule.... The appellate
court affirmed the judgment, saying: 'The element of any pecuniary benefit or gain
to the defendant being absent, the transaction was gratuitous, under which he is
liable only for gross negligence in the operation of the automobile'."
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recognizing the standard of varying degrees of care later declared by
statute, 17 placed strong emphasis on the requirement that the benefit
be a pecuniary one, based on a contractual relationship, and relied
heavily on Massachusetts cases which impliedly required the bene-
fit to be a "consideration" within the technical meaning of that term.
Later Virginia cases, apparently retaining the pecuniary-benefit and
contracutal-relation requirements,' 8 have, in the course of applying
these requirements to different fact situations, given some indication of
what is meant by the terms "pecuniary benefit" and "contractual rela-
tion"; and in the process the court has sometimes deviated from, or
at least relaxed, this requirement. Thus, cash payments by the rider
have been held sufficient, even though they were not requested by the
driver but rather were paid only at the insistence of the rider.19 Futher-
more, where defendant allowed plaintiff to drive defendant's truck to
test plaintiff's ability to work as a chauffeur, the benefit expected to
accrue to defendant was held to prevent plaintiff from being deemed
a guest.20 However, in some Virginia cases in which a definite benefit
17The guest doctrine was first applied by the Virginia court to the field of
automobile negligence law in Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 39, 16o S. E. 77, 81 (1931):
"To hold that a guest who, for his own pleasure, is driving with his host, may re-
cover from him for injuries suffered where there is no culpable negligence, shocks
one's sense of justice." This doctrine was affirmed in Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121, 163
S. E. 63 (1932), and was finally adopted by statute in 1938. A discussion of the origin
and growth of the doctrine in Virginia is found in Davis v. Williams, 194 Va.
541 at 544, 74 S. E. (2d) 58 at 60 (1953).
'In Brown v. Branch, 175 Va. 382, 9 S. E. (2d) 285 (194o) defendant was a
Sunday School superintendent who gave free transportation to plaintiff and others
on a picnic, but required them to pay for their own food. Defendant derived no
financial benefit from the picnic, or from the sale of food there. Plaintiff con-
tended that he rendered services in payment for his transportation to and from the
picnic in that he went with defendant to pick up other passengers and assisted in
unloading the truck at the picnic grounds, and that on the return trip he held an
empty ice cream freezer at defendant's request. The court said: "Therefore, since
the evidence relied on fails to show that the defendant derived any pecuniary
benefit from his transportation of the plaintiff, or from the latter's attendance
at the picnic, and likewise fails to show the existence of any contractual rela-
tion between the parties, the lower court correctly held that the plaintiff was a
gratuitous guest and not a passenger in the truck at the time of the accident." 175
Va. 382, 386, 9 S. E. (2d) 285, 287 (1940).
In Miller v. Ellis, 188 Va. 207, 49 S. E. (2d) 273 (1948) defendant told plain-
tiff: I have to move a stove for Mrs. K. early in the morning, and if you will help
me move this stove, I will help you move your furniture and building material.
Plaintiff and defendant were good friends and neighbors, and the offer to help was
purely in the nature of personal assistance without expectation of personal benefit
or compensation. In pursuance of this arrangement plaintiff was injured while
riding in defendant's truck. The court held plaintiff a mere guest, relying heavily on
Brown v. Branch supra, this note.
"Davis v. Williams, 194 Va. 541, 74 S. E. (2d) 58 (1953).
2'Braxton v. Flippo, 183 Va. 839, 33 S. E. (2d) 757 (1945).
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was shown to have accrued, the plaintiff has nevertheless been denied
the status of paying passenger where, by reason of the nature of the
trip undertaken or the relationship of the parties, the benefit was
deemed to be an incidental one, or at best an exchange of social ameni-
ties.21
The decision in the principal case exemplifies a trend away from
the rigid requirements alluded to in the earlier decisions. For the first
time the Virginia court has now expressly stated that a benefit con-
sisting of something less than actual monetary payment will suffice,2
2
although this view has been impliedly recognized in prior cases. 23 But
the court in this decision continues to assert that the benefit to the de-
fendant must be intended by the parties as a consideration for the
transportation; 24 however, as authority for this proposition a decision
is cited in which language to that effect was used but in which, it
is submitted, the holding was based upon the existence of a considera-
tion when in fact none existed. 25
If it is determined that there was no consideration and if a pas-
senger is therefore deemed to be a guest within the applicable statute, it
is necessary for the court to consider the problem of what type of con-
duct must be shown in the host to entitle such guest to recover. The
statutes vary in their terminology, ranging from "gross or wilful neg-
5 1Miller v. Ellis, 188 Va. 207, 49 S. E. (2d) 273 (1948); Brown v. Branch, 175
Va. 382, 9 S. E. (2d) 285 (1940).
-Dickerson v. Miller, 196 Va. 659, 662, 85 S. E. (2d) 275, 277 (1955): "Before
and since the passage of our guest statute it was recognized that payment in cash
was not necessary to change the status of an occupant of an automobile from
guest passenger to paying passenger; services rendered or to be rendered were
sufficient."
fBlraxton v. Flippo, 183 Va. 839, 33 S. E. (2d) 757 (1945) (benefit accruing to
defendant was expectation of employing plaintiff in his business); Garrett v. Ham-
mack, 162 Va. 42, 173 S. E. 535 (1934) (defendant was transporting plaintiff, his
employee, to plaintiff's place of employment).
2'Dickerson v. Miller, 196 Va. 659, 662, 85 S. E. (2d) 275, 277 (1955). The court,
citing its holding in Davis v. Williams, 194 Va. 541, 74 S. E. (2d) 58 (1953), said: "Con-
currence ... is general that an incidental benefit resulting to the defendant from
the transaction is not sufficient to enlarge the liability from guest to passenger.
The benefit to the defendant must be a consideration for the transportation."
-In Davis v. Williams, 194 Va. 541, 74 S. E. (2d) 58 (1953) plaintiff for more than
two years rode to school in the automobile of defendant, a fellow teacher, at the lat-
ter's invitation. Defendant made no request for payment but plaintiff at the end of
each week voluntarily paid defendant an amount equal to a week's bus fare. The
Virginia court, expressly stating that the benefit to the defendant must be a con-
sideration, found a consideration on these facts. But it appears doubtful if con-
sideration is constituted by payment to a party performing a service when such
performance was not expressly or impliedly conditioned upon payment, the per-
forming party merely acquiescing in same.
1956]
go WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII
ligence" 26 to "intentional act... heedlessness... or reckless disre-
gard ... "27 The Virginia Act applicable in the principal case conditions
recovery by a guest upon proof that the injury was caused by the "gross
negligence" of the host. Though this term is used widely in guest
statutes, it has defied accurate definition by the courts. There is gen-
eral agreement that the term means something more than "mere
inadvertence," but the latter term is frequently left undefined. 28
The more general view seems to hold that gross negligence differs
from ordinary negligence not in kind, but only in the degree of atten-
tion required, gross negligence being merely an extreme departure from
the ordinary standard of care.2 9 However, other courts have placed a
much more severe interpretation upon the term, and have found
it to signify wilfulness, saying either that it involves intent, actual or
constructive, which is characteristic of criminal liability,30 or that it
involves a lack of care which is "practically wilful" in its nature.31
Between these two extremes lies the view adopted in the Virginia
decisions, which usually have deemed gross negligence to exist when
there is an "utter disregard of prudence, amounting to complete ne-
glect of the safety of another .... -32 But the language of one recent
Virginia case leans more strongly toward the general view by accept-
ing a definition which falls short of the "utter disregard of conse-
quences."3 3 In this latest pronouncement on the subject, the court
declared: "Gross negligence 'falls short of being such reckless disregard
of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and intentional
wrong. Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention,
whiles both differ in kind from wilful and intentional conduct which
is or ought to be known to have a tendency to injure'. '3 4
'Vt. Rev. Stat. (1947) § 10,223.
2S. C. Code (Michie, 1952) § 46-8o.2
8Boshor v. Boshor, 1o3 Colo. 232, 85 P. (2d) 732 (1938); Craig v. McAtee, 16o
Wash. 337, 295 Pac. 146 (1931).
2Kastel v. Stieber, 215 Cal. 37, 8 P. (2d) 474 at 477 (1932). Accord, Altman v.
Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N. E. 5o5 ('919); Sorrell v. White, 103 Vt. 277, 153 AtI.
359 (1931)-
"Rideout v. Winnebago Traction Co., 123 Wis. 297, 1ol N. IV. 672 (1904).
3'Farmers' Mercantile Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 27 N. D. 3o2, 146 N. W. 550,
552 (1914).
3Garst v. Obenchain, 196 Va. 664, 668, 85 S. E. (2d) 207, 210 (1955), citing Ken-
nedy v. McElroy, 195 Va. 1078, io8z, 81 S. E. (2d) 436, 439 (1954).
13Boward v. Leftwitch, 197 Va. 227, 89 S. E. (2d) 32 (1955). In this case the driver
of a truck took his eyes off the road for the purpose of shifting gears, causing him
to allow the truck to run off the road and overturn, killing plaintiff's decedent. This
inattention was held insufficient as a matter of law to establish wilfull or wanton
negligence of the driver required to establish liability of the owner for the death of
the guest rider.
"Boward v. Leftwitch, 197 Va. 227, 231, 89 S. E. (2d) 32, 35 (1955).
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Perhaps the existence of these wide divergences of opinion in the
courts is explained at least in part by the fact that the foundation
for the recognition of varying degrees of negligence, or of care owed, is
historical rather than logical. Early in the English law of bailments it
was determined that one undertaking a duty gratuitously should be
held to a lesser degree of care than one undertaking an obligation for
pay.35 This distinction between compensated and gratuitous services
is recognized today in various branches of the law-e.g., as between the
duty of the private driver and the common carrier, and of the ordinary
host and the innkeeper. The unfortunate consequence of applying to
the field of automobile negligence law the doctrine of varying degrees
of negligence has been to license the ordinary negligence of the host
driver.36 Most courts have rejected the concept of varying degrees of
negligence in automobile accident cases, and it survives chiefly by
statutory enactment.
37
The tendency of courts in guest statute jurisdictions either to
make the rider a paying passenger by finding consideration where by
usual legal standards none would have been deemed to exist, or to ap-
ply less severe interpretations to the "gross negligence" requirement,
perhaps represents a justifiable effort to avoid the operation of the gross
negligence element in the guest statutes and thereby to avoid the excus-
ing of ordinary negligence of operators of automobiles.
MASON L. HAMPTON, JR.
TORTS-EXISTENCE OF CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR PRENATAL
INJURIES SUSTAINED BEFORE CHILD BECAME VIABLE. [Georgia]
Although the legal existence and personality of an unborn child
was recognized early in the history of the common law in the fields
of criminal and property law,' the courts until recently refused to ap-
-The history of the doctrine of varying degrees of negligence, or of care owed,
is discussed in: Prosser, Torts (2nd ed. 1955) § 33; Elliott, Degrees of Negligence
(1933) 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91, io3 .
'3The doctrine was applied in Virginia prior to the enactment of the guest
statute. The origin and growth of this doctrine in Virginia is traced in note 17,
supra.
3A survey of the treatment of the doctrine by the courts may be found in
Mayer v. Puryear, 115 F. (2d) 675 at 678 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
'For discussion of the position of the unborn child in the fields of criminal and
property law, see: Winfield, The Unborn Child (1942) 8 Camb. L. J. 76; 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries (1765) 129, 13o; Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A. (2d) 550
at 550-552 (1951); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 at 14o (D. C. D. C. 1946).
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ply the same logical concepts to tort law so as to allow a right of re-
covery for prenatal injuries. 2 Recognition of the child as a legal per-
son before birth was regarded as a legal fiction, since, in the view of
those not familiar with medical science, the infant was a part of its
mother until born.3 Once the concept of inseparability of the infant
from the person of the mother was accepted, there could be no lia-
bility for injuries to the infant, as there could be no duty of care
toward someone who did not exist as a separate person.4 This view
seems to have been first endorsed in America at the surprisingly late
date of 1884 in Dietrich v. Northhampton,5 in which the Massachusetts
court denied recovery for injuries which caused the child to be pre-
maturely born and to die a few minutes after birth. The court noted
that the recognition of the legal existence of an unborn child in other
fields of law did not extend to tort law, and decided that the complete
lack of precedent for a right of recovery by a child which survived the
alleged tortious injuries prevented recovery for the death of the child.0
This decision seemed to regard the unborn infant as an integral part
of the mother until after it has been born with the capacity to sus-
tain life.
In subsequent cases, the Dietrich decision was widely relied on as
precedent for denying recovery both in cases brought under the wrong-
ful death statute, in which the child had died either before or soon
after birth as a result of the alleged tort, and in cases in which the
infant had survived the injuries and was suing for the alleged tort
committed against it before birth.7 Lack of precedent for recovery was
cited as a legal justification for denial of liability to a surviving
infant for wrongs done him while still in his mother's womb.8 Later
cases advanced additional reasons. Where the defendant was a common
2Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (19oo); Dietrich v.
Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y.
220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921); Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N. J. L. 455, 26 A. (2d) 489 (1942).
'Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900).
'Stanford v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, io8 So. 566 (1926); Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (igoo); Magnolia Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944 (1935).
5138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
61x38 Mass. 14 at 16, 52 Am. Rep. 242 at 243 (1884).
7See cases in notes 2 and 4, supra.
'Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921). Accord: Buel v. United
Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. 71 (1913), overruled by Steggall v. Morris, 262 Mo. 1224,
258 S. W. (2d) 577, 579 (1953) wherein the court referred to the Buel case: "If in-
ability 'to find any precedent at common law' were a good reason to deny an injured
person a remedy, then, indeed, the common law would never have reached the
embryo stage."
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carrier, it was argued that the carrier had no contractual relationship
with the "non-existent" child, but only with the mother.9 There was
also a more practical concern over the difficulties of determining
whether the injury was actually caused by the alleged negligence of the
defendant, and over the resulting possibility of the successful assertion
of fraudulent claims.10 Weight has also been given to the argument
that the damages in such cases are so remote as not to be accurately
ascertainable, especially in respect to the loss of the future earning
capacity of a child which does not survive." In the Dietrich case, it
was reasoned that there is no need for a right of action in the child
because the mother would be able to recover any damages for the in-
jury to the child which are not too "remote,"'1 2 as a part of her cause
of action for the tort committed against her. However, this theory
would allow the mother to recover only such damages for injuries
to the child as could be regarded as a part of her own suffering, and
would leave the child which survived such injuries with no right to
recover any damages. 13 Until relatively recent years, the American
"Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 Ir. L. R. 69 (189 ); Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights Ry., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1913), dismissed without
opinion on appeal, 209 N. Y. 515, 1o2 N. E. 1107 (1913). Contra: Montreal Tramways
v. Leveille, [1933] Can. S. C. 456, [1933] 4 D. L. R. 337, where the court pointed out
that the basis for recovery lay not in the failure of contractual duty, but in the inde-
pendent tort committed on the child's person.
"5Stanford v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, io8 So. 566 (1926); Magnolia Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S. W. (2d) 944 (1935). This approach
has been criticised in Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678,
682 (1939): "The difficulty of obtaining proof of the wrong should prompt
greater leniency in affording the remedy, rather than a denial of plain justice. We
are not impressed with the reasoning that a clear remedy for an injustice should
be denied because the wrong is not readily susceptible of proof." In Steggall v.
Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S. W. (2d) 577, 580 (1953) the court said: "Certainly,
courts are not going to refuse to entertain suits for the redress of wrongs because
a plaintiff would have difficulty proving his case... [or] for the reason that to
afford a remedy may at times give rise to fraudulent claims."
uTunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. Ry., io02 Mich. 624, 61 N. W. 11 (1894);
Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App. 539, 138 S. W. 889 (1911); Butler v. Manhattan
Ry., 143 N. Y. 417, 38 N. E. 454 (1894).
'Dietrich v. Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 at 17, 52 Am. Rep. 242 at 245 (1884).
This viewpoint was clearly endorsed in Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468,
471 (1933): "So long as the child is within the mother's womb, it is a part of the
the mother, and for any injury to it, while yet unborn, damages would be recover-
able by the mother in a proper case.... [T]he mother ... may recover, in one and
the same action, damages ... sustained by her, by reason of... the negligence of the
physician in and about the parturition of the infant, including the death of the in-
fant...."
'2"From the time of the injury to the time of the birth the mother suffers
no physical damage merely because the child's limbs are distorted, or because its
health is impaired. It, therefore, follows that the child alone suffers damage on
that account; and, if the damage is held to be damnum absque injuria, the mother's
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courts have been almost unanimously satisfied that these reasons
justified denial of the right to recover in all such actions based on pre-
natal tort injuries to the child.
14
Within the last twenty years, however, significant progress has
been made in breaching this unanimity of judicial opinion. This
shift of position apparently has resulted from the advances in medical
knowledge which conclusively demonstrate the inadequacy of the
reasoning supporting non-recovery. The basic scientific inaccuracy in
the legal theory of the non-existence of the child before birth has been
clearly pointed out by both writers and judges.15 Further, the difficul-
ties of proof and the chance that fraudulent claims might prevail have
been diminished, though not entirely removed, by modern scientific
methods of establishing the facts of the cause and extent of the injury
to the unborn foetus.
Once the law began to accept the medical fact that the infant
does exist separately before birth, the courts were faced with the prob-
lem of fixing the point of time at which this existence legally began.
As early as 0goo, a dissenting judge in the Illinois case of Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital'6 pointed out that when an infant reaches that stage
in its development known as "viability"-when it thereafter could be
severed from the mother prematurely and still be capable of indepen-
dent existence-it is as much alive as it would be at the time of normal
birth; therefore, from the time it is viable, the child should be regarded
as a legal person. Although notice of this dissent was taken by several
courts in the following decades, nearly half a century passed before
the first decision applied the viability theory to permit a right of re-
covery where the infant survived the alleged negligent injury,
17 or
right thereto would not be increased." Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N. H. 46o, 69 At.
522, 524 (19o8). This case denied the right of the mother to recover for injuries
to an infant which survived, except to the very narrow extent where she could
show special physical pain caused her by the injury to the infant. Accord, Nugent v.
Brooklyn Heights Ry., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N. Y. Supp. 367 at 368 (1913). Both
cases indicated that there was precedent, at the time of their holdings, against the
the independent right of action of the child.
14Prosser, Torts (1941) 189, 190.
25Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 at 640 (1900) (dis-
sent); Kelley v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N. Y. S. (2d) 696 (1953); 1 Gray,
Attorney's Handbook of Medicine (3rd ed. 1949) 611; Note (195o) 3 Vand. L. Rev.
283, 286, 287.
uSee Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638, 640 (1900).
1'T ursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Super. 242, 111 A. (2d) 14 (1955);
Woods v. Lancet, 3o3 N. Y. 349, 1o2 N. E. (2d) 691 (195o), overruling Drobner v.
Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit
Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. (2d) 334 (1949).
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where it died as a result of the injury either before or after birth.'8 A
federal court led the way for American courts in 1946 by ruling that a
surviving child, injured by professional malpractice before birth but
after it became viable, could recover damages for his injuries.19 Three
years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the representative
of a viable child born dead was able to bring a wrongful death action,
on the ground that a viable child was a legal person for purposes of
suit under the statute. 20 More recently, the Illinois Supreme Court
overruled the often-cited Allaire case, and held that recovery could be
allowed for prenatal injuries where the viable child was born alive but
died very soon thereafter.
21
The viability theory, while a great improvement over the earlier
restrictive rule, still is open to criticism in two respects: It fails to give
legal recognition to the medical fact that even before the unborn in-
fant is capable of living separately from the mother, he is in existence
as a separate person; and it attempts to set up an arbitrary and exact
dividing line between recovery and non-recovery at a stage of the
infant's prenatal growth which is incapable of accurate determina-
tion as to time.
An even more drastic break with common law precedent has oc-
curred in the recent case of Porter v. Lassiter,22 wherein the Georgia
"Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N. E. (2d) 412 (1953); Verkennes v. Corniea,
229 Minn. 365, 38 N. W. (2d) 838 (1949); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92
N. E. (2d) 8o9 (195o).
''Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. C. D. C. 1946).
:'Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N. AV. (2d) 838, (1949), followed in
Rainey v. Horn, 72 S. (2d) 434 (Miss. 1954). In both cases, the infant was born
dead but had reached a stage of viability before birth. Contra: Drabbels v. Skelly
Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 5o N. W. (2d) 229, 232 (1951) where the court said: "[There is]
no convincing authority that a child born dead ever became a person insofar as
the law of torts is concerned." The court expressly refrained from comment on
the right of the surviving infant to recover for prenatal injuries, and seemed to find
a distinction between the child born dead and the child who, after birth, dies
from prenatal injuries: "If the child had been born alive there would have been
authority to sustain a recovery, although it appears at present to be a minority view."
Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. (2d) 95, 268 P. (2d) 178 (1954); In Re Scanelli, 142
N. Y. S. (2d) 411 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
2 Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N. E. (2d) 412 (1953) (court assumed for
purposes of case that child was born alive and then died, apparently feeling there
might be a distinction as suggested in note 19, supra). Accord: Steggall v. Morris,
363 Mo. 1224, 258 S. IV. (2d) 577 (1953), overruling Buel v. United Ry., 248 Mo. 126,
154 S. W. 71 (1913). Contra: Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N. E. (2d) 206 (195o),
wherein the Dietrich case was followed, although the court intimated that its sole
reason was reluctance to overrule the decision which has been the leading case in the
field for sixty years.
n91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S. E. (2d) 100 (1955).
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Court of Appeals upheld a right of recovery for the death of an infant
who, because of an injury to its mother, was born dead before it was
capable of living independently from its mother. The mother suffered
abdominal injuries in an auto accident when one and one-half months
pregnant, and had a miscarriage three months later, allegedly caused by
her earlier injury. In an action by the mother for damages for the
the death of the child, the trial court overruled the defendant's de-
murrer to the complaint, and the appellate court approved both the
action and reasoning of the trial judge. The suit was based on a 1952
Georgia statute authorizing a mother to "recover for the homicide of
a child,"' 23 and the question presented was whether the word "child"
included an unborn infant. After reviewing conflicting authorties, the
court concluded that "a suit may be maintained by the mother for the
loss of a child that was 'quick' in her womb at the time of the homi-
cide.... The court does not believe it necessary for the child to
be 'viable' provided it was 'quick,' that is 'able to move in its mother's
womb.' The question of when a child, in a given instance, is 'quick' is a
question of fact for a jury to determine."
24
This conclusion as to the rule in Georgia was reached by reference
to the criminal law of the state that "the wilful killing of an unborn
child so far developed as to be ordinarily called 'quick' is considered as
murder, '25 and to Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc.,2
in which recovery was granted for injury to an unborn child. In the
Tucker case, however, the injury was suffered by a fully developed
foetus while the mother was on the way to the hospital for a normal
delivery. The birth occurred only three hours later and the child sur-
vived and sued for the injury sustained. While the decision was support-
able on the theory that the child, being viable, was a separate person,
the Georgia Supreme Court instead relied on criminal and property
law principles, using language which dearly recognized the status
of a child as a legal person as soon as it becomes quick.27 Relying on
2Ga. Laws (1952) 54.
2"Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S. E. (2d) io, 1o3 (1955).
nPorter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S. E. (2d) 1oo, 102 (1955). The Georgia Su-
preme Court has defined "quick" to mean "so far developed as to move or stir in the
mother's womb." Summerlin v. State, 15o Ga. 173, 176, 1o3 S. E. 461, 462 (1920).
22o8 Ga. 201, 65 S. E. (2d) 909 (1951).
2'Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S. E. (2d) 9o9,
910 (1951), quoting i Blackstone, Commentaries (1765) 129, 13o: "[Life] ... be-
gins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's
womb." Cf. concurring opinion in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 179 Md. 417, 79 A. (2d)
550 at 562 (1951), which does not agree that Blackstone was referring to "an inter-
mediate period between conception and the period of viability, during which the
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this decision, the court in the Porter case extended the ruling to sup-
port a right of action by the mother for the death of a child who never
reached the stage of prenatal viability, but who was assumed to have
been quick before being born dead, though the injury to the mother
allegedly occurred long before.
This is, of course, a more liberal view than the rule which limits
recovery to viable infants, for the movement by the child in the womb
occurs noticably to the mother some months before the infant reaches
viability. Therefore, the rule of the principal decision makes possible
the recognition of a cause of action for prenatal tort injuries which
would not have given rise to liability under previous cases. However,
it is still subject to some of the same criticism directed at the view
allowing recovery on the viability theory. First, it creates the problem
of proving whether the infant was actually quick when the injury was
inflicted. Although this condition is first obvious to the mother, the
child may have reached the stage of its development before the
mother or a physician takes note of the fact. The more serious ob-
jection to the theory, however, is that it leads to a refusal of recovery
for injuries to infants in their earliest stage of prenatal development.
Even in the Porter case, the court, willing as it was to break with
American case precedent, drew a cautious limitation by declaring that it
did "not believe that a cause of action arose if the child was not 'quick'
at its death."23 Though it seems apparent in the light of contemporary
scientific knowledge, that what once was regarded as legal fiction should
now be recognized as legal truth, the courts are still reluctant to con-
sider the time of the beginning of human existence as a question to
be answered by medical or biological science rather than by legal
theory.
However, there is some indication that the law is moving toward an
acceptance of biological fact. In California, the legislature has in-
corporated into its wrongful death statute a provision that "A child
child might be considered alive...." [The majority opinion in that case seems to
agree with the interpretation given in the Tucker case. See 79 A.: (2d) 550 at 559].
Cf. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.C.D.C. 1946): "From the viewpoint
of the civil law and the law of property, a child en ventre sa mere is not only
regarded as a human being, but as such from the moment of conception-which
it is in fact." See Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S. W. (2d) 577, 579 (1953),
and note i, supra.
-Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S. E. (2d) "oo,- o3 (955. See Damasie-
wicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A. (2d) 550, 559 (1951), where the court said: "'In
both cases [where child is viable or quick] it is alive, and in both cases there is an
injury to a living human being for which the responsible party should be made
liable."
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conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so
far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent
birth."29 The "interests" referred to have been held to include not
only inheritance and property rights but also the right to compensation
for personal injuries inflicted any time after conception.30 Even with-
out the aid of statute, the Maryland Supreme Court, though divided in
its decision, held that an infant was entitled to recover for prenatal
injuries whether viable or not. While at one point in the opinion the
"quick" theory was mentioned favorably, the majority of the court
concluded by declaring: "... since we now know that a child does not
continue until birth to be a part of its mother, it must follow that as
soon as it becomes alive it has rights which it can exercise. When it
becomes alive is a medical question to be determined in each case
according to the facts."31
Further support for the more scientifically sound, and legally more
liberal, view came from a New York appellate court in 195 3 which
stated in clear language that the confusing theories of existence were
best settled by medical experts. 32 By holding that a child may recover
for a prenatal injury tortiously inflicted at any time after conception,
the decision extended an earlier ruling of the New York Court of
Appeals limiting recovery to a viable infant.3 3 The court declared:
"... the underlying problem that has usually troubled the judges who
have written on the subject of recovery for pre-natal injuries, has been
in fixing the point of legal separability from the mother. We ought
to be safe in this respect in saying that legal separability should begin
where there is biological separability. We know something more of the
actual process of conception and foetal development now than when
some of the common law cases were decided; and what we know makes it
possible to demonstrate clearly that separability begins at conception.1
3 4
While this viewpoint insures the infant a right of action for any
alleged tort committed on him before his birth, it must be conceded
that there are still definite problems of proof of causation, where
the injury occurs in the early stages of the child's development.3 5
-OCal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) § 29.
81Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. (2d) 629, 92 P. (2d) 678 (1939). But the
California court has refused to extend this right of recovery to include a child
who was never born alive, because the statutory right is created only in the event
of the child's subsequent birth. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 95, 268 P. (2d) 178
(1954).
3 Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A. (2d) 550, 561 (1951).
'Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N. Y. S. (2d) 696 (1953).
3Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. (2d) 691 (1951).
*Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N. Y. S. (2d) 696, 697 (1953)-
Wi Gray, Attorney's Handbook of Medicine (3rd ed. 1949) 611.
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Also, the difficulty of proving the extent of damages is one which may
have an adverse effect on recovery for the wrongful death of a foetus
in the early stages of its growth.36 But as the Maryland court has
pointed out, "the right to bring an action is clearly distinguishable
from the ability to prove the facts. The first cannot be denied because
the second may not exist."37 So long as it is possible for the tortfeasor
to avoid redress for his wrongdoing on the grounds that a prenatal
infant in any stage of its development is not such a legal person as
to have a cause of action, complete justice is not yet attainable in this
field of tort law.38
ROBERT H. MANN, JR.
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY ACCIDENT RESULTING FROM
SUDDEN INCAPACITATION OF DRIVER OF AUTOMOBILE. [West Virginia]
In Keller v. Wonn,l a recent case of first impression, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals has been called on to establish a rule
of law for that jurisdiction regarding the liability of the driver of an
automobile for injuries resulting from an accident caused by a sudden
attack of illness which incapacitated the driver. The evidence indi-
cated that an automobile owned and driven by Wonn, defendant's
decedent, left the public street, came up onto the sidewalk, and pinned
plaintiff to a building, severely injuring him. Testimony had established
that Wonn appeared normal and in good spirits minutes before the
accident but that he was unconscious at the time of the accident "or
within seconds" thereafter,2 and that he died before reaching a hospital.
His death certificate specified that the cause of death was a massive
cerebral hemorrhage, and evidence indicated that it was this attack
which caused him to lose control of the car.3
'Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. (3d) 95, 268 P. (2d) 178, 180 (1954): "Con-
sidering the highly speculative nature of the pecuniary value of an unborn child
[born dead], even if viable, it is apparent that practically everything that could
be recovered in an action for the death of an unborn child can now be recovered
by the mother in connection with her own claim for general damages."
'Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A. (2d) 550, 559 (1951). See note lo,
supra.
'Notes (1952) 6 Loyola L. Rev. 157, 16o; (1954) 19 Mo. L. Rev. 81, 85; (1954) 39
Corn L. Q. 542, 546. Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N. E. (2d) 2o6 (ig5o), which
denies recovery purely on the grounds of precedent, demonstrates the vitality of
the earlier point of view.
187 S. E. (2d) 453 (V. Va. 1955).
287 S. E. (2d) 453, 455 (IV. Va. 1955)-
3"...Mr. WVonn slumped out the door.... His eyes was openi, he was breathing
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Plaintiff, in support of his contention that the injury resulted from
Wonn's act in driving "with knowledge of his physical impairment"4
and contrary to medical advice, introduced medical testimony which,
taken together with that of defense medical witnesses, established that
Wonn had long suffered from high blood pressure and mild harden-
ing of the arteries, although there was disagreement as to the degree
of Wonn's condition, and as to its alleged progressive nature. Dr.
Golden testified for plaintiff that he had heard of Wonn's condition in
a hospital staff conference eight years before the accident and had in-
formed him that he "could shorten his life by excessive physical ac-
tivity; he should limit himself entirely to a more or less sedentary
life, should not participate in any unnecessary physical exertion, in-
cluding driving an automobile."5 Dr. Condry, who had personally ex-
amined Wonn regularly from 1938 until shortly before the accident,
testified for the defense that although Wonn's blood pressure was mod-
erately high, it had been constant throughout the period; that he had
advised Wonn only to lose weight "and live a reasonably normal life;"
and that he had not forbidden him to drive an automobile. 6 There was
no evidence indicating that Wonn had ever had a stroke, fainting spell,
or any other type of attack that had rendered him dizzy or uncon-
scious.
The trial court refused defendant's request for a directed verdict,
and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff upon which judgment
was entered. In reversing, the Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the
rule that "where the driver of a motor vehicle suddenly becomes
physically or mentally incapacitated without warning, he cannot be
held liable for any injury resulting from the operation of his vehicle
while he is so incapacitated but that where a prima facia case of negli-
gence has been established by the plaintiff, the burden is upon the de-
pretty hard...."-Officer Himes. "I don't believe he was quite dead-real purple."-
Witness Joseph. ". . .we opened the [car] door and loosened his collar and taken
his glasses off...."-Witness Collett. ". . .his tie was choking him like.., he slumped
a little and that was all."-Mrs. Stalnaker. Keller v. Wonn, 87 S. E. (2d) 453, 456
(W. Va. 1955).
187 S. E. (2d) 453, 457 (W. Va. 1955).
'87 S. E. (2d) 453, 455 (W. Va. 1955). The court considered it necessary to deal
with objections raised to this and other testimony of plaintiff's medical witnesses
although this seems unnecessary, since, in view of the decision, it made no dif-
ference whether they were upheld or denied. Consideration of these objections un-
duly lengthened the opinion, and such unnecessary matter may work harm. See
Judge Lovins' dissent in Dotson v. Town of Gilbert, 129 W. Va. 130, 89 S. E. (2d)
1o8, 115 (1946).
087 S. E. (2d) 453, 457 (W. Va. 1955).
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fendant to show the sudden illness or attack, and to further show that
the illness or attack was unanticipatable and unforeseen."7
The great majority of courts passing on the question of liability
of a driver suddenly incapacitated by illness have followed the rule
now adopted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. 8 Under
this approach, the defendant is not permitted to avoid liability when
he fails to sustain his burden of going forward with evidence
of his unconsciousness,9 and he is not shielded where he could or
should have foreseen the attack.10 Although it is difficult to make gen-
eralizations as to what types of incapacitating causes will be regarded
as sufficient to relieve the driver of liability, some classifications can
be indicated. In cases in which drowsiness or sleep caused the accident,
the rule is that a driver is not responsible for his conduct while asleep,
and that when he can show he was asleep, he will avoid liability unless
he should have foreseen the condition.1 Unfortunately for defendants,
however, this is a highly foreseeable condition, and few cases have been
found where defendant prevailed with such a defense. 12 Likewise
787 S. E. (2d) 453, 459 (V. Va. 1955) [italics supplied].
'Cohen v. Petty, 62 C. A. D. C. 187, 65 F. (2d) 820 (1933); Waters v. Pacific Coast
Dairy, Inc., 55 Cal. App. (2d) 789, 131 P. (2d) 588 (1942); Edwards v. Ford, 69 Ga.
App. 578, 26 S. E. (2d) 306 (1943); Armstrong v. Cook, 250 Mich. 18o, 229 N. W. 433
(193o);Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 P. (2d) 553 (1934);
Weldon Tool Co. v. Kelley, 81 Ohio App. Rep. 427, 76 N. E. (2d) 629 (1947); La
Vigne v. La Vigne, 176 Ore. 634, 158 P. (2d) 557 (1945); Driver v. Brooks, 176 Va. 317,
10 S. E. (2d) 887 (1940); Slattery v. Haley [1922] 52 Ont. L. R. 95, 3 D. L. R. 156,
ii B. R. C. 1o36. Cf. Journey v. Zawish, ii N. J. Misc. 482, 167 At. 7 (1933). See
Restatement, Torts (1934) § 2.
'Waters v. Pacific Coast Diary, Inc., 55 Cal. App. (2d) 789, 131 P. (2d) 588 (1942);
Meyers v. Tri-State Automobile Co., 121 Minn. 68, 14o N. W. 184 (1913); Lagasse
v. Laporte, 95 N. H. 92, 58 A. (2d) 312 (1948); Rasbach v. Cassidy, 263 App. Div.
1047, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 762 (1942); Driver v. Brooks, 176 Va. 317, 1o S. E. (2d) 887
(1940); Dishman v. Whitney, 121 Wash. 157, 209 Pac. 12, 29 A. L. R. 460 (1922).
'0Soule v. Grimshaw, 266 Mich. 117, 253 N. W. 237 (1934); State v. Gooze, 14 N.
J. L. 277, 81 A. (2d) 811 (1951) [Meniere's syndrome]; Goldman v. New York Rys.
Co., 185 App. Div. 739, 173 N. Y. Supp. 737 ('919); Golembe v. Blumberg, 262 App.
Div. 759, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 692 (1948) [epilepsy]; Eleason v. Western Casualty and
Surety Co., 254 Wis. 134, 35 N. W. (2d) 301 (1948) [epilepsy]. Existence of a guest
statute prohibiting recovery except for willful and wanton misconduct permitted a
driver to escape liability even though he had had epilepsy for several years, had
suffered previous loss of consciousness, had avoided placing himself in situations
where a sudden seizure might be dangerous, and had speculated to others as to the
possible hazards involved in his continued driving. However, the courts of that
jurisdiction require conduct which would sustain a criminal conviction in order
to establish liability to a guest. Espeland v. Green, 74 S. D. 484, 54 N. W. (2d) 465
(1952).
"Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Aft. 432, 44 A. L. R. 785 (1925); Note
(1953) 28 A. L. R. (2d) 12.
"Note (1953) 28 A. L. R. (2d) 12, 42, states the rule that one cannot be held
liable for his "acts" while asleep. Cases compiled within this annotation demon-
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drunkenness, either as a contributing cause to sleep or as an inde-
pendent cause of incapacitation leading to an accident, is foreseeable
and will not shield the driver from liability for injuries caused.'
3
On the other hand, the decisions indicate that heart ailments,
14
epilepsy (if not previously a cause of fainting),15 and unconsciousness
from menstrual sickness16 excuse the driver from liability. The fact
that the driver was physically defective or ill, but still conscious, not
only will not shield him from liability but is potent evidence against
him. When not rendered unconscious, the driver is under a duty to
stop if he cannot safely operate his automobile in such circumstances.1 7
strate, however, that the foreseeable character of this condition seldom permits the
defendant to escape liability on this ground. However, when gross negligence is the
measure of fault required to impose liability upon the driver, the courts appear less
disposed to permit recovery and often deny it on the theory that the condition
was not sufficiently foreseeable. Note (1953) 28 A. L. R. (2d) 12, 69.
'Note (1953) 28 A. L. R. (2d) 12 at 56 and 64. In a case also involving claimed
sudden blindness, the Louisiana court held that if plaintiff was a passenger and
could or should have foreseen the drunken condition of defendant, her failure to
leave the car was contributory negligence and she could not recover. Livaudais v.
Black, 13 La. App. 345, 127 So. 129 (193o).
"Ford v. Carew and English, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 199, 200 P. (2d) 838 (1948);
Barber v. Howard Sober, Inc., 269 App. Div. ioo8, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 465 (1945);
Weldon Tool Co. v. Kelley, 81 Ohio App. Rep. 427, 76 N. E. (2d) 629 (1947).
51 Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 2o Tenn. App. 229, 97 S. W. (2d) 452 (1936).
Although, in that case, liability was imposed on the common carrier defendant on
a theory of negligent selection of its agent, the court indicated there could be no
question of negligence at the time of the accident in an epilepsy situation. See discus-
sion and cases, note io, supra. In an assault and battery case, the condition of an
epileptic driver has been likened to insanity and the rule that insanity is no defense
applied. Sauers v. Sack, 34 Ga. App. 748, 131 S. E. 98 (1925). It has been argued
that the problem of the instant case should be considered as similar to insanity.
Slattery v. Haley [1922] 52 Ont. L. R. 95, 3 D. L. R. 156, 11 B. R. C. 1o36. Insanity
is not a defense to a tort action. The law imposes "upon a person already visited
with the inexpressible calamity of mental obscurity an obligation to observe the
same care and precautions respecting the rights of others that the law demands
of one in the full possession of his faculties." Williams v. Hays, 143 N. Y. 442,
447, 38 N. E. 449, 450, 26 L. R. A. 153, 156 (1894). This rule was applied when
"mental obscurity" suddenly set upon a driver while he was operating his ve-
hicle. Sforza v. Green Bus Lines, 15o Misc. i8o, 268 N. Y. Supp. 446 (1934). But
this rule has been adopted, because, inter alia, it is considered that it tends to
provide for the insane by giving their relatives or the beneficiaries of their estates
a financial interest in caring for them. In Re Guardianship of Meyer, German Fire
Insurance Society v. Meyer, 218 Wis. 381, 261 N. W. 211 at 213 (1935); McIntyre v.
Sholty, 121 I1. 66o at 664, 13 N. E. 239 at 240, 2 Am. St. Rep. 140 (1887); Throck-
morton, Cooley on Torts (1930) § 45; Prosser, Torts (1941) io9o. This particular rea-
son for the rule is clearly not applicable to unconsciousness and, in any event,
the rule itself even while applied is invariably criticised and scrupulously limited.
(See authorities cited, this footnote.)
"Edwards v. Ford, 69 Ga. App. 578, 26 S. E. (2d) 306 (1943).
:1 Tift v. State, 17 Ga. App. 663, 88 S. E. 41 (1916) [vertigo]; see cases cited, Note
(1953) 28 A. L. R. (2d) 12, 27.
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In administering these rules, the courts have generally held, as did
the West Virginia court in the instant case, that the plaintiff may es-
tablish a prima facie case such that the burden of going forward shifts
to the defendant.1 8 When the plaintiff has shown circumstances justi-
fying an inference of negligent conduct by the defendant, a burden is
cast upon the defendant to bring forth an explanation of his conduct
inconsistent with such an inference of negligence.1 9 In this type of
case, specifically, if the defendant relies upon the defense of an in-
capacitating but unforeseeable sudden illness, once the plaintiff has
shown an accident involving the parties, the defense must affirmatively
establish that the illness occurred and that it was not foreseeable.20
However, since there are two distinct meanings widely attached
to the term prima facie case,21 it must be noted that West Virginia
holds the term to denote the point at which the party with the initial
burden of proof (risk of non-persuasion) becomes entitled to go to the
nFord v. Carew and English, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 199, 200 P. (2d) 828, 833 (1948)
("...the burden of proving... [unforeseeability] ... was on the defendants.");
Edwards v. Ford, 69 Ga. App. 578, 26 S. E. (2d) 306 (1943); Driver v. Brooks, 176 Va.
317, 1o S. E. (2d) 887 (1940). Cf. Journey v. Zawish, ii N. J. Misc. 482, 167 Aft.
7 (1933).
"Harrington v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont. 40, 33 P. (2d) 553 (1934);
the plaintiff is put to prove merely the nature of his harm, and the defendant's
share in causing it; and the other circumstances, which would if they existed leave
him without a claim, are put upon the defendant to prove." 9 Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed. 1940) 275; ". .. the burden of such proof, in explanation of his conduct
rested upon the defendants." Driver v. Brooks, 176 Va. 317, 328, 10 S. E. (2d) 887,
892 (1940). That the use of the term "burden" is inaccurate and, in view of allied
inaccuracies in procedural terminology, has been confusing is clear. Michie, The Law
of Evidence in Virginia and West Virginia (1954) § 196. However, this controversy
is not significant since the penalty for silence need not be a directed verdict for one's
adversary. McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5 N.
C. L. Rev. 291.
"See cases cited, noted 18, supra. As the defense had not then sustained this
"burden," it was not error to deny defendant's motion for a directed verdict at the
end of the plaintiff's case. Keller v. Wonn, 87 S. E. (2d) 453 at 459 (W. Va. 1955).
"The phrase may indicate the point at which the proponent has entitled him-
self to a directed verdict unless his opponent comes forward with evidence. In this
sense, said to be equivalent to the notion of a presumption, the proponent has
fastened a duty upon his adversary. Or the phrase may indicate the point at which
the proponent with the risk of non-persuasion, either normally or always the
plaintiff, depending on one's resolution of another controversy in the law, has
entitled himself to go to the jury. In this sense, the proponent need only have
relieved himself of the duty of going forward. 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940)
§ 249. Obviously, the term might be properly applied in the latter sense even
though the proponent has so far exceeded the point as also to satisfy the meaning
of the term in the former sense. It is submitted that this is a good reason why
"it is often difficult to detect which of these [meanings) is intended in the judicial
passage at hand." 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3 rd ed. 1940) 293. 33 Words and Phrases
(Perm. ed. 1940) 543 et seq., contains an exemplary list of both usages.
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jury.22 If his adversary does come forward with evidence, as the
defendant did in the instant case, a jury question may be presented,23
or, as in the instant case, that adversary may entitle himself to
a directed verdict.24 The justice of such a rule is that it places upon
the party most able to sustain it the responsibility for bringing forth
the particular facts of an occurrence. 25 It can hardly be questioned that
this is the situation in a case in which a pedestrian has been struck by
an automobile, and for this reason, application of the normal require-
ment that the plaintiff make an affirmative showing as to each element
in his cause is appropriately denied.
In the instant case, proof of the plaintiff's injury together with the
testimony of eye-witnesses establishing a causal connection between
that injury and the movements of Wonn's automobile had entitled the
plaintiff to go to the jury, subject to the right of the defendant to come
forward with evidence and possibly discharge his burden sufficiently
to entitle himself to a directed verdict. It seems that only a difference of
opinion as to whether the defendant succeeded in this respect can
explain the trial court judgment. Since the medical evidence indi-
cated that cerebral hemorrhage was the cause of death, and testimony
of witnesses for both sides showed that Wonn was unconscious seconds
after the accident, there seems little ground for dispute that he was
unconscious at and just before the time of the accident.26 It would ap-
nMorris v. City of Wheeling, 82 S. E. (2d) 536 (W. Va. 1954); Michie, The Law
of Evidence in Virginia and West Virginia (1954) § 194. Cf. State v. Dodds, 54 W. Va.
289, 46 S. E. 228 (1903).
239 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) § 2487 (d). To the effect that the question
involved in the instant case presented a question for the jury: Ford v. Carew and
English, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 199, 200 P. (2d) 828 (1948); Soule v. Grimshaw, 266 Mich.
117, 253 N. W. 237 (1934); Meyers v. Tri-State Automobile Co., 121 Minn. 68, 140
N. W. 184 ('913); Lagasse v. Laporte, 95 N. H. 92, 58 A. (2d) 312 (1948); Barber v.
Howard Sober, Inc., 269 App. Div. 1oo8, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 465 (1945); Dishman v.
Whitney, 1a Wash. 157, 2o9 Pac. 12, 29 A. L. R. 460 (1922).
29 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 2487 (e), 2488 (b). To the effect that the
question involved in the instant case did not present an issue entitling plaintiff to go
to the jury: Armstrong v. Cook, 250 Mich. i8o, 229 N. W. 433 (193o); La Vigne v.
La Vigne, 176 Ore. 634, 158 P. (2d) 557 (1945).
"9 Wigmore, Evidence (3 rd ed. 1940) § 2509; McCormick, Evidence (1954) § 309;
Michie, The Law of Evidence in Virginia and West Virginia (1954) 36o. This idea
was well expressed in an argument for requiring defendant to come forward on
pain of a peremptory ruling for plaintiff: ".. . the sense of fair play rebels against
allowing the defendant to withhold his information and try his luck with the
jury." Note (1951) 3o Tex. L. Rev. 127, 129.
"See testimony, note 3, supra. Plaintiff made a vigorous argument on this point.
"All the testimony ... failed to suggest anything abnormal in the appearance or
condition of the driver... until after the violent collision and subsequent excite-
ment." Keller v. Wonn, 87 S. E. (2d) 453 (W. Va. 1955), Plaintiff's Brief in Support
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pear, therefore, that the difference of opinion as to liability arose
over interpretation of the foreseeability of this condition. The Supreme
Court of Appeals observed that the contention that Wonn could have
anticipated this calamity rested on Dr. Golden's testimony and that that
testimony, properly analyzed, lent little or no support to such a con-
clusion.27 On the other hand, evidence of Dr. Condry and another
doctor amply supported the contention of the defense that this at-
tack was not foreseeable. Thus, not even the allocation to the defen-
dant of a heavy share of the responsibility for producing evidence
permitted a finding of liability.
Such results may be open to criticism as violating the principle that
he who is harmed must be recompensed. This approach to the problem
was considered and rejected by the leading case 2s in the line of decisions
which West Virginia has just joined. The plaintiff there unsuccessfully
contended that he who put in motion a dangerous thing should be
absolutely responsible for any damage it caused. Although in most
jurisdictions that contention is not accepted in this type of case, a
Texas appellate court apparently would impose liability upon an
unconscious driver under the reasoning of a 19 5 decision.
29 Further-
more, there is considerable support outside of the courts for a system
which will give more assurance of adequate compensation to automo-
bile accident victims by (i) imposing strict liability in automobile
accident cases, and (2) requiring automobile operators to provide a
source of funds for the satisfaction of judgments against them.30 Some
progress has been made in the latter respect in the form of financial
responsibility legislation in force in many states31 and compulsory
of Petition for Rehearing 2. Plaintiff suggested that the "violent collision" may
have caused Wonn's condition rather than the condition causing the collision, and
contended that resolution of the question was for the jury. However, the court ap-
parently felt that for the jury to weigh the suggestions of the evidence against this
conjecture was, in Dean Prosser's phrase, like weighing seventeen pounds of sugar
against half-past two in the afternoon. Prosser, Torts (1941) 291.
'Keller v. Wonn 87 S. E. (2d) 453, 461 (W. Va. 1955): "A careful analysis of...
[Golden's statement] ... shows that Wonn was not informed that if he operated
an automobile he might have a sudden attack of some kind which would result in
serious consequences to himself or others."
2Slattery v. Haley [1922 ] 52 Ont. L. R. 95, 3 D. L. R. i56, ii B. R. C. 1o36.
2Leary v. Oates, 84 S. W. (2d) 486, 38 N. C. C. A. 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
IMarx, Let's Compensate-Not Litigate (1954) 3o N. D. L. Rev. 2o; McNiece
and Thornton, Auto Accident Prevention and Compensation (1952) 27 N. Y. U. L.
Rev. 585; Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation
(1950) 50 Col. L. Rev. 3oo; Note (1940) 6 Pitt. L. Rev. 3o8; U. S. News and World
Report, October 28, 1955, P. 48.
mFinancial responsibility laws, in force in Kansas, New Mexico, and South Da-
kota, provide that the registration and driver's license of any person having an
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insurance legislation in force in Massachusetts, 32 but these laws are
criticized by the advocates of a more effective guaranty for automobile
victims. Grounds usually assigned in criticism of these types of legisla-
tion are that they are inefficient and of little aid when liability is de-
termined upon the basis of common law principles.
33
This dissatisfaction early found respectable spokesmen when the
Columbia Report 34 recommended the establishment of a system simi-
lar to workmen's compensation for automobile accident cases. These
recommendations, while not now the law of any state, have been
enacted by the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. The Saskatch-
ewan plan in broad terms insures every citizen of the province against
automobile accident injuries, unless his conduct amounted to a crim-
inal offense, or he is unlicensed or unregistered, or he was riding on
a part of the vehicle not designed to carry a load. An exclusive state
insurance fund is used to provide compensation. Benefit levels in Sas-
katchewan have been based on earnings up to a maximum of $2o per
week with an arbitrary figure of $12.50 per week for housewives.35
outstanding unsatisfied judgment growing out of an automobile accident shall be sus-
pended until the judgment is paid and proof of financial responsibility is shown
(normally by proof of insurance coverage). Safety responsibility legislation, now
in force in forty-four states, including West Virginia, differs from financial respon-
sibility legislation in that it goes into operation upon the happening of an accident.
1 W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1955) c. 17 D, may be considered typical of the former.
Vorys, A Short Survey of Laws Designed To Exclude The Financially Irresponsible
Driver from the Highway (1954) 15 Ohio St. L. J. ioi.
'Various provisions of this repeatedly amended legislation are spread through-
out the General Laws of Massachusetts. It provides that no motor vehicle shall be
registered unless covered by a personal injury liability policy with limits of $5,ooo
and S1o,ooo. The motorist or owner must pay property damage judgments up to
$i,ooo on pain of suspension of his registration. Vorys, A Short Survey of Laws De-
signed To Exclude the Financially Irresponsible Driver from the Highway (x954)
15 Ohio St. L. J. ioi, io5.
'It is contended that provisions of these statutes leave the injured party
remediless should the driver choose to stop driving a car, that evasion of their
provisions is relatively easy, and that at best they provide only a limited fund.
Marx, Let's Compensate-Not Litigate (1954) 3o N. D. L. Rev. 20. Other and rarer
statutory approaches to the problem also criticised by "Compensation" advocates are
impounding acts, and establishment of an unsatisfied judgment fund. Vorys, A Short
Survey of Laws Designed To Exclude the Financial Irresponsible Driver from the
Highway (1954) 15 Ohio St. L. J. 1o, 107 et seq.
3'Report by the Committee To Study Compensation for Automobile Acci-
dents to Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences (1932).
This report, by a committee of eminent judges, legal educators and financiers, re-
mains the most comprehensive survey of the problem. The problems which the
committee noted have been massively documented in a somewhat later study,
(1936) 3 Law and Contemp. Prob. 465-61o, and the statistical basis of the report
was investigated and found valid as late as 1952. James and Law, Compensation for
Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late (1952) 26 Conn. B. J. 7o.
*Saskatchewan Automobile Accident Insurance Act (1947) (as amended). The
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This plan and variations on it elsewhere proposed have been de-
fended as necessary because the amounts of jury verdicts in court
actions are highly speculative, delay in payment is caused by congested
court calendars, the uninsured defendant is often unable to respond
in damages, and automobile accidents are said to happen too quickly
to make possible a reliable fault determination.36 The first two reasons
advanced, where applicable, are a result of the failure of the bench
and bar to keep the common law house in order. The third objective
of the compensation advocates is met to a degree by financial responsi-
bility legislation and to an even higher degree by compulsory in-
surance.
37
The question of the feasibility, and indeed the desirability, of de-
termination of fault in automobile negligence actions cannot, how-
ever, be lightly answered. From the beginning of the automotive age
there has been evident in tort law a trend toward strict liability in
automobile cases, 38 and there is a notorious jury preference for the
plaintiff which almost requires the defendant to prevail as a matter of
law in order to avoid liability.39 However, abolition of the fault princi-
Saskatchewan law has been reported to be working very well. Grad, Recent Develop-
ments in Automobile Accident Compensation (1950) 5o Col. L. Rev. 300, 323. But see
Vorys, A Short Survey of Laws Designed To Exclude the Financially Irresponsible
Driver from the Highway (1954) 15 Ohio St. L. J. ioi, io8.
fMorris, Torts (1953) 340 et seq.; Prosser, Torts (1941) 284; Marx, Let's Com-
pensate-Not Litigate (1954) 3o N. D. L. Rev. 2o; McNiece and Thornton, Auto-
mobile Accident Prevention and Compensation (1952) 27 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 585,
r88; Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation (195o)
50 Col. L. Rev. 300, 302 (quoting Columbia Report); James, Accident Liability Re-
considered: The Impact of Liability Insurance (1948) 57 Yale L. J. 549; Note (1941) 6
Mo. L. Rev. 512, 515.
3See notes 31-33, supra. This type of legislation, it is submitted, is quite effective
in dealing with the accident prone. Statistics indicate that this class of drivers
causes much of the trouble. James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident
Law (1950) 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769. It appears to increase the percentage of insured
drivers. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance
(1948) 57 Yale L. J. 549, 562. And such an increase markedly decreases the possi-
bility that a claimant with a valid claim will go uncompensated. James and
Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too
Late (1952) 26 Conn. B. J. 70.
1ZMcNiece and Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and Compensation
(1952) 27 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 585, 604; Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Auto-
mobile Accident Litigation (1936) 3 Law and Contemp. Prob. 476; "...a subsur-
face encroachment upon the principle [of fault] is apparent.... [L]iability is imposed
for ever lesser and lesser fault.... [W]idespread extension of vicarious liability ...
is indicative of a more direct trend toward liability regardless of fault." Grad, Re-
cent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation (195o) 50 Col. L. Rev.
300, 303.
a'... the notorious tendency of that body [the jury] to prefer the plaintiff,
especially as against the defendant suspected of carrying insurance, had made 'tak-
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ple is vigorously opposed both on philosophic and on practical grounds.
A serious objection to any compensation system is the multiplicity
of administrative and policy problems involved,40 including the prob-
ability that demagogic standards would govern determination of com-
pensation levels and other details of any such plan.4' Undoubtedly
imposition of such a system would increase the cost of operation of a
motor vehicle, although proponents of compensation insist this is a
social cost which those deriving benefit from the automobile should
bear.4 2 Although no such legislation has been enacted in the United
States, the insistence of its proponents and an appreciation of the
trend toward social insurance in all fields commend a serious study
of it to those interested in the fields of insurance or automobile law.
4 3
ing the case away from the jury' one of the primary objectives of the defense
counsel." Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation
(1936) 3 Law and Contemp. Prob. 476, 477; Morris, Torts (1953) 373.
'"Should liability be imposed on behalf of the grossly negligent plaintiff who
may be the author of his own harm? Will compensation for guests encourage col-
lusive or entirely faked claims? Shall a remedy over in tort be provided? What
formula is to be used for payments, especially as to infants, invalids, and the
aged? What is the incentive to the successful claimant to get out of bed and stop
disability payments? How can disabilities or other bases of compensation formu-
lae be checked? Shall compensation be equal or based on earning power, capacities,
and prospects? If the latter, how shall these be measured? Shall insurance be by
state fund or private underwriter? If the former, how can political tinkering and
expensive administration be prevented? If the latter, how can an actuarial basis for
premiums be obtained? Sherman, Grounds for Opposing the Automobile Accident
Compensation Plan (1936) 3 Law and Contemp. Prob. 598. It is claimed that
workmen's compensation proves that automobile compensation is workable. See
authorities cited, note 30, supra. But, "the utopia of speed and simplicity sought
by the legislators has eluded the injured worker, and legal representation remains
indispensable." Bear, Workmen's Compensation and the Lawyer (1951) 51 Col. L.
Rev. 965, 969. The volume of litigation, if judged by workmen's compensation,
would not be substantially decreased, Morris, Torts (1953) 353 et seq., and the
cost of administration may be much higher. Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is It
More Efficient Than Employer's Liability? (1952) 38 A. B. A. J. l11.
"Morris, Torts (1953) 371 et seq. Morris, however, fears political assaults on
economic rate-making even under the present system. The additional feature of
payment levels politically determined is, however, unique to the compensation
plan. See authorities cited, note 40 supra.
'"All figures are of course speculative in the absence of a specific plan on
which to base them and would remain speculative until actuarial data was de-
veloped from experience. For a proponent's estimate: Marx, Let's Compensate-
Not Litigate (1954) 30 N. D. L. Rev. 20, 35 (". .. a premium cost no greater than the
present cost of liability insurance..."). Contra: Sherman, Grounds for Opposing
the Automobile Accident Compensation Plan (1936) 3 Law and Contemp. Prob.
598, 608 ("...staggering .... beyond.- human capacity to proguosticate ... when
'claim consciousness' is aroused ....').
'5"The real fight.., is just getting underway. The next decade will probably
decide (i) whether you will be able to afford to own an automobile, i.e., pay the
fees and taxes necessary for its registration, and (2) whether, if you do get seriously
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Pending the adoption of some radical change in automobile law,
however, it is submitted that in avoiding both the extreme of asking
the plaintiff to produce evidence which he is ordinarily not in a posi-
tion to obtain and the extreme of holding the defendant where he is
not at fault, the West Virginia court has announced a sound rule.
JOHN S. STUMP
TORTS-REMEDIES OF OWNERS OF LAND NEAR AIRPORTS FOR INTER-
FERENCE WITH USE OF LAND CAUSED BY LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT.
[Pennsylvania]
The flights of aircraft in close proximity to the surface which oc-
cur during landings and take-offs have often been a source of damage
and annoyance to the owners of property adjacent to airports. In result-
ing suits, the courts have been faced with the difficult task of balancing
the right of the land owner to the free and undiminished use and en-
joyment of his property against the public benefit derived from the
flights. Consequently, the conclusions reached by the courts have been
far from uniform. The problem has been made even more complex by
the rapid growth of federal regulation of aviation.
Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate foreign and in-
terstate commerce granted by the Commerce Clause of the Federal
Constitution,' passed the Air Commerce Act of 19262 and the more
comprehensive Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.3 The later statute de-
clared that the United States possesses and exercises "complete and ex-
clusive national sovereignty in the air space above the United States."
4
The Act of 1938 further provided that there exists in behalf of any
citizen of the United States "a public right of freedom of transit in
air commerce through the navigable air space of the United States." 5
Navigable air space is defined as "air space above the minimum al-
titudes of flight prescribed by" the Civil Aeronautics Authority.6 The
hurt.., you will be circumscribed by a compensation system which limits your
damages to the figures contained in a schedule." Vorys, A Short Survey of Laws
Designed To Exclude the Financially Irresponsible Driver from the Highway
(1954) 15 Ohio St. L. J. 1oi, 1O9.
1U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cd. 3.
244 Stat. 568 (1926), 49 U. S. C. A. § 171 (1951).
252 Stat. 973 (1938), 49 U. S. C. A. § 401 (1951).
'52 Stat. 1028 (1938), 49 U. S. C. A. § 176 (1951).
r52 Stat. 98o (1938), 49 U. S. C. A. § 403 (1951).
052 Stat. 979 (1938), 49 U. S. C. A. § 401 (1951).
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power to prescribe these altitudes now rests in the Civil Aeronautics
Board (C. A. B.)7 which has provided in Section 6o.17 of the Civil Air
Regulations that "except where necessary for take-off and landing," no
person shall operate an aircraft below certain specified altitudes. The
minimum safe altitudes then prescribed are i,ooo feet above congested
areas, and 500 feet over other than congested areas.8
As it had previously done with the navigable waters, Congress has
brought the navigable air space within the public domain.9 In doing
so, Congress has recognized that uniformity of regulation will promote
safety and stimulate domestic and foreign air commerce in this vast
new highway of travel and trade, and that the federal government
alone can enact and efficiently enforce such a uniform system of regu-
lation.10 The rapid growth of aviation since Congress first undertook
'Originally, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 conferred the power to prescribe
minimum safe altitudes of flight upon the Secretary of Commerce. Hist. Note,
49 U. S. C. A. 555 (1951). By the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, this duty devolved
upon the Civil Aeronautics Authority (C. A. A.), and by virtue of subsequent execu-
tive department reorganization, the authority to prescribe these altitudes now rests
with the C. A. B. Transfer of Functions, 49 U. S. C. 7202 (1952).
sCiv. Air Reg. § 6o.17, 12 F. R. 5547 (1947), 14 C. F. R. § 6o.17 (1952 ed.).
'The analogy between navigable waters and navigable air space has often been
drawn by the courts. E. g., Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 3o3, 64
S. Ct. 950, 956, 88 L. ed. 1283, 129o (1944), where Justice Jackson, concurring, de-
clared: "Air as an element in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized
by the commerce clause than is navigable water. Local exactions and barriers to
free transit in the air would neutralize its indifference to space and its conquest
of time." Also, Roosevelt Field v. Town of North Hempstead, 88 F. Supp. 177, 187
(E. D. N. Y. 195o): "The parallel which plaintiff draws between the sovereignty of
the Federal Government in the air space above the United States, and that over nav-
igable waters, is true and complete."
"0 The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that certain phases of
commerce are of such a nature as to demand that their regulation be prescribed by a
single authority. Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 13 L. ed.
996 (U. S. 1851); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89
L. ed. 1915 (1945); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 16o, 62 S. Ct. 164, 86 L. ed. 119
(1941); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346, 59 S. Ct. 528, 83
L. ed. 752 (1939). The need for uniformity of regulation in air commerce was stressed
in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 107, 68 S. Ct.
431, 434, 92 L. ed. 568, 574 (1948), where Justice Jackson said: "Of course, air
transportation, water transportation, rail transportation and motor transportation
all have a kinship in that all are forms of transportation and their common
features of public carriage for hire may be amenable to kindred regulations. But
these resemblances must not blind us to the fact that legally, as well as literally, air
commerce, whether at home or abroad, soared into a different realm than any that
had gone before. Ancient doctrines of private ownership of the air as appurtenant
to land titles had to be revised to make aviation practically serviceable to our
society. A way of travel which quickly escapes the bounds of local regultive com-
petence called for a more penetrating, uniform and exclusive regulation by the
nation than had been thought appropriate for the more easily controlled,
commerce of the past."
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to regulate the field in 1926 has brought about a continuing expan-
sion in the scope of federal regulation." Today, the federal regula-
tory power encompasses nearly every phase of air transit, and extends to
intra-state, as well as interstate flights, since the former could affect or
endanger the latter.' 2
The conclusions that must necessarily be drawn are that Congress
has pre-empted the field of regulation and control of the flight of air-
craft, and that the federal government alone can regulate flights in the
air space above the specified minimum safe altitudes of flight. However,
the question of whether national sovereignty extends below 500 feet
continued to be unsettled because of a difference of opinion among
the courts as to whether the words "except where necessary for take-
off and landing" in Section 6o.17 of the Civil Air Regulations implies
that the national power includes the right to regulate within the lower
altitudes necessary for take-offs and landings.' 3 The point was some-
what clarified by a 1954 interpretation of Section 6o.17 in which the
C. A. B. stated that "navigable air space includes all of the airspace
uThe extent of federal control is tersely summarized in Justice Jackson's con-
curring opinion in Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 3o3, 64 S. Ct. 950,
956, 88 L. ed. 1283, 1290 (1944): "Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes
do not wander about in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal
permission, subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified person-
nel and under an intricate system of federal commands. The moment a ship taxis
onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls.
It takes off only by instruction from the control tower, it travels on prescribed
beams, it may be diverted from its intended landing, and it obeys signals and
orders. Its privileges, rights, and protection, so far as transit is concerned, it owes
to the Federal Government alone and not to any state government."
'2 "It cannot be doubted that if the Federal Act is devoted to the promotion of
safety and efficiency in interstate commerce, whether it be the stagecoach, sailboat,
steamship, railroad train, motor truck or airplane, if the Act bears some reasonable
and rational relationship to the subject over which it has assumed to act, the power is
supreme and may not be denied, although it may include within its scope activities
which are intra-state in character." Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F. (2d) 932, 935
(C. C. A. ioth, 1942).
"In United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 263, 66 S. Ct. io62, io67, 9o L. ed.
1206, 1211 (1946)., it was stated: "The altitude required for that operation [landing
or take-off] is not the minimum safe altitude of flight which is the downward
reach of the navigable airspace.... Thus, it is apparent that the path of glide is
not the minimum safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the statute." This
strict interpretation of the statute was not uniformly followed by the state courts.
In Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N. E. (2d) 752, 758 (1947), the
Ohio court said: "In order that effect may be given to regulations permitting flight
in the public domain, the words of the regulation-'Except where necessary for take-
off or landing'-must be construed to mean that a right is given to fly over the
lands of others at heights of less than 500 feet, when necessary for take-off or
landing." This more liberal interpretation was also accepted in Wisconsin. Kuntz v.
Werner Flying Service, 257 Wis. 405, 43 N. W. (2d) 476 (1950).
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above the glide path necessary for take-off and landing,"'14 thereby indi-
cating that the levels below 500 feet necessarily involved in these
stages of flight are under national regulation. Confirming this view is
a recent decision of a federal district court which invalidated an
ordinance designed to protect the residents of a village from the danger
created by low-flying planes from a nearby airport by prohibiting the
flight of aircraft over the village at less than 1,ooo feet.1 The court de-
clared that the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and the C.A.B. regulations
established thereunder have regulated air space to such an extent as to
constitute a pre-emption of the field, and that the states and their
sub-divisions are thus precluded from enacting contrary or conflicting
legislation.16 Furthermore, the contention that the air space under
i,ooo feet is not navigable air space was rejected on the ground that
certain areas of such air space are necessary for take-off and landing.
If it is assumed that the navigable air space over which the United
States exercises complete and exclusive national sovereignty includes
whatever air space is necessary for take-off and landing, there remains
the question of what effect this existence of federal control has upon
the rights of an individual owning property adjacent to an airport who
suffers injury as a result of repeated low flights over his property which
occur during landings and take-offs. This problem was recently con-
sidered by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Gardner
v. County of Allegheny.'7 The plaintiffs were owners of five tracts of
land located i,ooo feet from the end of one of the three runways of
the Greater Pittsburg Airport, which was owned and maintained by
the County of Allegheny. The action was brought in a state court
against the county and the several airlines leasing facilities at the air-
port.'s Plaintiffs alleged that during take-offs and landings, airplanes
of the various airlines operating out of the airport ascend and de-
scend along a glide path, which, as it crosses their premises, is be-
low the floor of the navigable air space and about 15 to 30 feet above the
chimneys of their houses. As a .result of these low flights, sometimes
:1Civ. Air Reg., Interpretation i, ig F. R. 4602 (1954).
"Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E. D. N. Y. 1955).
"It should be noted that the Cedarhurst decision does not decide the rights of
adjoining property owners. At the very outset of his opinion, District Judge Bruch-
hauser stated: "This action involves the constitutionalitly of an ordinance.... It does
not affect the rights of property owners."132 F. Supp. 871, 873 (E. D. N. Y. 1955).
27382 Pa. 88, 114 A. (2d) 491 (1955).
"The defendants filed a preliminary objection, contending that the C. A. B. and
the Civil Aeronautics Administrator were indispensible to the action. Although the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that these governmental authorities were not
indispensable parties, it is interesting to note that they were allowed to intervene
and file a brief as amici curiae.
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occurring as often as eight to ten times in ten to fifteen minutes, the
plaintiffs complained that they had suffered from noises and other
nuisances, and that the flights constituted a real danger to the occupants
of the property. These facts, the plaintiffs alleged, were (i) continuing
trespasses that endangered their homes and their safety, and (2) con-
stituted a "taking" of their properties by the county without com-
pensation. The plaintiffs sought alternatively (1) an injunction re-
straining all commercial airliners from flying over their properties be-
low the floor of the navigable air space during landing or take off, or
(2) payment of the present fair market value of their respective prop-
erties, ascertained as if there were no air operations at the airport.
It was not averred in the pleadings whether the flights complained
of were or were not within the air space "necessary" for take-off and
landing. Consequently, this question was not not decided.19 However,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did affirm the lower court's assump-
tion of jurisdiction and remanded for trial on the merits, ruling that
state courts have the authority, which Congress has neither limited
or destroyed, to enjoin trespasses to a land owner's property arising from
frequent interstate or intra-state flights below the minimum safe alti-
tudes of flight, and that this authority includes the power to enjoin
landings and take-offs below the minimum safe altitudes for such
operations. Even if planes do not fly below the necessary minimum
altitudes during take-offs and landings, and therefore cannot be en-
joined from flying, the court concluded that the land owner may still be
entitled to compensation for an easement established over his land, or
for a complete taking of his property, if, as a result of the flights, the
land was rendered uninhabitable. However, it was ruled that a court of
equity is wthout jurisdiction to assess damages for such a "taking," on
the ground that the specific procedure for the condemnation of property
for airdromes and landing fields provided for by the Pennsylvania
statutes was exclusive.
20
The only difference of opinion within the court was on the question
"Consequently, the conclusion of the court was that, "we need not and do not
decide whether a State Court can enjoin flights which are within the airspace
necessary for safe take-offs or landings if such flights imminently endanger plain-
tiff's life or property." 382 Pa. 88, 114 A. (2d) 491, 504 (1955).
!In Pennsylvania, when the interested parties cannot agree upon the amount of
compensation to be awarded after condemnation, the court of common pleas,
upon petition of the interested parties, is authorized to appoint three viewers from
the county board of viewers who shall estimate and assess the damages for the
property taken or destroyed. Act of May 2, 1929, P. L. 1278, Art. 7, §§ 518, 523,
since reenacted in the Second Class County Code, 16 P. S., § 26o8(a) et seq. Act of
July 28, 1953, P. L. 723, Art. 26 §§ 2608, 2613. 16 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon Perm. ed.)
§§ 2151-26o8, 2151-2613.
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of the power of state courts to grant an injunction. The view taken by
the one dissenting justice was that "The operation of airplanes, both
interstate and intra-state, is exclusively within federal jurisdiction.
State courts possess no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief concern-
ing minimum altitudes when landing or taking off, irrespective of
whether the flights are interstate or intra-state."
21
The court's conclusion that flights over private land which are
so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference
with the enjoyment and use of the surface land amount to a "taking"
is a reiteration of the doctrine laid down by the United States Su-
preme Court in the case of United States v. Causby.2 2 There, a land
owner was awarded compensation for flights of military aircraft over
his property at heights as low as 83 feet above the surface, on the theory
that the United States had established an easement of flight over his
land for which compensation was due under the Fifth Amendment.
23
However, compensating for a taking of property is often a wholly un-
satisfactory solution from the standpoint of the land owner, since it
necessarily involves a loss of all or part of his property. Futhermore,
as was pointed out in the Gardner case, such compensation can only
be obtained through proper eminent domain proceedings, and there-
fore would not be available as a form of relief where the flights origi-
nated from a privately owned airport, since private persons do not
possess the power of eminent domain unless specifically conferred by
statute.
24
The position taken by the majority of the court in the Gardner
case is in accord with the view generally expressed by the courts in
the earlier cases that a land owner is entitled to injunctive relief where
he has shown unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment
of his property and substantial damage caused by low-flying planes,
even if the flights occurred during take-off and landing.25 In these cases,
2See Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa. 88, 114 A. (2d) 491, 507 (1955).
-2328 U. S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. ed. 12o6 (1946).
T'rhe Fifth Amendment provides that "private property" shall not "be taken
for public use, without just compensation." U. S. Const., Amend. V.
2429 C. J. S., Eminent Domain § 27.
'Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931) (certain
operations of an airport which was not fully developed at time of trial, but which
was planned as a first class airport which would greatly interfere with enjoyment
of neighboring property when completed as contemplated, were enjoined); Vander-
slice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A. (2d) 87 (1942) (operators of an airport en-
joined from making, or authorizing others to make, objectionably low flights, and
from operating the airport in such a way that the low flights may reasonably be
expected to recur in its normal operation); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga.
862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245 (1942) (low flights which were imminently dangerous to life
and health of adjoining property owners held to be an enjoinable nuisance);
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both nuisance and tresspass have nearly always been alleged, and it has
not always been clear which has been used by the courts as a basis for
relief, but the one element present in nearly all situations is an un-
reasonable interference with the owner's beneficial use of his sur-
face land. However, the growth of aviation and the accompanying ex-
pansion of federal regulation of aeronautics has brought about a neces-
sary restriction in the right of owners of property adjacent to airports
to be free from interference in the use and enjoyment of their land.
The courts on several occasions have refused to grant relief on the
ground that the injuries resulting from low flights were only minor
inconveniences suffered by the land owner as a necessary consequence
of progress in aviation.20 Although injunctions have readily issued
against flights from, and the operation of, private airports, 27 the courts
have been more reluctant to take similar action when a public airport
is involved, especially where the issuance of an injunction would re-
sult in the airport ceasing its operations.28 In these latter cases, the
tendency of the courts has been to balance the harm which results to
the land owner against the benefit which would accrue to the general
public if the airport continued in operation. Several writers have taken
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934) (injunction refused on
ground that plaintiff's allegations were insufficient to show flights constituted
either a trespass or nuisance); Burnham v. Beverley Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42
N. E. (2d) 575 (1942) (flights over adjacent property at heights less than 500 feet held
to be trasspass justifying injunction); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass.
511, 17o N. E. 385 (1930) (injunction refused because of failure to show damage
to property or material discomfort resulting from low flights); Crew v. Gallagher, 358
Pa. 541, 58 A. (2d) 179 (1948) (injunction denied on ground plaintiffs failed to sus-
tain burden of proving flights caused damage or material discomfort). See Warren
Township School Dist. v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N. W. (2d) 134, 135 (944)
(city warned that operation of proposed airport could be enjoined as a nuisance
or a continuing trespass if planes took-off and landed in close proximity to ad-
joining property).
-Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) (flights
within ioo feet of surface of plaintiff's property held to be lawful in absence of
actual interference with possession or beneficial use of land); Smithdeal v. Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 233 (N. D. Tex. 1948) (noise and vibration); Antonik
v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E. (2d) 752 (1947) (noise, dust, apprehen-
sion of planes crashing, depreciation of property); Batcheller v. Commonwealth, 176
Va. 104, 1o S. L. (2d) 529 (1940) (noise, apprehension of injury from falling planes).
ZSwetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 2o (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Anderson
v. Souza, 38 Cal. (2d) 825, 243 P. (2d) 497 (1952); Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch.
225, 27 A. (2d) 87 (1942); Barrier v. Troutman, 231 N. C. 47, 55 S. E. (2d) 923
(1949).
-5"From all that appears the conditions causing the low flying may be rem-
edied, but if on the trial it should appear that it is indispensible to the public
interest that the airport should continue to be operated in its present condition,
it may be that the petitioners should be denied injunctive relief." Delta Air Corp.
v. Kersey, 139 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245, 251 (1942); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178
Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934).
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the view that all relief should be denied where the low flights are ab-
solutely necessary to the operation of an airport serving a great public
need.2 9
If, as was held in the Gardner case, the courts do possess the power
to enjoin flights below the minimum safe altitudes of flight, the is-
suance of such an injunction would appear to be of little practical
value in a fact situation similar to that in the Gardner case, since the
navigable air space now extends downward along the glide angle
to include whatever space is necessary for take-off and landing30 Once
the court had determined that the flights complained of were not with-
in the air space necessary for take-off and landing, apparently the most
that could be accomplished by the injunction would be to raise the glide
angle to a height that would conform to the federal regulations, and, in
all probability, the difference between the old and new glide angles
would not be enough to give the land owner any appreciable relief
from the harmful flights.
If it were determined that the flights are within the space "neces-
sary," and cannot be enjoined, the land owner desiring relief may
seek compensation for a "taking" through eminent domain proceed-
ings, but this can be done only when the party proceeded against pos-
sesses the power of eminent domain. A possible alternative remedy
for the injured owner would be to seek money damages through an ac-
tion for tortious invasion of his property by low-flying aircraft. Although
this form of relief was not sought in the Gardner case, it would appear
to be more satisfactory from the standpoint of the owner than a con-
demnation award, even if the latter were available, since enforcement
of the damages remedy would not involve the loss of property. The
amount of compensation received would necessarily vary according to
the extent of the harm suffered. If it should appear that the harmful
flights will continue, damages could be awarded for past and pros-
pective future invasions of the land.31 However, neither damages nor a
condemnation award should be automatically available each time
planes pass over private property at less than 5oo feet in the course
of take-off and landing, but only when the complaining land owner
can show actual physical damage to his property or an unreasonable
interference with its use. PHILLIPS M. DOWDING
"Leavitt, The Landowner v. The Airport (1946) 50 W. Va. L. Q. 145; Hunter,
The Conflicting Interests of Airport and Nearby Property Owner (1946) 11 Law
and Contemp. Prob. 539.
-"Note 14, Supra; Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871
(E. D. N. Y. 1955); Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N. E. (2d) 752
(1947); Kuntz v. Werner Flying Service, 257 Wis. 405, 43 N. W. (2d) 476 (195o).
"Restatement, Torts (1939) § 930; McCormick, Damages (1935) § 127(2)(b).
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TRUSTS-DETERMINATION OF CHARACTER OF LIFE INSURANCE TRUSTS AS
INTER VIVOS OR TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION. [Virginia]
Underlying the difference between inter vivos and testamentary
trusts is the principle that the former does, and the latter does not,
give the cestui a property interest in the trust corpus before the death
of the settlor, pursuant to the settlor's intent.' As a result of this distinc-
tion, an inter vivos trust need not meet the requirements of the law of
wills, such as formalities of execution imposed by the Statute of Wills;
but unless a sufficient interest was passed before the settlor's death, the
purported trust can operate, if at all, only as a will to dispose of proper-
ty at death.
2
The nature of life insurance trusts is such that their validity inter
vivos may be particularly questionable upon a measurement of the in-
terest passing in praesenti. The life insurance contract is itself some-
what testamentary insofar as enjoyment of the proceeds is postponed
until death of the insured and is subject to the commonly reserved
right of the insured to change the beneficiary. 3
The recent Virginia case of Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley National
Bank 4 touches upon and intermingles several of the traditional ap-
proaches to the problem of whether a sufficient interest passed before
settlor's death to support an inter vivos insurance trust,5 and in addi-
tion presents an interesting factual variation from the usual insurance
trust situation. In that case settlor's widow claimed a right to include
1Nichols v. Emery, iog Cal. 323, 41 Pac. 1089 (1895); Hines v. Louisville Trust
Co., 254 S. W. (2d) 73 (Ky. 1952); Dahlke v. Dahlke, 155 Neb. 169, 51 N. W. (2d)
266 (1952); Allen v. Hendrick, 1o4 Ore. 202, 206 Pac. 733 (1922); In re Shapley
Trusts, 353 Pa. 499, 46 A. (2d) 227, 164 A. L. R. 877 (1946); 1 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees (1951) § 1o3; 1 Perry, Trusts and Trustees (7th ed. 1929) § 97; 1 Scott,
Trusts (1939) § 56.
2See authority cited, note i, supra. In the final analysis, where no interest in the
subject matter passes in trust before death, the trust remains incomplete prior to
death for absence of a res, that being a basic element of any perfected trust. See,
recognizing this fact, Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 2Ol Ore. 648, 271 P. (2d) 653
at 655 (1954).
'Fidelity 9: Columbia Trust Co. v. Glenn, 39 F. Supp. 822, 825 (W. D. Ky. 1941);
Sigal v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 At. 742, 744 (1935);
Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P. (2d) 653 (1954); 1 Scott, Trusts
(1939) § 573; Smith, Personal Life Insurance Trusts (195o) § 17; Vance, Handbook
of the Law of Insurance (3rd ed. 1951) § io8.
Valid contracts other than life insurance contracts have been said to have a
"testamentary flavor." Harlan v. Weatherly, 183 Va. 49, 31 S. E. (2d) 263, 264 (1944).
'197 Va. 145, 88 S. E. (2d) 889 (1955).
GThe majority speaks only of what interest passed to the trustee whereas the
dissent refers to the interest passing to the cestuis. These viewpoints might give
different results in a case in which the purported trustee has considerable authority,
yet is only an agent of settlor because the "cestuis" receive no interest in the "corpus."
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certain insurance policy proceeds in settlor's estate for purposes of her
election to take a statutory share in the estate upon renouncing pro-
vision made for her in his will.6 She contended that the purported
inter vivos trust of the life insurance was in fact testamentary, and,
failing for lack of the formality required of wills, gave rise to a result-
ing trust in favor of the settlor and subsequently his estate.
The trust agreement provided that: (1) Should his wife elect
against his will, the insurance benefits were to be distributed in fourths
to settlor's four children by a former marriage; but, (2) should she
elect to take under the will, the proceeds were to go in five equal parts
to the wife and the four children. In either event the defendant bank as
trustee under the trust was to pay the portions of two of the children to
itself as trustee for them under the will. Settlor reserved the power to
revoke the trust and specified that the trustee had no rights in the
policies until settlor's death except the right to hold them in safekeep-
ing (which the trustee did from the execution of the trust agreement
until settlor's death). Settlor executed a valid will on the same day as
the trust instrument. That will remained in force until his death and
was duly probated. It provided, after specific bequests amounting
to about 8 per cent of the estate, that the wife and the four children,
also cestuis of the trust, were each to receive a fifth of the residue.
The lower court upheld the trust as valid inter vivos.7 The Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, in a 4-3 decision, finding the trust
to be testamentary and failing for want of formality. The majority of
the court presented, at different lengths, four reasons for that conclu-
sion: (1) The trust provision that the shares of cestuis be paid to the
will trustee, and the striking similarity between the distribution ar-
rangements provided under the will and the trust, were facts so inte-
grating the trust with the will that the trust was evidently testamentary
in purpose.8 (2) The trust instrument could have been probated had
it complied with the Statute of Wills, and therefore its character was
testamentary.9 (3) The purported trustee, having no more rights in
the policies before settlor's death than to hold them in safekeeping,
Pursuant to 9 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1950) §§ 64-13, 64-16.
MBickers v. Shenandoah Valley National Bank, 197 Va. 145, 148, 88 S. E. (2d) 889,
891 (1955).
8197 Va. 145 at 153, 88 S. E. (2d) 889 at 895 (1955).
0197 Va. 145 at 155, 88 S. E. (2d) 889 at 896 (1955).
This reasoning appears to be circuitous. To be admitted to probate in Virginia,
an instrument must be a will. 9 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 195o) Art. 4. And to be a
will it must be testamentary. i Page, Wills (3rd ed. 1941) § 44. To say that it can
be probated assumes that it is testamentary. The court, in giving as a reason for
its testamentary character the fact that it might have been probated absent the
Statute of Wills, assumes the conclusion which it ultimately seeks.
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was merely a custodian and not a trustee of a present trust.10 (4) Be-
cause no plan for distributing the insurance proceeds was provided in
the event settlor died intestate, the existence of a will at settlor's death
was a condition precedent to the efficacy of the trust, this factor making
the trust testamentary because the existence of a will is an uncertain
event having only testamentary significance-that is, one having no
significance independent of an intention to effectuate a disposition of
property at death."
In opposing the majority result, the dissent not only undertook
to demonstrate that settlor's reservation of rights and powers in this
life insurance trust was insufficient to invalidate it inter vivos, but went
on to define the interests actually passing to the cestuis in terms of
contingent future interests. Concerning the absence of any provision
in the trust agreement for the distribution of the policy proceeds
should settlor die leaving no will for his widow to elect to take under
or against, the dissent's conclusion was: "The trust was not in any
wise dependent upon a will except with respect to the number of
shares into which the proceeds from the insurance policies were to be
divided."12
As between the majority and dissenting opinions, the latter perhaps
gives rise to questions more fundamental to insurance trust law. In
"'197 Va. 145 at 153, 88 S. E. (2d) 889 at 895 (1955). It appears that the Bickers
trustee had no less rights in the policies than does the trustee of the usual re-
vocable life insurance trust. Lauterbach v. New York Inv. Co., 62 Misc. 561, 117
N. Y. Supp. 152 at 155 (1909) (revocable insurance trust upheld though trustee did
not even get delivery of policies or other proofs of trust, which contained his in-
structions, before settlor's death); i Scott, Trusts (1939) § 57.3 (active duties of trus-
tee and rights of cestuis may be postponed until settlor's death). Generally, it does
not seem to be doubted that the settlor may reserve "rights to change the bene-
ficiary, procure loans, take surrender value, etc." 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
(1953) 15. This may be because the subject matter of the trust may be considered
to be the policy itself, or the proceeds, or the insurer's conditional promise to pay.
Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 356 Ill. 612, 191 N. E. 250 at 252 (1934);
Dunn v. Second Nat. Bank of Houston, 131 Tex. 198, 113 S. W. (2d) 165 at 171, 115
A. L. R. 73o at 737 (1938) (and the several cases there cited).
In any event, the Bickers trustee was the named beneficiary of the policies and
was to hold his rights in that capacity in trust for the cestuis. One of those rights,
for example, has been said to be the beneficiary's right "that the policy shall con-
tinue in force as against the creditors of the insured who may seek to take its sur-
render value to satisfy a judgment," an interest which, though "a frail and fragile
one," may alone support a present trust since "[a] trust may be founded on the
slightest property interest," and that "need not be a complete or extensive inter-
est." 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1953) 27. The revocable insurance trust has
elsewhere been justified despite its being "a pretty thin trust." 1 Scott, Trusts (1939)
345.
u197 Va. 145 at 154-47, 88 S. E. (2d) 889 at 895-97 (1955)-
1197 Va. 145, 167, 88 S. E. (2d) 889, 903 (1955).
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discussing the wife's contentions as presented on appeal, the dissent
treats separately two questions which are no more than different
approaches to the same basic problem. It is there said: "Appellant at-
tacks the trusts on two grounds rather than one as stated in the ma-
jority opinion. First, she asserts that the powers reserved by Bickers
make the trust testamentary in character; and second, she contends
that no interest passed under the trust agreement prior to Bickers'
death. In either event, she argues that the proceeds from the policies of
insurance should be declared a part of Bickers' estate which passes
under his will."' 3 The essence of an inter vivos trust is the interest
which must pass before the settlor dies.1 4 Some courts directly examine
the nature of the interest acquired by the cestui to see if it is suffi-
cient to support an inter vivos trust,'5 but it appears to be more com-
mon for courts to measure the rights in, and control over, the res
which were reserved by the settlor, in order to determine ultimately
what interests remained to pass in trust.' 6 Aside from the merits of one
or the other test, the purpose is the same, and that is to discover what
property interest in the subject matter actually did change hands in
support of the trust in praesenti. 17 Thus, in discussing first "powers
reserved" and then, disjunctively, the nature of the interest passing
before death, the dissent decided the same question twice.' 8
197 Va. 145, 158, 88 S. E. (2d) 889, 897 (1955).
'-See authorities cited, note i, supra.
"E.g., Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N. E. 250 ('934); Kerr
v. Crane, 212 Mass. 224, 98 N. E. 783, 4o L. R. A. (N. S.) 692 (1912); Bose v. Meury,
112 N. J. Eq. 62, 163 Ad. 276 (1932); Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 2o Ore.
648, 271 P. (2d) 653 (1954). See also, 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1953) 27.
"E.g., Sigal v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 Ad. 742
(935); Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. (2d) 417, 125 N. E. (2d) 6oo (1955); Kendrick v. Ray,
173 Mass. 305, 53 N. E. 823 (1899); Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966
(1937); In re Voorhees' Estate, 2oo App. Div. 259, 193 N. Y. Supp. 68 (1922); Allen
v. Hendrick, io4 Ore. 202, 206 Pac. 733 (1922); In re Sheasley's Trust, 366 Pa. 316,
77 A. (2d) 448 (1951); In re Albert Anderson Life Ins. Trust, 67 S. D. 393, 293 N. W.
527 (194o); Russell's Ex'rs v. Passmore, 127 Va. 475, io3 S. E. 652 (192o). Also see:
1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1951) 479-
'71 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1951) 479; Newman, Law of Trusts (1949) 34;
Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 57, Comment h.
sThe majority opinion avoided this logical inconsistency. It would have risked
an actual contradiction had it considered separately the powers reserved by the
settlor and found them not too great to preclude a present trust, while deciding
later in the opinion that a present interest did not pass. The majority expressly
left undecided whether revocability would alone invalidate the trust. Bickers v.
Shenandoah Valley National Bank, 197 Va. 145 at 15o, 88 S. E. (2d) 889 at 892 (1955).
But the court did say: ". . .when these two provisions [revocability and postponed
enjoyment] are coupled with its intended and actual dependence upon the existence
of a valid will at the maker's death as a condition precedent to its efficacy, it is
manifest that no interest was conveyed inter vivos...." 197 Va. 145, 156, 88 S. E.
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However, after an excellent presentation of the point that a life
insurance trust, where the cestui's benefits and the trustee's active
duties are normally postponed until settlor's death, may be valid inter
vivos despite the reservation of a power to revoke at will, the dissent
did not go on to define the interest which passed under the Bickers
trust agreement. That interest passing to the children, who were to re-
ceive shares whether or not the widow elected against the will, was
said to be an alternative contingent limitation. The interest which the
widow received was a springing contingent limitation.19 Evidently
the "contingency" was the death of the settlor; the "alternative" was
that the children would get a fifth if the widow took under the will
but a fourth if she did not; and the widow's interest was "springing"
apparently in that her final enjoyment of it depended upon an election
by her to accept the will provisions.2 0 The interests were limitations
and not remainders because there was no preceding "estate" in the
insurance proceeds. 21
Such highly technical language of future interests does not seem to
be characteristic of decisions evaluating the inter vivos nature of
trusts. 22 Although future interests in personal property, even if un-
intrusted, are clearly recognized, 23 a difficult question is posed when
the mere naming of that interest which passed is judicially given as
the basis for supporting a present trust. That question is whether a
future interest in the trust fund, determined by strict analogy to estates
in land, bestows certain substantial rights beneficial to the cestui and
sufficient to support the trust in praesenti; or whether the future in-
terest is merely a description of those rights arising expressly from the
trust instrument in favor of the cestui, and which would support
(2d) 889, 896 (1955). Thus, indications of what the settlor retained were combined
with indications of what the cestuis did not get, to support the conclusion that an
insufficient interest passed for a present trust to arise.
fBickers v. Shenandoah Valley National Bank, 197 Va. 145, 165, 88 S. E. 889, 9o2
(1955).
-OSo long as the interest passing to the children is sufficient to support the
trust inter vivos, it is not strictly necessary that the wife's springing limitation
alone have been sufficient to support a trust since the reservation by the settlor
of the power to modify the trust by adding cestuis or by changing the shares of
the original cestuis does not of itself make the trust testamentary. 4 Bogart, Trusts
and Trustees (1948) § 994.
-"Minor, Real Property (2nd ed. 1928, Ribble) 1025.
-But see, for cases bordering on this approach: Kerr v. Crane, 212 Mass. 224,
98 N. E. 783, 40 L. R. A. (N.s.) 692 (1912); Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 2o Ore.
648, 271 P. (2d) 653 (1954); 1 Bogart, Trusts and Trustees (1951) 480.
=i American Law of Property (1952) § 44; 2 Fearne, Contingent Remainders
and Executory Devises (5 th ed. 1796) 26; Kales, Future Interests (19o5) § 186 et seq.;
Gray, Future Interests in Personal Property (igoi) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 52.
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the trust in praesenti even if they are not even collectively and formally
defined. This problem may be insoluble; neither writers nor the cases
seem to indicate why either the exercisable rights or the definable
legal interest should be prerequisite to the other.2 4
On the other hand, the majority opinion, in reaching a result in the
Bickers case, gave greatest emphasis to its finding that the settlor showed
his intention not to create a present trust by making the operation
of the trust dependent upon his leaving a will at death. The court
decided that the existence of the will was a condition precedent to
the efficacy of the trust and was an uncertain event within the control
of the settlor.25 Such language is characteristic of cases in which the
validity of an escrow transaction is questioned, 26 but a crucial differ-
2'Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 2o Ore. 648, 271 P. (2d) 653 at 656 (1954)
expressly left the nature of the cestui's interest undecided and upheld an insur-
ance trust on the basis of affirmative rights acquired by the policy beneficiary
(trustee) for the benefit of the cestui. Bose v. Meury, 112 N. J. Eq. 62, 163 ALI. 276,
277 (1932) describes those rights as follows: "[The trustee's] source of title was the
promise in the policies, not the trust agreement. The trust agreement is no more
than a declaration of trust by the trustee of the [cestuis], and whether [the trus-
tee] had physical possession of the policies or whether there was a stripping of
interest by the 'donor,' or that the trust deed was testamentary, is wholly imma-
terial."
In consonance with this approach, it has been held that the rights of a bene-
ficiary of a life policy, which are subject to the claims of his creditors, may not be
divested by an assignment by the insured which does not conform to the require-
ments of the reserved right to change the beneficiary. Goldman v. Moses, 287 Mass.
393, 191 N. E. 873 at 874 (1934).
HBickers v. Shenandoah Valley National Bank, 197 Va. 145 at 156, 88 S. E. (2d)
889 at 897 (1955). In this connection, the majority opinion refers to the will and the
existence of the will as having no "independent signficance." 197 Va. 145 at 155,
88 S. E. (2d) 889 at 896 (1955). It seems most likely that the court in the Bickers
case meant by "independent significance" that the leaving of a will by settlor had
no significance independent of his own continuing control over the trust. If so, this
term fits in with the perhaps doubtful escrow-type argument used by the majority
to show testamentary nature of the Bickers trust. However, the term "independent
significance" may have been borrowed from the rule of wills law that an act to
which a will refers must, in order to be non-testamentary, be one ordinarily hav-
ing a significance independent of any animus attestandi. That rule, stated in At-
kinson, Wills (1937) § 144, cannot have direct application to the Bickers case be-
cause it would require the assumption that the trust was a valid will, which it was
not. But, in examining the act there concerned-i.e., the leaving of a will by
settlor-to see if the trust itself became testamentary through dependence upon
a testmentary act, the court may have wished to determine that the act of leaving a
will has no independent signficance, within the meaning of the wills rule. This
requires the assumption that the trust depended for completion upon the act-that
is, that no trust could have arisen before the settlor died testate. But that assump-
tion is also the final conclusion because, if the trust could not be complete before
settlor's death, no interest could pass prior to death, and the trust is therefore
not inter vivos. i Scott, Trusts (1939) § 56.
HE.g., Deming v. Smith, 19 Cal. App. 683, 66 P. (2d) 454 at 456 (1937); Ullen-
dorff v. Graham, 8o Fla. 845, 87 So. 5o at 52 (192o); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 285 Ill. 570,
1956] CASE COMMENTS
ence between escrow and trust is that an escrow may not be revocable
at will whereas a trust may be and commonly is.2 7 Thus, the rule
that an escrow is defeated ipso facto where it depends upon an uncer-
tain event within the transferor's control should not be applied to
trusts.
If Bickers' failure in the principal case to provide for a disposition
of the insurance proceeds in case he died intestate was anything more
than an oversight, it might best be treated as an implied part of his
broadly reserved power of revocation.28 The court's analysis readily
conforms to that approach in that what is said there does not go be-
yond what may equally be said of the normal power of revocation. Cer-
tainly revocation is "an uncertain event within the maker's control"29
and, as such, needs no significance independent of the whim of the
settlor. Just as the absence of revocation is a condition precedent to the
cestuis' enjoyment of the benefits of any revocable trust, so might the
121 N. E. 243 at 245 (1918); McColley v. Binkley, 69 Ind. App. 352, 121 N. E. 847 at
849 (igig); Suter v. Suter, 278 Ky. 403, 128 S. W. (2d) 7o4 at 709 (1939); Eddy v.
Pinder, 131 Me. 139, 159 At. 727 at 728 (1932); Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185, 26 N. W.
426 at 432 (1886); Van Huff v. Wagner, 315 Mo. 917, 287 S. W. 1o38 at 1041 (1926);
McLain v. Healy, 98 Wash. 489, 168 Pac. 1 at 2 (1917).
2 7That a delivery in escrow may not be revocable at will: Barnes v. Spangler,
93 Co1o. 254, 25 P. (2d) 732 (1933); McReynolds v. Miller, 372 Ill. 151, 22 N. E.
(2d) 951 (1939); Payne v. Payne, 241 Mich. 547, 217 N. W. 756 (1928); Campbell v.
Thomas, 42 Wis. 437, 24 Am. Rep. 427 (1877); 3 American Law of Property (1952)
§§ 10.81, 12.67; 4 Tiffany, Real Property (Ord ed. 1939) § 1050. Iowa is a possible
exception to this rule: Tippold v. Tippold, 112 Ia. 134, 83 N. W. 8o9 (1goo).
That a trust revocable at will is, unless that power is exercised, as good and ef-
fectual as if irrevocable: Helvering v. Stuart, 63 S. Ct. 140, 317 U. S. 154, 87 L. ed. 154
(1942); Russell's Ex'rs v. Passmore, 127 Va. 475, 103 S. E. 652 at 659 (1920); 4 Bo-
gert, Trusts and Trustees (1951) § 994; 1 Perry, Trusts and Trustees (7 th ed. 1929)
§ 104; 1 Scott, Trusts (1939) §§ 37, 57 .1. "Indeed, this [right to reserve a power of
revocation] was strongly favored in the case of voluntary settlements at common
law, and such a trust, without such a reservation, was open to suspicion of undue
advantage taken of the settlor." Nichols v. Emery, 1O9 Cal. 323, 41 Pac. io8g, 1O91
(1895).
'If, as implied in Cohn v. Central Nat. Bank of Richmond, 191 Va. 12, 17, 60
S. E. (2d) 30, 32 (1950), a trust clearly made subject to express revocation by will
would be valid inter vivos, the reservation of a power to revoke by leaving, or not
leaving a will would likewise not invalidate a present trust. To place the con-
trolling emphasis on Bickers' actual intention, as does the majority opinion, it is
quite possible that Bickers merely overlooked situations contrary to his intention
to leave a will. In other words, since it was obviously his intention to leave a will,
he manifested no intention regarding distribution of the trust fund in its ab-
sence. That a will is inoperative until death should not mean an intention to die
testate may not be clearly established for other purposes, such as for the purpose
here of dispelling any suspicion that the settlor meant to control the operativeness
of a trust by leaving or not leaving a will.
nBickers v. Shenandoah Valley National Bank, 197 Va. 145, 156, 88 S. E. (2d)
889, 897 (1955) [italics removed].
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existence of a will in the Bickers case be a condition precedent to dis-
bution of the insurance proceeds, rather than to the efficacy of the trust
itself. That is not to say, however, that such a power of revocation-
i.e., revocation by dying intestate-could not be thought to extend
the powers reserved to a point where the interest remaining to pass
would be insufficient to support a trust inter vivos.
3 0
The prevailing tone of the majority opinion is established through
its frequent reference to the case as being one in which the settlor's
widow seeks to defeat the inter vivos trust.31 That fact seems to ex-
plain the weight given by the court to the similarity and integration
of the trust and will in confirming its suspicion that the over-all ef-
fect of the trust was to "evade" the widow's marital rights should
she renounce the will.3 2 It is not unusual for courts to consider whether
'An argument might be made that revocation normally requires an affirmative
act and that dying intestate, if allowed to revoke a trust, would be a passive, auto-
matic revocation not depending upon a further act by a settlor. However tenable
that point might be in another case, Bickers executed a valid will on the same
day as the trust. Thus, an affirmative revocation of that will would be necessary
in order to revoke the trust by dying intestate, even though a revocation of the
will would not work an effective revocation of the trust until the settlor's death.
"'E.g., "If this instrument, ineffectual as it is without the will, were held valid
as an inter vivos trust, . . .he will by such dependent writings, retain full con-
trol of and beneficial interest in his property until death, and at the same time
successfully prevent his widow from sharing in his estate. That is what this in-
strument was intended to accomplish to an extent materially detrimental to the
widow, and what it would accomplish if it were held valid." 197 Va. 145, 88 S. E.
(2d) 889, 896 (1955). Elsewhere the court said, in quoting Gentry v. Bailey, 6
Gratt. 594, 6o3, 47 Va. 846, 849 (i85o): "This right, by our law, on the part of the
wife, I think it clear the husband cannot defeat by any contrivance for that pur-
pose.... [SJuch an instrument, so far as regards the distributive share of the wife,
is in its nature testamentary only, and cannot affect the rights conferred upon her
by law in contemplation of his dying either testate or intestate." 197 Va. 145, 88
S. E. (2d) 889, 892 (1955).
In stressing that this particular trust was intended to deprive the widow of
her share, the court does not mention that its finding the trust to be dependent on
the will actually made it less likely so to deprive her than would the ordinary
revocable insurance trust. This is true because here, in the event there were no
will, the trust would be inoperative, as interpreted by the Bickers opinion, with the
result that the insurance proceeds would be included in settlor's estate which is
subject to her election.
2"... Bickers undertook to execute a writing... so integrated with the will then
executed as to evade § 64-16 [widow's right to share in husband's estate] should his
widow renounce." 197 Va. 145, 88 S. E. (2d) 889, 895 (1955). Assuming that similarity
between an inter vivos trust and settlor's will casts doubt on the inter vivos charac-
ter of the trust, certainly that fact should equally impugn the testamentary charac-
ter of the will.
Similarity of a trust and will has been noted before as a makeweight argu-
ment in finding the trust to be testamentary in nature. In re Pengelly's Estate, 874
Pa. 358, 97 A. (2d) 844 at 848 (1953). In Tootle-Lacy Nat. Bank v. Rollier, 341 Mo.
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the marital rights of a widow are involved in a contest over the validity
of an inter vivos transaction, but, as in the Bickers case, they usually do
not expressly indicate that the legal standards for such transactions
are influenced by that fact. 33 The uncertainty of this situation may
result from a conflict between what is probably a judicial desire to
secure a wife's rights in her husband's property and the often-stated
rule that a motive to frustrate marital claims of the wife will not
render ineffectual an inter vivos trust or other transfer which has met
the legal requirements pertaining thereto.
34
1029, 111 S. IV. (2d) 12, 16 (1937), a revocable insurance trust, the proceeds of
which were payable to the cestuis only upon certain contingencies, was upheld
inter vivos even though it was "a trust of the same nature, character, and condi-
tions and for the same beneficiary as the trust created by and 'operating under'
his [settlor's] will."
Rejecting the fact of concurrence of execution of trust and will, or similarity of
trust to the will, or fact that trustee is also executor, as indications that the trust
was testamentary: Fidelity 8: Columbia Trust Co. v. Glenn, 39 F. Supp. 822 at 825
(W. D. Ky. 1941); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat. Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa.
467, 169 Atl. 209 at 218 (1933).
It would seem that the similarity is material if it manifests an intention or
effect that the trust be ambulatory like a will, but not material if merely indicating
an intention to do inter vivos what might be done or is ordinarily done by will.
i Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1951) 476; Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 57, Com-
ment d.
uE.g., Brownell v. Biggs, 173 Mass. 529, 54 N. E. 251 at 252 (1899) (deed of con-
veyance); Walker v. Walker, 66 N. H. 390, 31 AtI. 14 at 15 (1891) (trusts reserv-
ing enjoyment and control for life); Gentry v. Bailey, 6 Gratt. 594 at 603 (Va. 185o).
If the standard for testing the testamentary nature of a contract may thus
depend upon who claims under what policy of the law, perhaps the law of trusts
might also recognize such a variable standard. However, in any system of rules for
measuring the testamentary nature of life insurance trusts, care should be taken
in cases where a widow claims a statutory share in the corpus not to find one
testamentary for reasons which would exist in no less degree if the life insurance
contract were unintrusted. Thus it must be remembered that a widow's statutory
share in life insurance proceeds is legitimately avoided merely by someone else
being the named beneficiary of a policy which may have a change-of-beneficiary
clause (analogous to a reserved power of revocation). Gurnett v. Mutual Life In-
surance Co., 356 111. 612, 191 N. E. 250 (1934).
31In Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y- 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966, 967 (1937), in which a
widow claimed a trust to be testamentary, the court said: "A duty imperfectly
defined by law may at times be evaded or a right imperfectly protected by law may
be violated with impunity, but to say that an act, lawful under common-law rules
and not prohibited by any express or implied statutory provision, is in itself a 'fraud'
on the law or an 'evasion' of the law, involves a contradiction in terms .... 'The
great weight of authority is that the intent to defeat a claim which otherwise a wife
might have is not enough to defeat the deed.' Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458,
462, 63 N. E. io68, 1o69, 92 Am. St. Rep. 426 [Holmes, C. J.], and cases there cited."
Accord: Hatcher v. Buford, 60 Ark. 169, 29 S. W. 641 (1895); Haskell v. Art Insti-
tute of Chicago, 304 Ill. App. 393, 26 N. E. (2d) 736 (1940); Small v. Small, 56 Kan.
1, 42 Pac. 323 (1895); Wright v. Holmes, ioo Me. 508, 62 Atl. 507 (igo5); Potter
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Aside from the possibility that this conflict may be resolved by
legislation, such as that passed in Pennsylvania,35 the solution might
quite properly lie in the adoption by the courts of a more demanding
legal requirement as to what interest must pass in order for an at-
tempted inter vivos trust to be valid as against the decedent-settlor's
widow. Clearly the courts, by statutory interpretation, have estab-
lished a different standard of what interest must pass before settlor's
death in cases involving inheritance, succession, and the estate taxes, so
that property considered validly transferred away by inter vivos trust
for other purposes may be subject to such taxes on settlor's estate.3 6
Writers have distinguished the cases according to whether it is the
settlor's creditors, his wife, or residuary legatees (heirs, absent a will)
who claim an interest in the trust fund over that of the cestuis. 37 Courts
sometimes impliedly observe such classifications of trust cases according
to claimants by reaching conflicting results where similar facts support
the trust, and occasionally express comment is made on the persuasive-
Title & Trust Co. v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 Atl. 401, 64 A. L. R. 463 (1928). Con-
tra: Merz v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co., 334 Mo, 1150, 130 S. W. (2d) 611
(1939)-
12o Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, ig5o) § 3oi.11 (gives a widow right to share in hus-
band's revocable inter vivos trusts as if it were part of his estate provided she re-
nounce any provision for her in his will).
-"By statute most states impose a tax on all transfers of property intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the transferor. DuBois'
Adm'r v. Shannon, 275 Ky. 516, 122 S. W. (2d) 103 at 107 (1938); Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. v. Bouse, 181 Md. 351, 29 A. (2d) 9o6 at 91o (1943); 1 Scott, Trusts
(1939) § 57.6-
"... [T]he criterion for determining whether the transfer of an interest is
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the transferor's
death is whether he retains a string or tie whereby he can reclaim the transferred
property or whether he has otherwise reserved an interest whose passing to others
is determinable by his death." Lloyd's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
141 F. (2d) 758, 760 (C. C. A. 3 rd, 1943). Applying this general test to inter vivos
trusts: Cochran v. McLaughlin, 129 Conn. 176, 27 A. (2d) 120 (1942); Kings County
Trust Co. v. Martin, 121 N. J. L. 290, 2 A. (2d) 187 (1938); In re Whittier's Estate,
256 App. Div. 377, 1o N. Y. S. (2d) 354 (1939) aff'd 282 N. Y. 613, 24 N. E. (2d) 393;
(1940); In re Glosser's Estate, 355 Pa. 210, 49 A. (2d) 4o1 (1946).
That a different measure of the testamentary character of trusts was used for
tax purposes than in other instances even before introduction of the typical in-
heritance tax statutes is demonstrated by two Pennsylvania cases: In re Lines' Es-
tate, 155 Pa. 378, 26 AtI. 728 (1893) (where trust found testamentary for impos-
ing tax); Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21 At. 8og (i89i) (where found valid inter
vivos and not part of estate subject to statutory marital rights).
31 Scott, Trusts (1939) § 57.5; Note (1951) 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 879. Instances
in which the beneficiary's interest in unintrusted insurance requires judicial evalua-
tion are classified according to the contesting parties in Vance, Handbook of the
Law of Insurance (3rd ed. 1951) § 1o8.
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ness of the particular statutory or public policy which would be frus-
trated by upholding the trust.
3
8
A remarkable example of this conflict between cases with parallel
facts is found in comparing the Bickers case with Tootle-Lacy Na-
tional Bank v. Rollier.3 9 In the Tootle-Lacy case payment of certain
intrusted proceeds of settlor's insurance was likewise to be made to
the trustee of a trust to be created under his will and only then upon
the following contingencies: "... (1) That Rollier [settlor] died testate;
(2) that his wife, Emma E. Rollier, survived him and is living; (3) that
there was a trust operating under his will; and (4) that the will has
been admitted to probate .... 140 The right to revoke by changing
the beneficiary of the policies was reserved. No cestuis were named by
the policy endorsement which served as the trust agreement. The court
inferred, construing the will and inter vivos trust together, "that
Rollier intended to adopt and make the terms and conditions and
beneficiary of the testamentary trust applicable to the trust in the pro-
ceeds of the insurance policies. . .. -41 That case differs from the
Bickers case in the one significant aspect that the parties were reversed.
In the Tootle-Lacy case, settlor's widow was cestui of the inter vivos
trust and she was opposed by a legatee claiming that the express trust
failed and that a resulting trust arose thereupon in favor of settlor's
estate. Upon these facts, the trust was unanimously declared valid inter
vivos by the Missouri Supreme Court on the ground that "the intention
to create a trust in proceeds of the policies with the bank as trustee,
See, e.g., cases cited, note 36 supra; Newman v. Dore, 275 N. Y. 371, 9 N. E.
(2d) 96 6 (1937) (trust held invalid inter vivos as to settlor's widow, decision as to
its validity for other purposes being expressly withheld); In re Pengelly's Estate,
374 Pa. 358, 97 A. (2d) 844 (1953) (public policy of protecting widow's rights re-
quires the resolving of doubts as to the inter vivos validity of a trust in her favor);
Epperson v. Mills, 19 Tex. 65 (1857) (trust "evading" the Texas forced heirs
statute applying to wills invalid whether or not it was testamentary).
Regarding the effect upon a purported inter vivos trust of the policy under-
lying the statutes restricting transfers to charities by will, compare Cleveland Trust
Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N. E. (2d) 627 (1938) (charitable trusts in praesenti
upheld notwithstanding that it accomplished what a will could not) with Worth-
ington's Adm'r v. Redkey, 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N. E. 211 (1912) (holding against
the trust because a trust created as scheme to circumvent statute limiting charitable
devises must be completely and irrevocably separated from settlor's control).
The result of a case in which creditors contest the validity of an inter vivos trust
may be determined by statutes expressly preserving their rights against all trans-
fers by decedent during his life. E.g., Thomas v. Dye, 117 N. E. (2d) 515 (Ohio
App. 1953); Green v. Seaver, 59 Vt. 602, 1o At. 742 (1887).
'341 Mo. 1029, 111 S. W. (2d) 12 (1937).
'°341 MO. 1029, 111 S. W. (2d) 12, 16 (1937).
'1341 Mo. 1o29, iii S. W. (2d) 12, 17 (1937).
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is manifest...." 42 The testamentary question was ignored altogether.
Apart from the theories for and against the reasoning of the
Bickers case, it appears that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
upon the facts there presented, followed in the spirit which it forecast
in Norris v. Barbour,43 where it struck down an otherwise valid inter
vivos trust on the ground that it was obviously a scheme to deprive
settlor's widow of her marital rights. It may well be desirable to pre-
serve for married women the benefits intended for them by the legis-
lature. But if that desire is to cause a court to hold against the validity
of a trust, such a case must be considered distinguishable from cases
where marital rights are not involved. Otherwise, cases decided under
pressure of the desire to protect widows, and resulting in trusts being
struck down as testamentary, might seriously undermine the singular
usefulness of the trust device. If the Bickers case is not so distinguished,
it will indeed place Virginia, as said by the dissent, "not in the majority
or minority class but in a class by [herself]."
44
EDWARD E. ELuS
42341 Mo. 1029, 111 S. W. (2d) 12, 16 (1937).
43188 Va. 723, 51 S. E. (2d) 334 (1949).
1,97 Va. 145, I68, 88 S. E. (2d) 889, 904 (1955). Liberal in their view favoring
the inter vivos validity of trusts are the following recent decisions from jurisdictions
other than Virginia: Farkas v. Williams, 5 III. (2d) 417, 125 N. E. (2d) 6oo (1955);
In re Sheasley's Trust, 366 Pa. 316, 77 A. (2d) 448 (1951).
